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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines four main subjects; consumer federated Internet Identity 
Management (IdM), text analysis to detect grooming in Internet chat, a system for 
using steganographed emoticons as ‘digital fingerprints’ in instant messaging and a 
systems analysis of online child protection. 
 
The Internet was never designed to support an identity framework. The current 
username / password model does not scale well and with an ever increasing number of 
sites and services users are suffering from password fatigue and using insecure 
practises such as using the same password across websites. In addition users are 
supplying personal information to vast number of sites and services with little, if any 
control over how that information is used. 
 
A new identity metasystem promises to bring federated identity, which has found 
success in the enterprise to the consumer, placing the user in control and limiting the 
disclosure of personal information. This thesis argues though technical feasible no 
business model exists to support consumer IdM and without a major change in 
Internet culture such as a breakdown in trust and security a new identity metasystem 
will not be realised. 
 
Is it possible to detect grooming or potential grooming from a statistical examination 
of Internet chat messages? Using techniques from speaker verification can grooming 
relationships be detected? Can this approach improve on the leading text analysis 
technique – Bayesian trigram analysis? Using a novel feature extraction technique and 
Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) to detect potential grooming proved to be 
unreliable. Even with the benefit of extensive tuning the author doubts the technique 
would match or improve upon Bayesian analysis. Around 80% of child grooming is 
blatant with the groomer disguising neither their age nor sexual intent. Experiments 
conducted with Bayesian trigram analysis suggest this could be reliably detected, 
detecting the subtle, devious remaining 20% is considerably harder and reliable 
detection is questionable especially in systems using teenagers (the most at risk 
group). 
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Observations of the MSN Messenger service and protocol lead the author to discover 
a method by which to leave digitally verifiable files on the computer of anyone who 
chats with a child by exploiting the custom emoticon feature. By employing 
techniques from steganography these custom emoticons can be made to appear 
innocuous. Finding and removing custom emoticons is a non-trivial matter and they 
cannot be easily spoofed. Identification is performed by examining the emoticon (file) 
hashes. If an emoticon is recovered e.g. in the course of an investigation it can be 
hashed and the hashed compared against a database of registered users and used to 
support non-repudiation and confirm if an individual has indeed been chatting with a 
child. 
 
Online child protection has been described as a classic systems problem1. It covers a 
broad range of complex, and sometimes difficult to research issues including 
technology, sociology, psychology and law, and affects directly or indirectly the 
majority of the UK population. Yet despite this the problem and the challenges are 
poorly understood, thanks in no small part to mawkish attitudes and alarmist media 
coverage. Here the problem is examined holistically; how children use technology, 
what the risks are, and how they can best be protected – based not on idealism, but on 
the known behaviours of children. The overall protection message is often confused 
and unrealistic, leaving parents and children ill prepared to protect themselves. 
Technology does have a place in protecting children, but this is secondary to a strong 
and understanding parent/child relationship and education, both of the child and 
parent. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 S. Brown (INCOSE President Elect), Personal communication, 21st April, 2009. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis represents the results of work performed during a four year placement at 
BT Research Labs. The work started with a broad investigation into Identity 
Management (IdM) resulting in a published discussion paper [9] examining the 
obstacles to Identity Management becoming established in the Retail Sector, where 
the end users are general members of the public. The main finding of this 
investigation was that that the general public are unlikely to adopt IDM technologies 
in the foreseeable future unless there is immediate tangible benefit and user friendly 
implementation.  After this investigation of the IDM space, the work moved toward 
looking at the general problem of online child protection. BTs initial requirement was 
to look at technologies that purport  to protect children from on line predators who 
may attempt to befriend them in chat rooms or via MSN, with illegal underlying 
intentions; otherwise known as Child Grooming. The initial work looked at 
technologies for detecting the difference between text chat from a child and text chat 
from an adult who is masquerading as a child. There are several issues around testing 
such technologies in that appropriate test data is not easily available. Nevertheless, 
despite the problem with data availability, in order to get a sense of the possible 
accuracy of such systems, an analysis of text from different authors was performed. 
The aim here was to establish if an appropriately trained classifier could distinguish 
between the texts of various authors. The degree of difficulty for this task was, 
reasonably, assumed to be the same as that of identifying written text of adults 
pretending to be children, compared to that of genuine children. Although initial 
results looked promising, the research established that it is indeed very difficult to 
spot subtle differences between author styles and from this we can infer that the same 
is true for separating chid text chat from pseudo child text chat. This research then led 
on to two main strands of work, the first looked at novel methods for protecting 
children on line, culminating in the development of a technique for legally placing a 
digital ‘fingerprint’ on the machine of a potential groomer, thus proving that there has 
been interaction between their machine and the machine of a child running the new 
protection software. The second strand of work concentrated on looking at the larger 
picture of online child protection and basically concluded that technology only plays a 
very small role in child protection. It is much more important to understand the 
circumstances under which children come under threat and the best ways to mitigate 
 these threats.  This last area of work is arguably the most useful to BT in that it 
provides a deeper understanding of the problem which is not immediately
the uninformed. 
 
The success of this work has led the author to become a consultant for BT advising on 
Child Protection issues. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of this thesis and how it relates to the larger field of 
Internet security. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Thesis Structure 
 
1.1 Identity Management
Users are familiar with sites that require them to sign up to websites in order to gain 
access to services and buy products. The vast majority of these sites record the 
personal details and issue them with a username and password for use with that site 
only, or perhaps other sites operated by the same organisation. Users are becoming 
overwhelmed with a plethora of online identities which has lead to password fatigue 
using the same username and password across multiple 
passwords in plain text. 
 
In addition to the problem of password fatigue users are revealing a great deal of 
personal information when registering for services and products. This i
 
identities and
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often unnecessary for the provision of services and products and increases the 
likelihood of such information falling into criminal hands and the user becoming a 
victim of identity theft. 
 
Identity management is common in the enterprise where central policy can dictate 
how and where identity is used, as well as bearing the associated costs. In the 
unmanaged consumer domain the future for identity management is much less clear. 
 
A feasibility study of consumer Internet identity management and federation revealed 
that while no insurmountable technical challenges exist, user interest, user experience 
and business model are a significant barrier to a new identity metasystem. In the short 
to medium term there will be no significant changes to the consumer Internet identity 
management space. Users will continue to reveal personal details when signing up to 
a new product or service. Products and services will continue to identify users with 
usernames and passwords. More security conscience platforms, typically those 
providing financial services will increasingly use one time passwords and other 
hardware tokens. Without a severe breakdown in Internet trust and security, this status 
quo is set to remain. The author has presented a conference and journal paper [9] 
detailing this study. 
 
1.2 Online Child Protection 
The major theme of the author’s research was online child protection - this began as a 
project to see if child groomers can be identified from the contents of online 
messages. During this work the author reviewed the literature in order to gain a 
broader understanding of the problem, this lead to an expansion of the work into a 
systems driven meta-analysis of the problem space. During the ongoing meta-analysis 
a side project was completed that allowed ‘digital fingerprints’ to be left on the 
computer of individuals who chats with a child on the MSN .NET Messenger Service. 
 
Is it possible to detect when a child may be chatting to a groomer based on the content 
of the conversation? No longer can parents see who their children are chatting with, 
this makes keeping them safe increasingly onerous. Children often conduct online 
friendships in chat rooms, by instant message, email and social networks. These 
conversations can be in real time or time lapsed. Research has evaluated the feasibility 
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of detecting potential grooming by conducting statistical analysis on the features of 
text based conversations. A novel technique of feature extraction and classification - 
building ‘sliding windows’ of character strings and Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) 
is described and tested against the leading text classifier – Bayesian trigram analysis. 
 
Experiments revealed that obviously differing text, for example sexual explicit 
conversation as might be found in grooming could be reliably detected. More subtle, 
long term grooming is much harder to detect and the reliability of classifiers drops 
accordingly. Ultimately the novel feature extraction and GMM classifier proved 
unsuccessful and was inferior to the current leading technique. 
 
With ever more children enjoying online friendships the possibility of being groomed 
also increases. A method has been devised to create a ‘digital fingerprint’ by 
manufacturing a unique emoticon using steganographic principles. This digital 
fingerprint can be left on the computer of anyone who chats with a child by exploiting 
properties of the MSN .NET Messenger Service. This works as a transparent 
background function and involves no hacking. At some later time the 
emoticon/fingerprint can be recovered, for example during a law enforcement 
investigation and used to prove the recipient engaged the child in conversation. A 
function of the chat clients changes the file contents if the emoticon is reused by the 
recipient eliminating false positives. 
 
The meta-analysis examined the online child protection domain from a systems 
perspective. This indicated that perception of the issues and parental fear is largely 
disproportionate to reality, driven to a significant degree by media and political 
interest. The analysis revealed that the dangers facing children are essentially the 
same they have always faced; only the delivery agent, the Internet, has changed. 
 
Solicitation, bullying and exposure to unwanted material are the main risks facing 
children. Solicitation is rare and children handle it well, similarly the majority of 
children were unfazed when exposed to unwanted material. Bullying is not 
uncommon and may be a source of long term emotional distress. 
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Technology does have a part to play in protecting children, especially younger naïve 
children; it is much less important where older, head strong, technologically 
competent teenagers are concerned. Social measures including education and family 
relationships are more powerful tools for protecting older children. 
 
A significant factor retarding progress in the field is a lack of agreed definitions, 
standards and metrics which prevents any side-by-side comparison of data and means 
scientifically rigorous work on a subject can produce widely differing results. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 examines the existing situation, the requirements of a new system and high 
level perspective of how such a system would work. It discusses two possible futures 
for consumer identity management and the conditions each would require and the 
barriers to a new system. 
 
 
Chapter 3 describes the text analysis work; it investigates the various approaches to 
feature extraction, entropy handling and classifiers performance and suitability to 
task. It also describes the novel feature extraction and GMM classifier and the 
experiments against the current techniques. 
 
Chapter 4 details the steganographed emoticon / ‘digital fingerprint’ project; it 
discusses the birth of the emoticon, how the emoticon is manufactured, the operation 
of .NET Messenger Service, the use of hashes to identify the emoticon and the 
experimental work. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the Internet child safety meta-analysis; it uses the systems 
approach to examine the problem space from a holistic perspective. It examines the 
complexity inherent in a social problem of this size, it looks at stakeholders, 
technologies, human factors and behaviours, media and political involvement, the 
risks facing children and how these can best be addressed. 
 
Chapter 6 recaps the key points from each chapter and discusses the conclusions 
drawn from the findings. 
16 
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2. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
The explosion of online applications, services and websites has lead to an equally 
large plethora of credentials – usernames, passwords and one time password (OTP) 
key fobs and card readers. With few exceptions each website, service or application 
requires separate registration, username and password. This multiplicity of accounts 
has led to ‘password fatigue’ - insecure practices such as writing down passwords in 
clear text and using the same username and password for multiple accounts. In 
addition users are supplying personal information to numerous organisations (the 
website and service operators), often with little knowledge of how secure, or 
trustworthy these organisations are. 
 
In the real world identity documents often assert specific claims about the user, for 
example being over 18, or possessing a driving licence. The traditional username / 
password approach of Internet security lacks the functionality necessary for users to 
prove such assertions. 
  
There has been much hype and evangelising in the blogging community [1] [2] about 
the coming identity revolution. Often this refers to a federated identity metasystem2, 
where users possess a portable (use anywhere) identity, are able to assert specific 
claims and control the disclosure of personal information. At present there has been 
only limited realisation of this. 
 
At the root of the Identity Management3 (IdM) challenge lays the design and structure 
of the Internet. It was not designed to support digital identities; the current approach 
of username / password has evolved organically over time to meet the needs of a 
single provider (website or service) but is inadequate to meet the needs of the modern 
Internet. Attempts have been made to address these problems – most notably 
Microsoft Passport4 - but, for a variety of reasons, they have met with failure – the 
lack of provider and consumer buy-in, a closed proprietary approach, inadequate user 
                                                 
2
 An interoperable architecture based upon multiple underlying technologies and providers.  
3
 Defined as an individual’s ability to manage their identity as they join, leave and interact with an 
organisation. 
4
  https://accountservices.passport.net/ppnetworkhome.srf?vv=800&mkt=EN-GB&lc=2057 (accessed 
on 23 June 2010). 
 controls [3], lack of privacy [17], data l
silo [18] and the lack of a decentralised architecture [19].
 
A new breed of IdM systems promises to meet the needs of the modern Internet 
providing the existing functionality of logging
individual claims about the individual (age for example)
domains (different websites and services)
 
2.1  Circle of Trust and nomenclature
Although the language, implementation 
they all employ the notion of a Circle of Trust
Identity Provider (IdP) is the repository for user information and personal details. A 
Reliant Party (RP) is any platfor
currently be required to login to. Rather than each RP being an isolated silo of user 
information, the identification process (of consumer to RP) is mediated by an IdP 
the IdP testifying to the user’s 
 
Figure 2 - Circle of Trust 
 
The need for a new identity system is not in doubt, but users are not ready to embrace 
it [4]. At present only a handful of IdPs exist on the In
limited functionality. There are no signs now, or in the short term future, that an IdP 
will emerge to offer non-trivial functionality, such as online retail or online banking to 
consumers. 
 
oss (expose) and a lack of security of the data 
 
-in but also being 
and be portable across 
and place the user in control of disclosure. 
 
and design goals of the various systems differ 
 (see figure 2). In identity parlance the 
m, service, website or application that a user would 
identity and providing any credentials the RP requires.
 
ternet and they provide very 
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by 
able to verify 
 
– 
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This chapter of the thesis will examine what is necessary for a workable identity 
metasystem to emerge, what the common goals are and why this will not happen 
without a culture change among users in the Internet community. IdM has made 
successful inroads in the enterprise with products from the likes of Microsoft5 and 
Oracle6 offering identity management within and between organisations. The 
enterprise controls and administers the identity of its employees (within the scope of 
their employment); it also controls the RPs, the various systems employees need to 
access. It does not need user buy-in or support from RPs. Unlike the democratic 
nature of the Internet, the enterprise is able to mandate IdM with carte blanche, this 
accounts for the success of enterprise IdM. In this chapter the focus will be on 
consumer IdM, that is, the management of individuals’ identity as they use the 
Internet. 
 
2.2 Features and Goals for a Successful Identity Metasystem 
To avoid the failings of Passport a successful identity metasystem will have to follow 
common goals and features. 
 
• Federation – Users need one identity (or a limited number) and use this to 
provide their identity anywhere with Single Sign On (SSO) capability, much 
as an individual can use a credit card anywhere. There will likely need to be an 
existing relationship between the IdPs and RPs. 
 
• Login Security – Passwords are often a weak link; weak passwords are at risk 
of cracking, complex passwords are often written down by users. Multi-factor 
authentication, in the form of hardware based or mobile phone OTP are 
suitable for this purpose. 
 
• Information Security – Identity theft has been on the rise in recent years [5], 
for an IdP to gain traction users must be confident their IdP can protect their 
personal information. 
 
                                                 
5
 http://download.microsoft.com/download/3/a/f/3af89d13-4ef4-42bb-aaa3-95e06721b062/ADFS.doc 
(accessed 09 June 2010). 
6
 http://www.oracle.com/technology/products/id_mgmt/index.html (access 09 June 2010). 
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• User Centricity – Consensus suggests that users want to be in control of how 
and when their identity is used [6] and should be able to withdraw from a 
transaction if an RP requests excessive information. Users must be able to 
control how information is released in order to maintain privacy, for example 
when using adult services, online gaming or simply separating their work and 
private lives [7] [8]. 
 
• Standards – To ensure interoperability between IdPs and RPs a common 
standard or suite of standards is necessary, without which the system is 
unlikely to be adopted by users. 
 
2.3 Internet Revolutions 
Martin, Durbin, Pawlewski and Parish [9] argue that IdM will not see a sudden surge 
in user uptake typically seen in ‘Internet revolutions’ such as email, social networks 
and VoIP. Each of these ‘Internet revolutions’ is very different to what came before, 
but has a real world counterpart  (mail, offline social networks and telephones) but 
the Internet introduced a key selling point7 – added functionality, speed, convenience, 
accessibility or price. The technology itself isn’t necessarily revolutionary, the 
emphasis is on user experience and how it changed the nature of user interaction. 
 
Real world revolutions are driven by grass roots individuals, rapidly gain support and 
usurp the previous administration. Similarly ‘Internet revolutions’ quickly gain in 
popularity among users and replace (or compliment) what came before. 
 
Increased or improved security adds no ‘useable’ feature that users can enjoy – it does 
not effect the user experience, it hardens (the security) that already exists. Individuals 
are frequently concerned with security only once it has failed, this can be observed in 
the mindset ‘it does the job’, indeed users may not be aware of, or understand the 
issues and risks surrounding security [15] [16]. This has inhibited a grass roots 
interest among consumers which seems unlikely to change without a cultural shift in 
attitudes. 
 
                                                 
7
 ‘Selling’ in terms of selling an idea or concept, rather than a transaction for goods or services. 
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2.4 No Business Model 
The long term success for any organisation is dependent on its business model, 
essentially how it generates funding. Numerous business models exist including 
selling products or services, advertising, external revenue e.g. charitable donations or 
subsidy. Unsustainable business models were responsible for the failure of many 
organisations in the Internet ‘dot-com bubble’ [102].  
 
There are no IdPs that support financial transactions and none operate with financial 
institutions (banks, credit card companies). At present IdPs only support simple, non-
financial applications such as blogging. The general public is resistant to paying for 
services on the Internet (particularly those they currently receive for free) and there is 
no incentive for RPs (retailers, service providers, banks, etc) to fund IdPs.  
 
Customer records and transaction histories are a rich source of marketing information 
providing retailers and service providers opportunities for upselling and cross-selling. 
Some organisations even sell customer records and mailing lists to marketing 
organisations. Surrendering this information to IdPs, reducing to a minimum amount 
the customer data they held, would curtail a potentially lucrative revenue stream for 
RPs. 
 
When a fraudulent transaction takes place the credit card company or bank, in the 
absence of negligence (on the part of the consumer), absorbs the loss as an operating 
cost and refunds the consumer. If a financial loss was incurred as a result of failings at 
an IdP, the IdP would likely be liable. If a fraudster managed to comprise an 
individual’s account they could conceivably have access to all the user's financial 
details (current account, savings, mortgage, shares, and credit cards). If a fraudster 
successful executes a series of attacks or worse, a class attack8 - the liability exposure 
could run into millions of pounds. In 2007 retailing umbrella group TJX (owners of , 
among others TJ Maxx) agreed to pay banks $40.9M after up to 100 million credit 
numbers were sniffed (intercepted) from insecure networks [10].  
 
                                                 
8
 An attack against a class of products or services, e.g. a vulnerability in Windows XP. 
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With neither customers nor RPs willing to providing a revenue stream and the 
potential of enormous liability exposure, the business model appears unsustainable. 
 
2.5 The Identity Management J-Curve 
Given the status quo, the appearance of a non-trivial identity metasystem seems 
improbable. Could a catastrophic breakdown in trust and security on the Internet (with 
associated financial losses) force the issue to the fore and provide the required 
impetus? 
 
Consumers are resistant to paying for IdPs as a solution already exists and levels of 
identity theft are low. Millions of people in the UK have seen their personal 
information exposed, either through identity theft or data mismanagement [11], but 
the consequences have been few. As a percentage of the total number of records lost, 
the number of individuals suffering financial loss or credit rating difficulties is low. 
Without this financial penalty much apathy surrounding IdM will likely remain. 
 
The J-Curve is used in economics, political stability, medicine and elsewhere. 
Bremmer [12] uses the J-Curve to plot the relationship between political stability and 
government openness – when moving from a closed, secretive state, to an accountable 
democracy, national stability suffers. Martin et al [9] use the J-Curve (see figure 3) to 
illustrate how a breakdown in Internet trust and security would lead to an open 
federated identity ecosystem i.e. things will have to get worse before they get better. 
 
Moving to the left of the J-Curve would improve identity security and stability 
through the hardening of information silos and processes (proprietary protocols, 
complex passwords, OTP devices). This would do nothing to address the underlying 
issues of IdM and security improvements might prove temporary until Internet 
criminals discovered and exploited new vulnerabilities. 
 
  
Figure 3 - The IdM J-Curve 
A move to the right would see the rise of IdP
infrastructure based on open standards. Initially this would see a reduction in security 
as the ecosystem suffered ‘teething problems’ (as a result of improper configurations, 
user confusion etc). Over time the ecosystem w
improve – the more consumers, 
the more security and stability would improve. In addition to improvements in 
security and stability the federated IdM approach would also
failings in the current siloed approach.
 
The current state of the IdM ecosystem is to the left of the trough, for an immediate 
improvement in security it would be necessary to move to the left. Indeed this is 
happening in the online banking world 
(though not an online process) i
banks have issued OTPs to customers, these are providing security improvements but 
at the expense of convenience and add
an ideal state of affairs; 
 and RPs operating in a federated 
ould ‘settle down’ and security would 
IdPs and RPs adopting the federated IdM approach
 address the underlying 
 
– the launch of ‘Chip and PIN’ in the UK 
s an example of a hardening procedure. Some UK 
ress none of the larger IdM issues. This is not 
more desirable would be a move to the right, with open 
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protocols, federated infrastructure and user centricity featuring minimal disclosure 
and a consistent user experience. 
 
2.6 Moving Towards a New IdM System 
The current state of IdM is not sustainable. Sources estimate that 25% of UK adults 
have had their identity stolen or know someone who has [13]. These figures are 
increasing year-on-year – see figure 4. If these levels and the losses associated with 
them become endemic this could provide the impetus necessary to see a modern IdM 
metasystem take hold. As more and more individuals continue to incur losses, there 
maybe a sea change which finds the public willing to pay for IdPs. Comparisons can 
be drawn with the uptake of anti-virus, anti-malware, anti-spam and other Internet 
protection software that was driven not by popularity or novel features, but by the 
necessity of protecting users and computers on the Internet. These Internet protection 
products are only popular because of the ubiquity of Internet threats, a considerable 
rise in identity theft and in particular personally incurred financial losses would be 
necessary to realise this affect to the IdM ecosystem. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Identity Theft Complaints (Source FTC [5]) 
In the absence of consumer driven change in the identity ecosystem, the government 
could mandate the use of Internet IdPs. This might be feasible within the UK banking 
sector, but would likely meet limited success in retail and service provision. Any 
government mandated requirements would only be enforceable in the country of 
origin and would doubtfully see the universal uptake necessary to reform IdM. 
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Lack of user education, user understanding (of the larger problem) and user concern 
are retarding a federated IdM metasystem. Users aren’t aware that an alternate 
approach exists, nor of the advantages it offers. This might provide an opportunity for 
government intervention, in the form of education and awareness. In the UK the 
government participates in a joint venture called Get Safe Online9 to provide free 
advice on Internet safety. If suitable IdM infrastructure did exist, the government 
could use this platform, or one like it, to assist in user education and promotion. 
 
2.7 Technologies of Interest 
Among the new crop of IdM technologies two are particularly worthy of mention -
Microsoft CardSpace10 and OpenID11. 
 
CardSpace [14] from Microsoft is a cryptographically secure product based on the 
InfoCard standard, developed around the ‘Identity Laws12’ of project champion Kim 
Cameron. The project is open, extensible and encourages third party contribution. 
This approach overcomes the failings of Passport, but still has the penetration and 
market share of Microsoft Windows. CardSpace is a standard feature of the Vista and 
Windows 7 operating systems and an option for Windows XP. Despite this a 
CardSpace infrastructure has yet to emerge. 
 
OpenID is a lightweight browser-driven (requires no additional software) SSO tool, 
based on standard web protocols. OpenID is significant because it has been subject to 
grass roots driven success – it’s popular in the blogging community where visitors can 
comment on blogs without registering, by logging in with their OpenID. OpenID is a 
decentralised protocol that requires no existing relationship between IdPs and 
(OpenID enabled) RPs. An inherently insecure protocol OpenID is susceptible to 
‘phishing’ attacks and unsuitable for financial transactions. OpenID now has support 
for CardSpace hardening it against this type of attack. 
 
                                                 
9
 http://www.getsafeonline.org/ (accessed on 17 June 2010). 
10
 http://www.microsoft.com/windows/products/winfamily/cardspace/default.mspx (accessed on 18 
June 2010). 
11
 http://openid.net/ (accessed on 18 June 2010). 
12
 http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2004/12/09/thelaws.html (accessed on 18 June 2010). 
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2.8 Conclusion 
The need for a modern federated IdM metasystem is clear and though common in the 
enterprise, it has not found success in the consumer market. There is no business 
model to support the operation of an IdP, users see it as offering nothing exciting and 
will not pay and there may be extensive liabilities involved. Businesses will be 
unwilling to pay and not keen to surrender customer details that offer a wealth of 
marketing opportunities. 
 
The Identity J-Curve illustrates the current state of consumer Internet IdM, as present 
society is some way left of the trough and moving further left. This move to the left is 
being driven by the rise in fraud and identity theft. It has led to a hardening of identity 
silos, enforcing of complex passwords and proprietary, per application OTP devices. 
The IdPs that do exist only offer access to low value applications such as blogging. 
 
The challenges are well understood, the technologies and protocols necessary to build 
a functioning identity metasystem exist today. As long as customers are unwilling to 
pay, businesses remain resistant to loss of control and no other business model arises 
the short-to-mid-term outlook for IdM will be a continuation of the status quo. This 
will be a continuation of more username / passwords, complex passwords, OTPs and 
hardware devices. Should there be a breakdown in Internet trust and security, this may 
provide the impetus necessary to seed a modern federated IdM metasystem. If a 
significant percentage of online transactions are fraudulent and consumers are 
financially exposed to losses and the inconvenience associated with identity theft, 
they may be willing to pay for an IdP. This might find support from banks and credit 
card providers if losses become endemic (indeed, financial institutions would make 
ideal IdPs). In the event of a serious decline in Internet trust and security a 
government sponsored push perhaps from the US or EU might also provide the 
traction required to launch a successful identity metasystem. 
 
2.8.1 Facebook as an IdP 
Facebook13 is a hugely popular social networking site with over 500 million active 
profiles [20], it stores a considerable amount of personal data about users (name, 
address, email address, instant messaging ID, phone number, and photographs), it also 
                                                 
13
 https://www.facebook.com/ (accessed 15 May 2011). 
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maps relationships with friends, and events the user has been invited to. Much of the 
personal data an IdP would require is already held by Facebook. 
 
The Facebook platform is a set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that 
allows third party developers to integrate into Facebook and access its core features. 
The platform components of particular interest to IdM are 
• The Graph API – provides access to the ‘social graph’ - objects (users, photos, 
events, pages, etc) and the connections between them (friendships, shared 
interests (‘Likes’) shared content, photo tags). 
• Authentication – Single-Sign On (SSO) across web, mobile and desktop 
applications. 
• Facebook Connect – enables Facebook members to login to third party 
applications using their Facebook identity. 
 
These components align closely with some of the features necessary for an identity 
metasystem; the Graph API holds the information and allows legitimate relying 
parties access to it. The authentication mechanisms provided a SSO in a unified 
customer experience, and Facebook Connect allow the identity to be federated. 
 
When a user installs an application into their profile the application lists the 
permissions (the access to other data) it requires and the user is able to withdraw from 
the transaction at any stage. SSO is naturally part of any identity management system, 
but Facebook Connect enables users to authenticate to thirds parties (relying parties) 
without a separate registration process. The login credentials remain inside Facebook, 
the third party in merely assured the user has been adequately verified by Facbook, 
this approach helps increase security and privacy for the user.  
 
Facebook is in reality lacking some key IdP qualities, namely security and privacy. It 
has leaked data through misconfigured systems [21], has allowed developers easy 
access to unnecessary personal information [22] and plays host to SPAM and other 
social engineering attacks [23]. 
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At the moment and, in the author’s opinion in the short to mid-term Facebook is not 
suitable as an IdP for financial transactions and it is difficult to imagine a bank 
entering into a partnership with them. However it is likely to see increased use as a 
low value identity broker. If Facebook tightens or adapts it security model (perhaps 
firewalling off certain details) this could see it become an IdP Facebook would have 
difficulty adapting its business model to increase privacy (indeed its business model is 
uncertain anyway [24] [25]), so if it were to become an IdP it might not be a ‘model’ 
example as envisaged and described. 
 
2.8.2 Government Intervention 
The late-2000s saw a series of banking crisis throughout the world, with banks being 
propped up by governments using a range of economic measures. A similar crisis 
(probably with a large Internet dimension e.g. a loose of confidence in banks as a 
result of massive Internet fraud) could see governments stepping in again but 
requiring the banks to support an identity metasystem (perhaps by becoming IdPs as 
part of the bail out).  
 
2.9 Business Impact 
Federate identity management has made significant inroads in the enterprise and 
academic environments; here the organisation provides and controls the user’s 
identity and typically serves as the IdP. The organisation funds these services as they 
provide superior security and efficiency. The organisation also controls the 
infrastructure where the identity is used or has contractual agreements with partners 
when the identity is used beyond its immediate control. This differs from the 
consumer model; consumers are unwilling to pay for a technology they perceive as 
currently being free, and relying parties are unwilling to surrender their identity silos 
which are a rich source of sales and marketing information. While the technology 
exists and is suitably mature, without the emergence of a sustainable business model 
the status quo will continue.  
 
This work provided BT with a clear understanding of how the consumer market 
differs from that of the enterprise and academia, and how without a catastrophic 
breakdown in Internet trust and security this market cannot be readily capitalised. BT 
should remain current with the technology and continue to observe developments 
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(technical, legal and social), but not launch any products or services until a viable 
revenue stream emerges. 
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2.10 Identity Paper 
The following paper, in addition to being reported within BT was presented at The 
Fourth International Conference on Legal, Security and Privacy Issues in IT Law 
(LSPI) and published in the International Journal of Liability and Scientific Enquiry. 
It expands on some of the ideas presented in this chapter. 
 
 
Future Vision of Identity 
T. Martin, C. Durbin, M. Pawlewski, and D. Parish 
T. Martin, C. Durbin, M. Pawlewski 
BT, e-mail: {thomas.2.martin, chris.durbin, mark.pawlewski}@bt.com 
D. Parish 
Loughborough University, e-mail: d.j.parish@lboro.ac.uk 
Abstract This paper presents two possible visions of the future, one where the 
status quo of consumer Identity Management remains largely unaffected by the emerging 
technologies, the other where these new technologies gain popularity and wide-spread 
acceptance. More importantly, we give arguments that support both futures occurring. 
The object of this exercise is to try to enumerate those obstacles that lie in wait for the 
mainstream acceptance of any significantly new approach to Identity Management, 
before we can determine how they are overcome. 
1. Introduction 
There is a commonly held belief that the management of digital identity online will be ‘the next big 
thing’. There is no shortage of literature on the subject, nor supporters for the cause14. It is generally 
agreed that a new approach to Identity Management (IdM) in the digital world would be beneficial (in 
this paper, we refer to IdM as the management of individual’s identity as they join, leave and interact 
with different organisations). The enterprise space has many Single Sign-On (SSO) federation tools 
such as PingFederate15 
and Active Directory Federation Services16; Shibboleth17 has made inroads in academia; consumer IdM 
services include CardSpace18, OpenID19, Sxipper20, and Higgins21. Despite the availability of these 
technologies to assist in implementing new IdM strategies, there is no clear evidence that these 
approaches to IdM would be adopted on a wide scale basis in the foreseeable future (Bennett, R. 2009). 
 
There is overwhelming evidence that current IdM is failing us. Many internet websites now require 
some form of registration of user credentials and individual users are now faced with the task of 
remembering a number of usernames and passwords. This multiplicity of user accounts has exploded to 
an extent where user frustration known as ‘password fatigue’ frequently leads to insecure practices 
such as employing the same username and password across multiple sites i.e. different websites and 
services. At the root of the problem is the fundamental flaw that the internet was not designed, but 
evolved without a uniform system of digital identity in place. There have been numerous attempts to 
solve this problem, such as Microsoft Passport, but many of these have failed leaving a scattering of 
inconsistent, ad hoc, partial solutions (Bertocci, V., Serack, G., & Baker, C. 2008). 
 
However, the promise of the new crop of Identity Management systems extends beyond managing the 
glut of usernames and passwords. One of the wider challenges is to provide users with immediate 
                                                 
14
 See http://identityblog.com (accessed 07-06-08) or http://confusedofcalcutta.com (accessed 09-07-08). 
15
 http://www.pingidentity.com/products/siteminder.cfm (accessed 12-07-08) . 
16
 http://www.microsoft.com/windowsserver2003/r2/identity_management/adfswhitepaper.mspx       
   (accessed 14-07-08). 
17
 http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/ (accessed 15-08-08). 
18
 http://www.microsoft.com/net/windowscardspace.aspx (accessed 11-08-08). 
19
 http://openid.net (accessed 19-06-08). 
20
 http://www.sxip.com/sxipper (accessed 23-08-08). 
21
 http://www.eclipse.org/higgins/ (accessed 12-06-08). 
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access to websites sites where they have not already enrolled but do meet the requirements for access, 
e.g. being over 18 years of age and possessing a valid credit card. In this type of scenario a user would 
need to be enrolled with an Identity Provider (IdP) who performs the task of mediating between the 
user and 
the web site (Relying Party (RP)). Although there is clearly a need for new Identity Management 
systems that meet the challenges of the modern internet, it is evident that users are not ready to use 
such systems (Harrington, E. 2004). There are currently only a handful of IdPs available on the internet 
and these provide very limited functionality. There is no sign, now, nor on the horizon, that an IdP will 
emerge and provide genuinely useful functionality such as access to e-commerce sites (e.g. 
amazon.com), or online banking. 
 
There are many reasons why the small IdPs that do exist are currently confined to activities such as 
blogging communities and social networking sites. We explore both, these reasons, and also the forces 
pushing for advances in IdM. 
 
The aim of this paper is to explain why early attempts at IdM have failed to find grassroots acceptance, 
why the current status quo of separate information silos is unsustainable and what road blocks exists to 
a successful Internet-wide IdM landscape. 
 
1.1. Document Structure 
Section 2 gives an overview of the state of the art in Identity Management. Section 3 splits into two 
parallel threads. The two threads represent two contrasting possibilities for IdM. Section 4 then 
provides guidance on how progress can be made, based on the arguments and possible consequences 
from Section 3. 
 
2. Identity Management Overview 
In this paper, we look at a number of different approaches to the management of identities and the 
developing trends they are taking. This covers the complete life-cycle of digital identities, as well as 
related issues of federation, privacy and standards. While we discuss different technologies, we are 
largely concerned with higher level issues. The main differences we wish to explore are between 
current, well established methods, and newer experimental approaches that are being put forward. 
Current methods largely use username/password authentication tied to an email address, coupled with 
detailed personal information on the user, and restricted to a single domain (siloed). The new Identity 
Management approach/technology/framework will be discussed in Section 2.1, but broadly attempts to 
give more control to the user and enable better cooperation between organisations. The IdP manages 
the identity for the user and can attest their identity to the RP. The RP is spared the trouble of user 
administration, and the user’s convenience can give a better customer experience.  
 
From the technology perspective, interactions can be viewed as being enterprise or consumer. In this 
context, enterprise interactions refer to those where the general pubic is not involved. As such, these 
interactions would be between companies, governments or between companies and governments. 
Consumer interactions, on the other hand, refer to interactions where at least one of the parties is an 
individual from general public. The distinction between consumer and enterprise is made here because 
it has a bearing on the type of technology that can be deployed. Enterprise Identity Management is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2.1. Consumer Identity Management 
The situation for consumer applications (consumer as defined above) is much more complicated in that 
the scope of the problem is less well defined; interactions are more complex and the end user, i.e. the 
general public, has got to ‘buy in’ to the proposition. As such there are very few advanced Identity 
Management systems currently available, and the technology is still in its infancy. There are many 
different approaches to this problem, but the consensus favours the user-centric model (Cameron, K. 
2005). User-centric Identity Management is based around the premise that identity is personal 
information and should be under the control of the identity subject. With the current model, Identity 
information is scattered across a wide number of organisations with the user having little control over 
how this information is used. 
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2.1.1. Technologies of Note 
Two technologies feature heavily in this paper - Microsoft CardSpace (Chappell, D. 2007) and 
OpenID. CardSpace is a cryptographically hardened approach based on extensible open standards, with 
support for third party IdPs and user generated self-issued cards. OpenID is a lightweight, browser 
driven, SSO tool based on existing web protocols. Inherently insecure (‘phish-able’), it has nonetheless 
found favour in the blogosphere. OpenID now features CardSpace support - maintaining the ease of use 
whilst being hardening against attack22 (Fox, K. 2007) (Jones, M. 2008) (Recordon, D. 2007). 
 
Higgins23 is an open source project from the Eclipse Foundation which presents an umbrella approach - 
a flexible data model, portable across platforms, inclusive of multiple technologies and protocols. 
Higgins aims to unite various approaches and deliver an identity meta-system. 
 
2.1.2. Main features for successful IdM  
Federation – A user should be able to enrol with a provider and use their identity anywhere, much as 
they would with a credit card. A credit card is provided by a financial institution but can be used 
anywhere. 
 
Login Security – Passwords can be a weak link in the login process, multi-factor authentication is a 
good method for mitigating this weakness. Hardware devices such as One Time Password (OTP) ‘key 
fobs’, or transmitting an OTP to a mobile phones are often used for this. 
 
Information Security – Loss of customer records leading to identity theft is a source of concern to 
consumers. They must have confidence in their provider, this confidence stems from good business 
practises backed up with secure technology. 
 
User Centricity – Users want to be in control of their information, they should be aware of what 
information RPs are requesting, and should be able to cancel a transaction if they feel the RP is being 
too invasive. 
 
2.2. Common Goals 
Looking at current IdM solutions, it is clear that there are a number of common goals. First is some sort 
of Federated Infrastructure. Members of the public access numerous domains on a daily basis. 
Federation at the least ensures a consistent experience, and can provide Single Sign-On (SSO). Users 
enter their authentication credential’s once, to gain access to a range of sites. 
 
Most solutions are also promoting the user-centric model. This puts the user at the centre and in control 
of all transactions that involve any aspect of their identity. All transactions from the IdP to a RP are 
approved by the user before being passed onto the RP, and the reverse is also true. There may also be a 
trust relationship between the IdP and the RP, but this is only essential for transactions where the RP 
requests specific information that 
requires some form of underwritten guarantee. 
 
Interoperability between technologies is an essential ingredient for the widespread take-up of IdM. If 
IdM is to become pervasive it is likely to stem from disparate technologies being able to interact via a 
common infrastructure, and able to cope with different technologies and users having multiple 
identities. Within a consumer context users may want to support a range of identities, for instance 
purchasing of adult content, online gaming, etc, may be transacted under a different alias to your 
employment identity for instance. As individuals conduct more business and leisure online the ability 
to separate these personae and maintain privacy will become increasing important (Fish, G. 2009) 
(Bennett, R. 2009). Work in this area includes WS-*24 and Liberty Alliance. 
 
 
3. The Prospects for Identity Management 
                                                 
22
 http://www.identityblog.com/?p=668 (accessed 10-10-08)  and http://www.identityblog.com/?p=659 (accessed 10-10-
08). 
23
 http://wiki.eclipse.org/Higgins (accessed 25-09-08). 
24
 http://www.w3.org/2002/ws/ (accessed 30-09-08). 
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This section primarily concentrates on Consumer IdM, which has yet to realise its potential. The 
sections present two possible directions for Consumer IdM. 
 
Figures from the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) show cases of reported identity theft 
increased from 31,140 case per year in 2000, to 313,982 in 2008, see Figure 1. Although there is much 
variation in the figures during that period the overall trend shows identity theft increasing. The real 
number is likely to be considerably greater, the figures only represent cases reported to the FTC - 
people may simply report suspected cases of ID theft and fraud to their bank and credit referencing 
agency. The FTC data (Finklea, K. 2009) supports an argument that the current approach to IdM is 
failing, and will continue to see identity fraud increasing until it plateaus out and remains at a level that 
fails to provide the critical mass necessary to drive the adoption of a new identity meta-system. 
Alternatively identity fraud may become so endemic that the public will embrace a more radical 
approach, even if this leads to even more fraud in the short-to-medium term as the system is rolled out. 
 
 
Figure 1 – FTC Identity Theft Complaints 
 
3.1. Bleak Future 
The future predicted in this section is one where all the new technologies being introduced in Identity 
Management fail to take off. The existing siloed approach of single domain identities remains in place. 
The main argument given for this is user acceptance. The approach taken here is to try to learn from 
past experiences about what has been done to change user behaviour and to apply this to Identity 
Management. 
 
3.1.1. Internet Revolutions 
In its short history, the Internet has gone through many changes. Some of these changes have been slow 
and gradual, but most have been new technologies (or uses of existing technologies) that have become 
extremely popular, very rapidly. To capture the latter type, we define the word “revolution” to mean 
any technology that:  
 
• Changed how people used the internet 
• Was very different from what came before 
• Became very popular, very quickly 
 
The emphasis is on user experience. The technology itself need not be revolutionary, nor is it limited to 
looking at commercially motivated/driven revolutions. Nevertheless, technological advances are 
typically components of these revolutions and new business models quickly spring up around them. 
 
3.1.2. Properties of a successful Revolution 
The following are a list of technologies that qualify as revolutionary, (as defined above) - www, e-mail, 
search engines, VoIP, social networks and MMOs/Virtual Worlds. 
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The choice of these seven technologies as revolutionary is, we hope, uncontroversial. Each has changed 
the way people use the internet (although strictly speaking, the web and e-mail did not change how 
people used the internet so much as cause people to use it). Each is significantly new in terms of how it 
is used (real-world parallels will be discussed later), although some may be arguable (e.g. VoIP has 
similar predecessors in Instant Messaging, IRC, etc., but the speed, convenience and usability 
differentiates it). The time it took each of these technologies to become popular has certainly varied. 
But each of them has enjoyed a period of rapid growth to the point of receiving media attention. Rather 
than failing to live up to the hype, each has continued to grow in popularity. There are several 
characteristics that are clearly common across all these revolutions: 
 
Each of the technologies listed has an equivalent real-world activity. E-mail equates to mail, VoIP to 
telephone, search engines to directory enquiries, social networks on-line are just another type of social 
network. These parallels with the real world may increase take-up by making it easier to understand. 
This does not contradict the requirement that each revolution be very different to what came before. 
 
Naturally, these technologies are not identical to their real-world counterparts. It is not enough that 
each differs, but in order to become popular they all had to provide advantages over their real world 
parallel. The main improvement is speed (consider the difference in time it takes to deliver email 
versus regular mail), but there can also be increased convenience (search engine) and reduced cost 
(VoIP). The technology must also provide a functional benefit and not be a technological fad. 
Immediate acceptance is not necessary but people should be able to envisage themselves using it. 
 
Each of the technologies listed serves a desired purpose, which could be considered a consequence of 
the parallel in the real world. It must be something that people want and will use, not just technology 
for the sake of technology. 
 
3.1.3. Why IdM will not be revolutionary 
Most of the criteria for the definition of an ‘Internet Revolution’ can only be judged in hindsight. When 
applied to IdM, how much it will change how people use the internet will need to be seen, and how 
quickly it grows in popularity is what we are trying to determine. The third criterion, that it must be 
very different to what has gone before, is open to debate. The solutions being proposed in the field of 
Identity Management are all trying to replace the existing widespread use of individual 
username/password. No matter how different the new user experience will be, at heart they will still be 
“logging in” to a service. This already suggests that IdM will not be revolutionary, at least as far as our 
definition goes. The broader significance of this is that there is an existing solution that for all its flaws 
“does the job”. Replacing this solution will require changing the habits of those who are of the mindset 
“if it’s not broken, don’t fix it”. Having described in the previous section those properties that we see 
as common to all Internet Revolutions, the following discussion justifies how they largely do not apply 
to IdM. 
 
The problems the new identity frameworks are addressing (weak authentication, proliferation of 
personal data, masquerading and misdirection attacks) exist in some form in the real world, but are 
nowhere near as serious or as widespread. None of the proposed solutions can be said to have true real 
world counterparts. One may argue that CardSpace, with its credit card like interface for the card 
selector, is an embodiment of a wallet. Authentication in CardSpace is not based on a physical object 
that can be used 
anywhere, and it is strongly tied to the host computer. Using your CardSpace ‘wallet’ on any computer 
(as you would use your actual wallet in any store) is being researched, but it has not been at the core of 
the original design (Bertocci, V., Serack, G., & Baker, C. (2008). The addition of portability will 
certainly introduce problems in usability and/or security. 
 
One approach to identity management that would make everyone’s life easier is universal SSO from a 
single provider. All users would enjoy a consistent experience, would only need to authenticate once, 
and could be protected from attackers by a trusted entity. This is the Microsoft Passport approach. All 
subsequent proposals have pointed to its failure and worked on how to avoid repeating it. There will be 
a plurality of Providers, and a plurality of technologies that interoperate. Each of the proposed systems 
would no doubt curtail the password fatigue people now experience, but forcing users to learn and use 
many new technologies in parallel will undo this benefit. The CardSpace interface, for example, is 
visually very different from a website username / password. Even OpenID, based entirely on web 
protocols refers the users back to the OpenID provider. This maybe daunting and confusing to the nave 
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user. There is also an inherent problem with complexity. The definition of user-centric places the user 
in control. On the one hand, this can increase security, provide privacy, anonymity, control of 
acceptable use/transfer of personal information. On the other hand, being placed in control, the user 
now had to make decisions on these subjects. This control does have benefits, but convenience is not 
one of them. 
 
The sales pitch for any of the new identity frameworks is a hard one. One selling point is security, but 
that has always struggled to get the population at large excited. Convenience is arguable, depending on 
how many solutions gain acceptance. The question is, how do you convince the man-in-the-street to 
adopt any of these new technologies? They serve a purpose, but because it is a purpose that is already 
being served (admittedly in a less than satisfactory manner) there is a momentum that needs to be 
fought. 
 
3.1.4. What this means for IdM? 
We have described many properties of several internet revolutions and given justifications of how these 
have contributed to their success. We have argued that these same properties are not shared by the new 
Identity Management approaches. While not being sufficient to claim that these approaches are 
doomed to failure, we believe we can state that they will not enjoy anything like the rapid growth in 
popularity of other technologies. These are very real hurdles to gaining widespread acceptance and 
either they must be mitigated, or a more aggressive deployment must be used. 
 
3.1.5. Business Model 
There are no IdPs available for sites where financial transactions take place and there are certainly no 
IdPs for internet banking applications. It is abundantly clear that the public would not pay for an IdP 
service and RPs such as retailers or banks are also unlikely to pay to provide such a service for their 
customers. Customer records provide a rich source of marketing information, organisations will be 
reluctant to surrender control of this to an IdP25. Aside from the fact that no financial mechanism to 
support the growth of an IdP has been found so far, there is also the issue of liability if the IdP data 
becomes compromised. An IdP would have to underwrite the risk and potentially have to pay 
significant compensation to users if things go wrong. In a nutshell the case for becoming an IdP is to 
provide an IdP service that no one is currently willing to pay for and underwrite the risk if things go 
wrong. The current situation with banks and credit card companies is that many of them absorb the 
losses for their customers who are the victims of banking and credit card fraud. From the customer’s 
point of view this arrangement works very well. If an individual is subjected to fraud, then at most they 
will suffer the inconvenience of re-establishing their bank or credit cards, but are unlikely to suffer 
financially. There is therefore very little incentive for a banking customer to use an IdP (if one existed), 
unless it was free and also offered at least the current level of protection that financial institutions offer. 
This lack of business model is the crux of the problem and is arguably the main reason that there is 
currently no serious internet IdPs. 
 
3.1.6. Bleak future summary 
If IdM had many properties in common with the previous revolutions we discussed, then its success 
would seem likely. The fact that it does not is no proof that it will fail. But it does raise a valid 
question: “How can we convince the population at large to adopt a significantly new technology 
requiring a similar level of effort as they have been asked before, but without as clear a benefit?” 
 
3.2. Promising Future 
In this section, we describe how we see a new identity framework being established. We will not be 
trying to directly counter the arguments of the previous section, but rather assume a watered-down 
version of their conclusions. The new identity framework will not arrive quickly on a wave of popular 
support, but there are forces pushing us in this direction. We will describe these forces and show how 
they will eventually reach the common goals identified in Section 2.2. 
 
We start this section with some very high level arguments, describing various trends that support our 
case. We also delve into specific areas that are moving us towards new approaches in Identity 
                                                 
25
 Google checkout (http://checkout.google.com accessed 06-01-09), allows customers to buy products from retailers. 
This is more of a payment service than an IdP and its success is tied to both the Google brand and the incentives Google 
provide for participating sellers. 
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Management. Finally, we look at the success of OpenID, and how it already provides many of the 
desired features of the new identity framework. 
 
3.2.1. The Identity Management J-Curve 
Section 3.1 described many hurdles to the successful adoption of an identity framework. We will 
describe how a major catalyst that could cause significant change in Identity Management, namely in 
the form of some catastrophic breakdown in security on the Internet. Although millions of people have 
had their personal information exposed either by identity theft or poor information management (Oates, 
J. 2007) and security practises the authors do not considered this a catastrophic breakdown. Very few 
people (as a percentage of the number of lost records) have incurred any financial loses or suffered any 
detriment to their credit history. Certainly not in sufficiently high numbers to overcome the inertia and 
apathy currently surrounding IdM 
 
In order to understand the conditions that need to exist for widespread take up of new IdM technology, 
it is important to understand the J-Curve phenomenon. This basically predicts that things have to get 
worse before they get better and can be applied to a wide range of areas such as economics, medicine 
and political stability. In his book “The J Curve - A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and 
Fall” (Bremmer, I. 2006), Ian Bremmer explains that countries follow a J-Curve when moving from a 
state of isolation to a state of openness. Similarly, the J-Curve can be proposed as a way of modelling 
the potential changes in Identity Management. 
 
A J-Curve for Identity Management is shown in Figure 2. In this context, the Openness axis refers to 
the degree of openness of the technology (standards vs. proprietary) as well as of the approach (use of 
Federation, transparency, etc). Moving to the right along this axis implies fewer standalone siloed 
approaches to identity and moves towards federated approaches. The Stability axis refers to the degree 
of security of the user experience, as well as the durability of the parties involved. Movement up the y-
axis implies increased identity security and decreased volatility. 
 
 
Figure 2: J-Curve representing IdM adoption 
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The current position of IdM is somewhere to the left of the lowest point on the curve. This is an 
interesting position to be at, because it can be seen that immediate increased stability would only be 
obtained by moving to the left. This implies the application of additional siloed security measures. 
Interestingly, this is precisely what is happening with current banking security. The introduction of 
chip and PIN is an example of this, and more recently, in the UK, the introduction of EMV (Europay, 
Visa, MasterCard) card readers and one-time password tokens for secure banking internet access. 
Nevertheless, with the introduction of increased siloed security measures comes an increased “user 
fatigue”, this time not by the need to remember a multitude of passwords, but by the need to remember 
to carry a variety of hardware paraphernalia to facilitate secure internet access. 
 
In the long term, it would be more desirable to move to the right. An open platform can give a simpler 
user experience, provide transparency and minimal disclosure (reducing the problems of identity 
abuse), and place the user in control. But opening up the technology will, in the short term, cause 
problems experienced by any new technology. In the early change-over period, users will inevitably 
make mistakes and become confused with the new technology. At this stage the technology is 
relatively immature and will certainly contain vulnerabilities. This can be seen in the OpenID standard, 
which is well known to be susceptible to phishing attacks. This is the dip in the J-curve, and the reason 
why the long right side of the dip is a longer slope: it is more difficult to take this path, but ultimately 
more rewarding. 
 
3.2.2. Gradual Move Towards New IdM Technologies 
It is estimated that a quarter of UK adults have had their identity stolen or know someone who has 
fallen victim to ID fraud26. With these figures increasing yearly it is entirely possible that Internet users 
will, perhaps reluctantly, start to use new IdM systems in order to protect their electronic interests. This 
take up would be more analogous to the take up of anti-virus software or anti-spam systems, being 
necessity rather than popularity driven. No one can say for sure what level Internet fraud would have to 
reach before widespread adoption, but it would seem that current levels are insufficient. 
 
The entrenched usage of username/password is simply not scalable, and not sufficiently secure. But 
once users start to “vote with their wallets” against password fatigue and identity theft, there may be an 
impetus to change. This pushback by the users to bring about positive change, as we describe in the 
next section. 
 
 
 
3.2.3. User Education 
A definite barrier to the take up of new IdM technologies is the level of awareness of the public. This is 
such a problem that there are now government backed campaigns designed to raise awareness of the 
general problem of internet fraud and identity theft. Get Safe Online is one such campaign that 
provides straightforward advice for the general public27. The level of this advice is extremely basic, 
advising people not to publish their identity information (name, phone, number, home address) on 
public web pages or social networks such as Facebook. The fact that it seems necessary to advise the 
public on some very fundamental steps to protect their identity perhaps highlights the scale of the task. 
On one hand there are the IdM experts talking about the merits of IdPs, SSO, OpenID and CardSpace 
technologies and on the other is the general public leaving their personal information on websites for 
the world to see. There is a chasm between the two groups and this clearly needs to be bridged before 
the general public will accept and use new IdM technologies. 
 
3.2.4. Compliance with Legislation 
With internet-based identity fraud growing rapidly, it is feasible that the Government could mandate 
compulsory IdM technologies for online financial transactions. The exact makeup of these technologies 
is open to debate, but this is already happening to an extent with the introduction of the APACS 
(Associates for Payment Clearing Services) specification for two-factor online authentication standard 
which stipulates that banks should use two factor authentication for banking transactions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4311693.stm (accessed 24-03-09). 
27
 http://www.getsafeonline.org (accessed 02-08-08). 
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3.2.5. Learning from OpenID 
OpenID is by far the most popular IdM system available on the Internet. The most important positive 
aspect of OpenID is the fact that it is not a centralised identity service, users can choose which IdP they 
are happy to entrust with their identity information. This decentralised nature means that the whole 
system does not fall apart if one IdP goes out of business. Users can even set themselves up as their 
own IdP. The main aspect of OpenID that attracts users is in its ease of use, with only one user name 
and password to remember. 
 
There are also positive benefits to the website operators in that they can simplify user registration, a 
well known obstacle for signing up new users. Organisations are protected in that they no longer need 
to store personal identity information which potentially could be lost or stolen from their server 
(causing both financial and reputation damage). 
 
OpenID has a strong following and a very supportive community. While it is generally agreed that 
OpenID does not address the real problems in Identity Management it is still relatively young and there 
is time for the OpenID technology to evolve into a credible IdM technology, and for others to learn 
from its success. 
 
3.2.6. Promising future summary 
There is no doubt that the battle for the general acceptance of new IdM technologies is only just 
beginning. The evolution of these is potentially going to stem from the current trivial uses such as 
OpenID in social networking and in blogging applications. Popularity of the technologies in these 
communities could fuel a demand for widespread use of more advanced, secure systems. The fact that 
OpenID is notoriously insecure is somewhat irrelevant, people are using it. The desire for ease of use 
and convenience will 
fuel demand for new IdM technologies. Systems based on OpenID and Microsoft CardSpace will no 
doubt emerge as the front runners and with this, the technology will evolve to meet the stringent 
security requirements required for commercial/financial transactions. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have discussed two potential, contrasting, futures for the management of identity in the electronic 
world, and have given rational arguments to support both views. 
 
The Bleak Future predicts that very little will change in the foreseeable future and asks the question: 
“How can we convince the population at large to adopt a significantly new technology requiring a 
similar level of effort as they have been asked before, but without a clear benefit?” The Bleak Future, 
although perfectly feasible and valid as a potential outcome, is not very interesting from the research 
perspective. If it is believed that this outcome is likely, then it would seem that the best course of action 
would be to resist wholesale overhauls of identity infrastructures, and make minor, iterative changes to 
existing systems. 
 
The Promising Future predicts that new identity management techniques will slowly start to grab a 
foothold and will gain widespread acceptance throughout the digital world. If this direction does prove 
to be the correct one, then this raises a number of interesting questions both with regard to technology 
and to the emerging attitudes towards digital identity. The predominant players (Card Space, Liberty 
Alliance and OpenID), may find opportunity to combine their technologies into an all encompassing 
meta-system. Any security shortcomings in these systems could be shored up with the relevant 
technologies, i.e. biometrics, hardware tokens, etc. 
 
Despite the pessimistic outlook of Section 3.1, there is no denying that there is a need for a change to 
the way we manage our personal identities on-line. By being wary of the pitfalls and possible road-
blocks, a safer and more prosperous future can be made real. 
 
In the short term the identity ecosystem will follow the path of the bleak future, seeing a proliferation 
of username/password, OTP and other proprietary siloed approaches, pitting service providers against 
thieves and fraudsters in a game of cat-and-mouse. If service providers can keep fraud to an 
‘acceptable’ level the status quo may remain in place. If identity fraud increases to levels that cannot be 
tolerated it is likely that a new identity meta-system as described in the promising future will emerge. 
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3. TEXT ANALYSIS 
More and more children are using the Internet for both education and leisure. Many 
children converse with friends in chat rooms, by Instant Messaging (IM) and via 
social networks. This may entail the continuation of ‘real world’ friendships online or 
meeting contacts and forming relationships in a purely Internet setting. 
 
In the real world it is relatively easy for parents to meet and keep track of their 
children’s friends. On the Internet this is more difficult. People can easily conceal 
their true identity and adopt a completely different persona. Groomers and abusers 
who wish to harm children are known to communicate with them via text based 
mediums. It is important to ensure children are protected from the dangers that such 
individuals pose.  
 
The following chapter investigates the feasibility of developing algorithms that can 
differentiate between children chatting to their genuine friends and the same children 
chatting to adults attempting to groom them. The basic premise here is that the style 
of text chat between genuine friends is likely to be different to that of text chat 
between a child and a groomer. The extent of this difference will certainly vary from 
case to case. At one extreme the groomer can be very blatant and direct using a 
language style that can reasonably easily be detected via simple word/phrase spotting 
techniques. Statistics from [1] suggest that 80% of groomers fall into this category. At 
the other extreme the child groomer can be much more subtle in their approach, it is 
this type of grooming that is of interest here. In considering subtle child grooming, the 
main questions are 1) to what extent can subtle child grooming be detected using an 
automatic system? and 2) can existing techniques be improved?  
 
The general problem of detecting grooming activity in text chat is similar to that of 
detecting spam email. In both cases (spam detection and grooming detection) the 
challenge is to detect text that doesn’t fit the model of a bona fide email, for the case 
of spam, or bona fide text chat for the case of a child groomer. Arguably, the degree 
of difficulty of detecting spam is similar to that of detecting a reasonably blatant child 
groomer, but as the grooming style becomes more subtle, the difficulty of detection 
increases. Spam detection is also easier in that generally for a spam email the majority 
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of its content will indicate that it is spam, but for grooming text chat, only a small 
fraction is likely to be blatant sexual grooming. 
 
3.1 Text based Internet conversations 
Message boards, news groups, email, IM, chat rooms and social networks allow users 
to participate in conversations on the Internet. These conversations can be 
synchronous, where the text chat is a two-way real time exchange, or they can be 
asynchronous where the chat is over a message board where several hours (or longer) 
may elapse between entries.  
 
Instant Messaging, a synchronous chat tool, has experienced an explosive growth in 
recent years. In February 2006, 82 million Europeans (49% of the population) used 
IM [2]. In Canada 56% of children use IM, 27% use it every day [3]. 58% of children 
aged 12-17 have a social networking profile [1].  
 
Modern media rich Internet applications are blurring the traditional lines between IM, 
chat rooms and social networking sites. The key issue is that all use text based 
communications. Statistics [1] indicate that 77% - 86% of online solicitations occur 
over chat or IM sessions. 
 
 
3.2 Automatic Grooming Detection 
The following section describes a set of experiments that were designed and run in 
order to establish the feasibility of detecting grooming through text based channels.  
The immediate difficulty in designing such tests is that there is not a sufficient text 
corpus available to evaluate a) build models to represent grooming style text chat and 
b) testing the robustness of these models. 
 
There is one well known test corpus, the Perverted Justice (PJ) corpus that is publicly 
available but the text in this corpus falls into the category of being highly blatant text 
chat exchanges which would be easy to detect with simple word spotting techniques. 
 
In order to create a test which is more realistic than the PJ corpus, a number of texts 
from different authors were chosen. The task was to establish if it is possible to 
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differentiate between the writing styles of different authors. The rationale being that 
this task would be the same level of difficulty as that of differentiating between the 
writing style of a child and that of a groomer masquerading as a child.  
 
 Four source texts were selected - On the Origin of Species - Charles Darwin, 
Fahrenheit451 – Ray Bradbury, Nineteen Eighty-Four - George Orwell and The War 
of the Worlds – HG Wells. Three of these texts Fahrenheit 451, Nineteen Eighty-Four 
and The War of the Worlds are broadly similar works of science-fiction. On the 
Origin of Species is substantially different – it is a piece of scientific literature that 
introduced the concept of biological evolution.  
 
This makeup was chosen to determine if the algorithms would detect that one text was 
substantially different from the others. The assumption here is that harmful chat 
would be substantially different to children’s everyday chit-chat. It is of course not 
ethical to expose children to harmful material in order to test classifier performance.  
 
The texts are of various lengths but were normalised to the length of the shortest work 
(Fahrenheit 451). 
 
Each book was divided into multiple 500 word test sets and a single (per book) 5,000 
word training set. Each book was divided in eighty-two28 sequential 500 word test sets 
and one 5,000 word training set. In all books the training set began at word 15,000. 
No test sets where subsets of the training set [ trainingtestset ∉ ]. 
 
3.3 Classification Tests 
Three categories of test were performed. These were: 
 
• Simple trigram 
• Bayesian 
• Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) using a novel feature extraction technique 
 
Each is explained below. 
                                                 
28
 As a sanity check each training set was also tested again itself. 
  
3.3.1 Simple trigram 
As a baseline, a simple trigram
trigrams in a 500 word test set and counts how many times each trigram appears in 
each reference training set of 5000 words. Thus if, for example, the first trigram is 
most popular in the work: 
author gets a vote. This is performed for all trigrams and the author with the most 
votes is deemed to be the author of the unknown (test) text. Trigrams are used because 
they have been shown to be optimal in text classification [4].
example of trigram harvesting.
Figure 5 - Trigrams 
 
3.3.2 Bayesian 
Bayesian classification is considered by many to be the leading method for use in text 
classification (particularly in spam detection) [5] [6] [7] [8].
 
Bayesian analysis allows probabilities to be revised in the light of new evidence.
 
“Bayes' theorem, in the context of spam, says that the probability that an email is 
spam, given that it has certain words in it, is equal to the probability of finding those 
certain words in spam email, times the probability that any email is spam, divided by 
the probability of finding those words in any email:
 
|( wordsspamp
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 A trigram is a ‘token’ of three words
29
 counter was tested. This examines each of the 498
“On the Origin of Species - Charles Darwin”,
 Figure 5 illustrates an 
 
 
 
” [9] 
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 then this 
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Bayes’ equation allows conditional probabilities to be calculated. Typically a 
classifier will measure the probability of a sequence of words being spam when 
matched against a spam model. 
 
For the purposes of differentiation between authors, Bayes’ equation is applied as 
follows: 
 
There are four models m1 to m4 corresponding to the four authors and there are a 
number of test tokens (trigrams), N. 
 
Each test token is compared against each of the four models. This gives four P(o|m)  
values P(o|m1),  P(o|m2),  P(o|m3),  P(o|m4).   
 
Strictly speaking P(m|o) is required, but in reality the actual value of P(m|o) is not 
required. It is only necessary to know which of the four [(P(m1|o),  P(m2|o),  
P(m3|o),  P(m4|o)] is the highest. This then corresponds to which of the models, m1, 
m2, m3, m4 is the most likely. 
 
The relative ranking of P(m|o) can be inferred from the relative ranking of four 
P(o|m) values [P(o|m1),  P(o|m2),  P(o|m3),  P(o|m4)]. From Bayes’ equation P(m|o) 
can be calculated from P(o|m): 
 
)(
)()|()|(
oP
mPmoP
omP =  
 
P(o) is the probability of an observation o, irrespective of which author it comes from.  
 
P(o) is not known. However, in this case it is constant and in general it would be 
reasonable to assume that it is always constant or changing very slowly.  
 
Similarly, for this test P(m1) = P(m2) = P(m3) = P(m4),  
 
and  
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P(m1)/ P(o) = P(m2)/ P(o) = P(m3)/ P(o) = P(m4)/ P(o) = K 
 
 
Thus, in general P(m|o)= P(o|m).K 
 
This means that the highest P(o|m) will correspond to the highest P(m|o). 
 
Each training and test set is divided into tokens – three word trigrams. The probability 
of each unique token appearing in the text i.e. P(o|m) is calculated as the number of 
times the token appeared divided by the total number of tokens in the (training) 
dataset. 
 
rOfTokensTotalNumbe
pearsmesTokenApNumberOfTi
moP =)|(  
 
 
The probabilities for P(o|m) are very small and therefore Log probabilities are used in 
order to maintain precision. 
 
 
3.3.3 Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) 
This approach to classification is based on GMM techniques which are widely used in 
many areas of pattern recognition and notably in speech technology [10] [11].  
 
The author developed a novel feature technique extract to generate vectors for 
GMMs. The technique produces a sequence of vectors, each vector having a number 
of coefficients. The following example illustrates the feature extraction technique. In 
this example four coefficients are used per vector. 
 
Consider a sentence extract such as ‘The cat sat on the mat’ taken from a large body 
of text. In vector form this can be represented as: 
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Figure 6 - Feature Vectors (Underscores represent spaces) 
The first coefficient refers to letter pairs (tokens lengths of 2 letters), the second 
coefficient refers to letter triples (token lengths of 3 letters)and so on. 
 
These vectors (figure 6) are further processed into a normalised frequency of 
occurrence. 
 
Suppose the letters “Th” occur 100 times in the body of the text, the “Th” in figure 6 
is replaced by 100. Similarly other letter sequences are replaced by their frequency of 
occurrence. If “he” occurs 75 times then “he” is replaced by 75. Figure 7 shows 
numerical coefficients. 
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Figure 7 - Vectors representing frequency of occurrence 
Clearly “The” will occur less that “Th”. 
 
The final stage of the feature technique is to normalise the coefficients. Each 
coefficient is divided by the total number of equivalent size tokens in the texts i.e. the 
first coefficient would be divided by the total number of letter pairs in the text sample. 
Similarly the second coefficient would be divided by the total number of letter triples. 
 
In general, if there are N characters in the text sample, then the number of tokens is 
given by  
 
M = N - L + 1 
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Where M is the number of tokens and L is the number of letters in a token. 
 
The algorithm is case sensitive and includes punctuation to maximise entropy. 
 
 
3.4 Results 
During development and in initial testing the GMM method appeared to function well 
and results were promising. With a larger, statistically significant data the method 
proved unreliable. 
 
Table 1 lists the results by classification technique and author (book). The 
unreliability of the GMM method is clear. It is further apparent that the Bayesian 
method offers superior classification to simple trigram matching. 
 
 GMM Bayesian Simple 
Bradbury 1.2% 81.2% 67.1% 
Darwin 1.2% 100% 100% 
Orwell 55.4% 91.5% 89% 
Wells 84.3% 85.4% 84.1% 
Average 35.5% 89.5% 85.1% 
Table 1 - Classification results matrix 
 
As Darwin is substantially different from the other works it is expected a good 
classifier would detect this.  
 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Despite successful application in other pattern matching fields and the initially 
promising results the GMM method can be considered a failure based on these results. 
 
The method should perhaps not be completely discounted. Statistical researchers may 
find that changing the token structure to words, altering the token length, or varying 
the number of coefficients may improve the quality of classifier. Word stemming and 
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stop word removal may also improve accuracy. The classifier may prove beneficial in 
other areas of text analysis such as text mining. Varying in the attributes in the GMM 
(number of modes) may also improve classification. 
 
Although the headline figure for the simple technique is similar to the Bayesian score 
the classifier was significantly poorer at detecting Bradbury. 
 
The initial assumption that detecting grooming is similar to detecting spam is 
supported by these findings – Bayesian classification appears the best technique at 
present. This assumes that grooming chat (like Darwin in the experiments) is 
significantly different from regular chat. Even differentiation of the similar texts was 
encouraging. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Chatting online is a popular activity among children and parents are rightly concerned 
about their children’s safety and whom they might be chatting. Monitoring and 
reviewing a child’s online conversation can be onerous especially if the child spends 
long periods online or uses lingo and slang with which the parent is unfamiliar. 
 
In an effort to improve the safety of children participating in text based conversations 
on the Internet a novel feature extraction method was developed and combined with a 
GMM classifier. The hope was this approach would prove superior to existing 
classifiers, more accurately determining whether a child was chatting to a groomer. 
The approach was based on techniques commonly used in voice biometrics and 
speech processing. 
 
Bayesian classifiers are popular for ‘undisciplined’ text (informal text, as used in 
‘everyday’ conversation that may feature poor spelling, grammar and syntax) and 
have proved very successful in spam detection.  
 
The novel/GMM method performed proved to be a wildly unreliable classifier, 
significantly worse than the current leading approach – Bayesian classification. 
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Statistical researchers may find interest in the approach and might be able to 
significantly improve the classifier, but the author believes that Bayesian represents 
the best choice in this environment. 
 
The value of automated protection methods when social factors are considered is 
critiqued in chapter 5. 
 
3.7 Business Impact 
This work has demonstrated that the Novel/GMM approach to text analysis though an 
interesting research exercise is ineffective and even with the benefit of further work is 
unlikely to improve on the current leading method, Bayesian trigram analysis. 
  
The systems analysis of the problem space (chapter 5) questions the ‘real world’ 
performance of technologies attempting to detect grooming and sexual predation. 
Blatant grooming can certainly be detected but the subtler form (where the groomer 
shows attention, interest and affection in their victim) are identical in nature to teen 
dating. While the providers of anti-grooming technology keep experimental 
methodologies, training data and test data secret their results should be treated 
sceptically. This work has shown BT that such technology is of questionable value 
and should not be pursued further at this stage.  
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3.8 Text Analysis and Message Review Paper 
The following paper, in addition to being reported within BT was presented at The 
Fourth International Conference on Legal, Security and Privacy Issues in IT Law 
(LSPI) and published in the Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Technology. It describes a method for grooming detection using automated analysis 
including the techniques discussed in this chapter to flag messages of concern for 
anonymous human review. 
 
A Pseudonymous Peer-2-Peer Review System for 
Child Protection On-line 
T. Martin, C. Durbin, M. Pawlewski, and D. Parish 
T. Martin, C. Durbin, M. Pawlewski 
BT, e-mail: {thomas.2.martin, chris.durbin, mark.pawlewski}@bt.com 
D. Parish 
Loughborough University, e-mail: d.j.parish@lboro.ac.uk 
 
Abstract Children are using the internet more and more, and from a younger age. 
This is despite the commonly known dangers of predators. There is no policing of the 
internet, nor would it be possible to instigate. Parents are in the difficult position of 
trying to monitor and control their children’s internet usage, when more often than not 
the children know the technology better than they do. This can lead to either ineffective 
measures, or measures that the children will deliberately circumvent for their own 
privacy. There are also technical issues that are far from trivial. The problem of 
distinguishing the dialogue of a child from a predator pretending to be a child is 
extremely difficult. This paper presents a solution which can accurately identify threats, 
while satisfying the apparently conflicting needs for safety of, and privacy for, the 
children. 
1. Introduction 
This paper looks at the problem of protecting children from on-line stalkers/predators. A recent survey 
of 1,500 children (aged 10-17) in the United States found that approximately 1 in 7 (13%) received 
unwanted sexual solicitations, and 34% communicated online with people they did not know in person 
(Wolak, Mitchell & Finkelhor, 2006). This often took the form of crude or vulgar comments in chat 
rooms - the victims were not bothered and handled the situation well. However some victims felt 
traumatised and some are targets of aggressive online solicitations (Mitchell, K., Finkelhor & Wolak. 
2007). There is also a growing gap between what children do online, and what their parents think they 
are doing (Lemish, 2008). With the increased importance of the internet in all of our lives, there is 
more and more pressure on children to be active on-line, and from a younger age. The dangers 
permeate almost the entire internet, and change rapidly as the technology evolves. Parents are ill-
equipped to protect their children through no fault of their own, but (partly) because while they did 
grow up in a society where these threats existed, they did not exist in this new form. Today’s 
reductions in barriers to communication have made the problem of protecting children much more 
complex. Children are often taught not to talk to strangers but with the variety of social interactions 
available today, teaching a child to block all communications from unknown parties would be 
challenging to even the most technically minded parent. This is probably undesirable too (Wolak, 
Finkelhor, Mitchell, & Ybarra. 2008) 
 
This area has understandably received a lot of attention. There is a wide variety of content-control 
software available to prevent children from accessing illicit material. This mainly works by blocking 
known URLs, but also by dynamically analysing the content. While by no means trivial, this problem is 
limited in that it is only the content being sent to the child that needs analysis. These approaches do not 
apply to two way interactions. Firstly, blocking entire sites/protocols is not necessarily desirable as 
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some safe use may be allowed (or else the child would be motivated to try work around the blocks). 
Secondly, the danger a predator poses is not merely displaying unwanted material to the child, but in 
arranging a meeting outside the parents’ control. This can (and may) be done without mentioning 
anything overtly sexual. Predators are a danger because they can effectively mimic normal child-to-
child conversations. If nothing else, one half could be simply copied and pasted from other 
conversations between actual children. The only difference may be in attempting to meet in person. 
 
This paper discusses the existing approaches to online child protection and the conflicting requirements 
of the parent and the child in a moderated approach to chat. It presents an idea for a system of 
anonymous review with various options for added functionality, along with a justification of the 
system. The penultimate section expands on the two key technical components – pseudonymous 
messaging and intelligent text analysis. 
 
2. Previous Work 
Existing approaches to online child protection typically fall into the following broad categories Block, 
Review, Filter and Moderate. To enable the reader to better understand the problem domain these 
approaches and the weaknesses associated with them are examined. 
 
Blocking restricts access to protocols and applications deemed “unsuitable”, for example peer-to-peer 
(P2P) networks or Instant Messaging (IM). Operating in a simple deny/permit fashion can make 
blocking something of a blunt and unwieldy tool. This lack of flexibility restricts its usefulness only to 
situations where something must be prohibited. 
 
Reviewing technologies vary in type and application but the core ethos is to allow the parent to monitor 
the child’s activity. Website histories, messaging logs, emails, even full replay of video conference 
sessions maybe recorded. This may be impractical if the child is an avid internet user or in families 
with multiple children. Reviewing also suffers from problems of privacy (older children are 
particularly sensitive about their privacy and may be tempted to circumvent the system) and the 
generation gap - parents may not be able to penetrate youth lingo and slang. 
 
Filtering may be considered a subset of blocking, usually applied to restrict access to websites 
considered unwholesome in content. Filters generally consist of blacklisted (or whitelisted) URLs, or 
dynamic blocking of websites based on content - typically examining sites for a list of proscribed 
keywords and phrases. Each of these methods suffers drawbacks - blacklisting often involves content 
labelling, sites labelled as containing certain content are blocked. Labelling is performed by the website 
operator (who may not be aware of the labelling scheme or may neglect to use it). Some providers of 
filtering software manually review sites but this is an unscalable approach and the quality of this 
filtering has been brought into question as has its subjective nature (National Research Council. 2002).  
 
Many internet forums use moderation to enforce rules, edit posts, and ban disruptive users, trolls and 
spammers. Some child oriented forums, including those of the BBC30, operate a process of pre-
moderation - each message is examined before it is posted. Moderators are trained to screen messages 
for signs of bullying, harassment, or anything that may result in a child being in exposed to harm. 
Moderation suffers two key drawbacks - scalability, and the human bias (subjectivity). 
 
The system proposed here addresses the issues highlighted above without sacrificing safety. The child 
can feel their privacy is being maintained, although messages of concern are being reviewed, the 
contents of the message will not seen be their parents (thus shielding them from any embarrassment). 
In this regard the system may be considered similar in fashion to traditional moderation - their 
messages may be reviewed but not by their parents - but able to overcome its limitations. 
 
3. Conflicting requirements 
On-line child protection cannot be solved with technology alone. This paper therefore proposes a 
system that uses a combination of automation and human judgement to recognise threats. There are 
many potential pitfalls in trying to solve this problem. One solution might be to give parents 
comprehensive logs of their child’s internet usage. This would be giving them too much information to 
manage effectively, and would be a tempting target for identity theft. If the parent has the power to 
                                                 
30
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/chatguide/glossary/moderation.shtml. 
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control exactly what their child does on-line, it is possible they can better protect them, but the controls 
may be overwhelming. Also, children do not want to have their privacy violated, and will circumvent 
the system one way or another if it is too invasive. Even if they do not have the level of skill necessary 
to circumvent the system, they could always spend the majority of their internet time away from the 
home (at school, library, friends, etc). So some level of privacy for the child is needed. Similarly, all 
access that can be given and kept “safe” needs to be allowed. It would also be naive to expect children 
to suddenly migrate onto a new “safe” social network, IM network, etc. Any solution must cater for 
what they already use. 
 
4. Description 
The proposed system uses existing technology as a pre-filtering stage to create a prioritised list of 
‘suspect’ chat conversations. This is subsequently analysed using human judgement via a 
pseudonymous volunteer who sees an appropriately sanitised version of the data which does not 
divulge the identity of the child, thus protecting their privacy.  
 
The system works as a software client that can be downloaded and run on any PC. The primary user 
(presumably a parent of at least one child), installs and sets up the client. There are two stages to the 
setup. First, the parent must record any sensitive/personal data unique to themselves and their child. 
This could include names, addresses, email/contact info, credit card number, phone numbers, etc. 
These will be used to determine when the child may be giving inappropriate information to a stranger, 
but also when they are inadvertently identifying themselves. The data can be stored as hashed values, 
or at least encrypted. The second part of the setup is performed in conjunction with the child. The 
parent reviews or “vets” all contacts the child has (in all applications/platforms/networks). The parent 
determines which contacts can be considered “safe”. This should only include contacts the parent 
has/can meet in person, or know through some trusted organisation/third-party. At the very least, 
contacts who neither the child nor the parent has met should be considered unsafe. All contacts are 
labelled either “safe”, “uncertain” or “blocked”.  
 
Once setup, the client runs in the background when the child logs onto the computer. The client 
intercepts all text-based communication protocols before they are presented to the user (the idea is text-
based, but see Section 4.8 for voice/video extension). All communications between the child and 
contacts that have been explicitly labelled safe by the parent continue unimpeded and un-monitored. 
Any communications to/and from a contact that has been labelled uncertain, or from a new contact get 
processed. The processing works as follows: 
 
1. All received text from the contact and keystrokes from the child are stored. 
2. The text is checked against a list of known problem words/phrases (“sex”, “drugs”, “would 
you like to meet”, etc.) 
3. Other probabilistic analysis is performed (Bayesian network analysis, Gaussian modelling, 
etc.) looking for indicators of unwanted behaviour. 
4. The text is searched for any of the sensitive/personal data entered by the adult. If any is found 
it is removed and noted. 
5. The results from all these tests are combined in a single weighted score. 
6. The identifier for the contact (email address, Skype name, etc.) is stored as a keyed hash using 
the child’s password (could be their login password). 
 
The processing is done on a section of text of a limited size (a page), and only on communications 
between the child and one contact. The client stores the processed logs in a list prioritised by the results 
of the analysis in the above list (top of the list will be the highest match with expected pattern of a 
predator). As noted in the fourth step, all sensitive/personal data will be removed from the log (can be 
replaced with a generic placeholder). Rather than just using the data the parent entered in the initial 
setup, a dictionary of names/local places could also be used to sanitise the logs. Periodically the client 
will send the logs at the top of the list to another client. Even with the sanitisation of personal data and 
replacing contact details with hashed values, in order to protect the privacy of the child, the logs will be 
sent over a pseudonymous network (Kinateder, Terdic & Rothermel, 2005). This allows messages to be 
passed from client to client, without either being able to discover who the other party is. This works 
through repeated layers of encryption and routing through various different nodes on the network. The 
idea is to create a community of effort where parents are reviewing each others children’s logs, but in 
an anonymous manner. The technology used in anonymous communications is described in Section 6. 
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The receiving client (of the logs) will be administered by another parent. They will be presented with 
the sanitised logs and asked “Is this something the parent should be concerned with?” The reply can 
either be a yes/no button, or a scale e.g. from 1 to 10. The second parent can also highlight the text of 
the logs that is objectionable and a specific reason, e.g. “contact trying to meet child”, “inappropriate 
sexual content of messages”, “child is revealing personal information/identifying him/herself or home 
location”. The results are returned to the first parent, again through the pseudonymous network. The 
first parent will be presented with only those logs (still sanitised) where the reviewer thought there was 
a problem. The particular application and time/date can be made known to the parent, but the identity 
of the other contact is still protected by the child’s password. The parent can then decide whether to list 
the contact as “blocked” preventing any further communication, discuss the matter with their child to 
determine if the contact can be added to the safe list, or leave the contact “unknown” and continue 
monitoring.  
 
Figure 1 shows a typical example. In the example, there is a central server called the Match Maker that 
maintains a list of pseudonymous clients that are on-line. An adult can request the details of one or 
more clients from the Match Maker. An alternative method that distributes this information throughout 
the network is also possible, and discussed in Section 6. The numbered steps in Figure 1 are explained 
below: 
 
1. Adult1 downloads software client. 
2. Adult1 installs client and configures settings (records sensitive data). 
3. Adult1 and Child1 agree all safe contacts. 
4. Child1 interacts with contacts. Communication with safe contacts continues as normal. 
Communication with uncertain contacts monitored. 
5. Monitoring consists of analysis as described in previous list. 
6. Suspect logs are stored in priority list based on results of analysis. 
7. Client1 queries Match Maker server over pseudonymous network for list of online clients. 
8. Client1 selects from list and sends sanitised logs for review. 
9. Adult2 checks sanitised logs for undesirable communication. 
10. Logs returned to Client1 with rating results. 
11. Adult1 takes any necessary action based on feedback. 
 
The most important part of the system is step 9. In order to encourage good behaviour in the clients, 
each adult will only receive results from the pseudonymous network about their children when they 
have finished a certain amount of reviews for other clients. This promotes good behaviour. This can be 
taken a step further by enabling a reputation system at the Match Maker server. This would record 
feedback from adults who found the results they received helpful. The reputation would be tied to the 
pseudonym and the person behind it would remain unknown, but they could be rewarded by being 
given a higher priority when requesting (clients for) reviews of their own logs, both in terms of speed 
and the quality of the rated reviewer.  
 
The following section presents several variations that may improve the overall system, but which 
should be considered optional as they may have downsides, depending on the implementation details 
and user requirements. 
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Fig. 1 Communication flow for Pseudonymous Peer Review 
 
4.1. Monitoring all communications 
The client could be configured to monitor all communications, including those between the child and 
safe contacts, but with a higher threshold needed for logs to be stored and sent for review. This negates 
more of the privacy the child has, but is still a great deal better than traditional monitoring: the contact 
can still be protected with the child’s password, and only logs that have been considered problematic 
get passed on to the parent. It may be appropriate for younger children. 
 
4.2. Multiple reviewers 
The client can send the logs to several other clients for review. This will likely reduce the time it takes 
for a response, and the redundancy will give the parent more confidence in the results. The downside is 
the increased burden on reviewers. But given that there may only be a few logs sent, and they can 
probably be reviewed very quickly, it is likely a good balance can be achieved. For example, the client 
sends all of the top 3 logs to 3 different clients (sending out 9 in total), but can only review results once 
they have reviewed 9 other logs. This approach has the benefit of normalising the reviewing process – 
the effect of a wildly liberal or conservative response would be brought closer to the prevailing societal 
attitude. 
 
4.3. Instant reaction 
Because of the human component of the review process, there will be a delay in the response time. One 
option that could be considered is that if a given log has a particularly high score, then the client can 
immediately block communication with that contact and notify the adult, bypassing the anonymous 
reviewer process. Careful configuration would be needed to avoid too many false alarms. Likewise, the 
sanitisation could be applied as a filter to all out going communications, not just the stored logs. 
 
This may not be necessary – research indicates (Walsh & Wolak. 2005) that where a victim and sex 
offender met, the online relationship typically formed over a month or more, from multiple 
conversations. These would likely have already being flagged, reviewed and reported to a parent. 
 
4.4. Learning behaviour 
If the feedback from the reviewers is sufficiently detailed (selection of problem 
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words/phrases, reasons for choice), then it would be possible for the clients to improve their 
scoring/prioritisation algorithms. This could either be done locally, or centrally at the Match Maker 
server. Learning at the central server could be very efficient, but would introduce problems with 
keeping submissions anonymous and being able to trust submissions. Learning locally at the client 
would not have any privacy problems, but would have a much smaller selection of results to draw from 
and hence a slower rate of learning. 
 
4.5. Use of dictionary 
The client could use a dictionary of common names to sanitise the child’s logs. Certain patterns could 
be identified, such as phone numbers, credit card numbers, postcodes, etc. When the adult enters the 
home address, a central service might be able to provide a list of all nearby street names, local 
monuments, and locations that could be used by the child to give directions. This could also be 
incorporated into the scoring mechanism as well as the sanitisation. 
 
4.6. Re-vetting 
A good precaution would be for the adult to periodically re-vet the child’s safe contacts. Strangers are 
not the only sources of potential threats to young children, and asking the child about their relationships 
with their peers could bring to light early warning signs. 
 
4.7. Impersonation prevention 
The times and duration the child has been on-line can be safely stored without fear of privacy invasion. 
When the adult logs in, a simple calendar with the child’s usage can be graphically presented. This 
prevents the most obvious circumvention method. If there are no usage hours recorded for large 
amounts of time the parent knows the child was using the computer, then the parent knows the child 
has circumvented the system (most likely by using the parent’s or another un-monitored account). 
 
4.8. Voice/Video chats 
As previously described the system is text-based. This can be extended to voice/video, such as 
commonly found in IM products such as Skype/MSN, etc. This requires the use of Speech Recognition 
Techniques. This technology is currently of limited maturity, but could potentially be employed for 
keyword spotting. This will slot easily into the proposed system converting the video/audio stream into 
a text document. This also adds further protection of privacy than would be had by direct monitoring of 
the video/audio. 
 
4.9 Age of Children 
The definition of “a child” covers a large range of ages and maturities. Ultimately the decision to allow 
a child to use the internet for chat resides with the parent, however a total prohibition would likely lead 
to using the technology anyway and without parental oversight. The best result is achieved when child 
and parent have a strong relationship and agree on what is, and what is not permitted. Internet initiated 
grooming of pre-pubescent children is extremely rare (Wolak, et al. 2008) (Lanning, K. 2001), partly 
because they are more closely supervised and also because it is difficult to engage them in 
sexual/romantic conversation because of their immaturity. 
 
This system is best suited to children approaching puberty, they can be informed that (like adults) they 
are being rewarded with privacy in return for abiding by the rules. As they enter puberty, become 
sexually aware, and start to desire privacy they will already be familiar with the system. The child 
would continue to use the system until they reached a suitable level of maturity so that it was no longer 
needed or they reached adulthood. 
 
Conversations of concern that are sent for moderation would include an indication of the child’s age. 
This would have a bearing on what would be deemed appropriate. 
 
5. Justification 
In order for this system to work, active participation of all parties is required. The system has 
deliberately been designed to encourage good behaviour. The child is motivated to convince the parent 
that his/her contacts are trustworthy in order to have confidential communications. The parent is 
encouraged to provide meaningful reviews, in order to get a better reputation, which will result in 
speedier replies. The process of reviewing can also be of direct benefit to the reviewing adults 
themselves. It is educational, in that they are made aware of the kind of dangers that exist on-line and 
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what their child may be exposed to. This better places them to discuss the problems with their child and 
agree what is safe/acceptable internet usage.  
 
The shortcomings of existing approaches to this problem have been highlighted, and the approach 
described here overcomes these issues. Conversations, emails and message board postings will be 
monitored by the emerging generation of intelligent text analysis tools to spot conversations of 
concern. Only these conversations will be submitted for manual/human review. This process 
overcomes the scalability issues associated with traditional moderation, vastly reducing the reviewer’s 
workload. The community nature of the approach also negates the cost associated with the traditional 
moderation model. 
 
Any single moderator reviewing a conversation of concern will be subject to the human condition - 
bringing their own bias and prejudice into the review process. Using multiple moderators for each 
conversation of concern will reduce the impact of any one error in judgement. For example say a 
conversation of concern is reviewed by a conservative individual and someone of a more liberal 
mindset, an average of their result/feedback will tend towards the centre ground. Here “centre ground” 
is meant as the general view of society at large. 
 
The moderator will be faced with the hurdle of slang employed by children and may need assistance 
interpreting the contents of some messages (conversations of concern). It is hoped that such 
information will be sought from the moderator’s own children. The benefits of this will be twofold; the 
parent will gain a better understanding of trends, challenges and experiences of young people in the 
modern world helping them to better understand their own children. From reviewing the contents of the 
messages (conversations of concern) both parent (moderator) and child can learn first hand of the 
dangers that exist. This will be informative for the parent and can serve as a warning for the child. 
 
6. Components 
This section gives a very brief description of how the technical aspects of the system might be 
implemented. This system relies heavily on the use of pseudonymous communications, along with the 
dependent technology of Distributed Hash Tables. The first subsection describes the work by 
Kinateder, et al (2005), the second deals with the work of Stoica, Morris, Karger, Kaashoek & 
Balakrishnan, (2006) and the third describes how text classifications are best applied to this system. 
 
6.1. Pseudonymous Communications 
In order to protect the anonymity of the child, the parent and the reviewer, a communication system 
with the following properties is required: 
 
• the sender has some ephemeral/indirect knowledge of the receiver, but not their actual address 
• the receiver cannot know the address of the sender 
• the receiver can reply to the sender 
• no observation of the network gives any information about who is communicating with whom 
 
These are all achieved with the use of public key encryption and intermediaries. It is assumed that there 
is a network of nodes, called mixes, capable of processing messages (encryption/decryption) and 
passing them on. These nodes are not trusted, and while they can disrupt the communications by not 
participating as expected, it is imperative that they learn nothing by analysing messages as they pass 
through. It is also assumed that public keys for all parties can be readily obtained (as well as the 
addresses of the mixes). 
 
However they are stored, the public keys are used to ensure that only the recipient can decrypt the 
message, but does not help in anonymously delivering the message. Along with the public key, one or 
more pseudonym is stored. These are created by those who want to receive anonymous 
communications (the recipient) and will be used by a sender. The pseudonym is a sequence of 
addresses of mixes, but nested in layers of encryption that ensure that only the next mix can decrypt the 
current layer and they only get the address of the next mix. The further layers of encryption mean that a 
mix cannot know any further destinations than the next mix, and they do not know any of the previous 
mixes in the chain since these addresses have been stripped off. Since knowledge of the path of the 
route is effectively split amongst all these independent entities, it would be impossible to determine the 
ultimate sender and receiver for a given message without compromising the majority of the network.  
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There are other ways to increase anonymity, sending messages in batches to confound traffic analysis, 
sender adding more mixes to the sequence to protect against dishonest recipients, etc. For more details 
see (Kinateder, et al. 2005). It is also preferable to store the public keys/pseudonyms in a Distributed 
Hash Table, rather than a single server. This is described in (Stoica, et al. 2006). 
 
6.2. Text Classification 
Traditional keyword and regular expression filters are inadequate for analysing IM and chat forum 
conversations. The new generation of text mining and text analysis tools offer far superior 
classification abilities. Word frequency, word distance, word pairs (bi-grams), Latent Semantic 
Analysis, term strength, term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf), and term by document 
matrices have all proven successful at extracting features from textual sources. These features are 
subsequently applied to statistical modelling techniques including Bayesian analysis, k-Nearest 
Neighbour and Support Vector Machines (Tretyakov, 2004) (Conrad & Hunter, 1994). These 
techniques have proven results in spam detection, document categorisation, authorship attribution and 
information mining (Aas & Eikvil, 1999). 
 
Classification techniques such as these typically compare new information against known values and 
categorise it accordingly. For example, a new email will be analysed and the result compared against 
the result for known spam and ham (legitimate email). This process poses a problem in the child 
protection domain. 
 
In order to classify conversations as safe or uncertain they need to be compared against known 
paedophile, and normal chat models. Constructing normal chat models is a trivial task, constructing 
paedophile (chat) models is not. To construct an accurate model access to paedophile chat logs is 
required. Law enforcement does not typically share this information freely. Honey trap organisations 
such as Perverted Justice31 publish chat logs from sting operations (against paedophiles) on their 
website. Research (Wolak, J., Finkelhor, D., Mitchell, K., & Ybarra, M. 2008) indicates the in the 
majority of online sexual predation the offender quickly reveals his true age and intentions – this tallies 
with the chat logs of Perverted Justice. Pendar’s (2007) work shows that Bayesian trigram analysis is 
effective at detecting grooming (based on Perverted Justice chat logs). The operating practices of 
Perverted Justice have been called in to question and allegations of entrapment and poor evidentiary 
quality have been made (Stokley, 2008) (Salkin, 2006). As a consequence of this, the reliability of 
these chat logs to represent “real world” logs must be considered uncertain. The following proposes 
another method that may also be suitable - a system of thresholding. 
 
Rather than classifying based on the results of messages matching against two categories/models 
(normal chat and suspicious), a match against a single model with a threshold value could be used 
instead. Conversations would be compared against the normal chat model; those matching closely 
(with a probability above a certain threshold) would be considered normal and not be affected. 
Conversations poorly matching the model (below the threshold) would be marked as “uncertain” and 
passed on to the system for evaluation by a moderator. In addition, those conversations falling well 
below the threshold might be marked for priority moderation/inspection. 
 
In order for the process to work a normal chat model would first need to be trained. The child’s online 
chat activities over a given time would be used to train the initial model. This model will serve as 
baseline of normal behaviour. Once the training process is complete, online conversations are 
compared against the model. During the initial training of the model it will not be able to flag 
problems. As the text classification is just one of several tools used to identify potentially suspicious 
behaviour, other mechanisms are still available. Key word matches with known general problem 
phrases and scrubbing of specific personal details is still performed. And to further protect the child 
(and ensure a “clean” model) the parent can require that no communication with new contacts is 
allowed for the period of the training. After the initial training period there are likely to be a number of 
false positive, especially if the training period is brief. If, for example, the child only converses with 
their peer group during the training of the model, a conversation with a parent or grandparent would be 
flagged as anomalous. This should be considered a period of normalisation. As the review process 
records the conversation as a false positive, the text of the conversation can be used to tune the initial 
model. 
                                                 
31
 http://perverted-justice.com. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper presents a concept whereby parents can have “conversations of concern” reviewed 
anonymously by other parents in return for their own actions as a reviewer. The limits of existing 
technical measures to protect children have been highlighted and it is proposed that the system 
described here could help bridge the gap through a community approach.  
 
The merits of this idea do not come solely from the technology, but rather from several deliberate 
reward mechanisms for the users. Children are encouraged to play-by-the-rules and are rewarded with 
privacy. Parents who are conscientious reviewers will get a better view of the dangers their children are 
exposed to. The technology provides the means for what would be sensitive information to be shared in 
a safe way. Great lengths have been made to avoid anything that could be considered censoring by the 
end-users. All of this is combined to strike the best balance between the child’s safety and their 
freedom on-line. 
 
References 
1. Aas, K., & Eikvil, L. (1999). Text categorisation: A survey. Norwegian Computing Center, Oslo, 
Norway, http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/aas99text.html 
 
2. Conrad, J. G., & Hunter, M. U. (1994). A system for discovering relationship by feature extraction 
from text databases. Annual ACM Conference on Research and Development in Information 
Retrieval, 1994 
 
3. Kinateder, M., Terdic, R., & Rothermel, K. (2005). Strong Pseudonymous Communication for 
Peer-to-Peer Reputation Systems. ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, 2005. 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1067033 
 
4. Lanning, K. (2001). Child molesters: A behavioral analysis No. Fourth Edition)National Centre 
for Missing & Exploited Children. 
 
5. Lemish, D. (2008). Generation Gap? ’Online Gap’ Widens Divide Between Parents and Children. 
Science Daily. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080204143203.htm 
 
6. Salkin, A. (2008). As perverted-justice.com battles web pedophiles, some raise concerns over its 
tactics. International Herald Tribune. 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/13/news/justice.php?page=1 
 
7. Stoica, I., Morris, R., Karger, D., Kaashoek, M.F., & Balakrishnan, H. (2001). Chord: A Scalable 
Peer-to-peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications. Proceedings of the 2001 ACM SIGCOMM 
Conference. http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/chord:sigcomm01/chord sigcomm.pdf 
 
8. Stokley, S. (2008). ’To catch a predator’ sex stings net mixed results. The Press Enterprise. 
http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE News Local R dateline28.6b3814.html 
 
9. Tretyakov, K. (2004) Machine Learning Techniques in Spam Filtering. Institute of Computer 
Science, University of Tartu. 
 
10. Walsh, W., & Wolak, J. (2005). Nonforcible internet-related sex crimes with adolescent victims: 
Prosecution issues and outcomes. Child Maltreatment, 10(3), 260-271. 
 
11. Wolak, J., Finkelhor, D., Mitchell, K., & Ybarra, M. (2008). Online "predators" and their victims 
myth, realities and implications for prevention and treatment. American Psychologist, 63(2), 111-
128. 
 
12. Wolak, J., Mitchell, K., & Finkelhor, D. (2006). Online Victimization of Youth: Five Years Later. 
http://www.missingkids.com/en US/publications/NC167.pdf 
  
60 
 
4. STEGANOGRAPHED CUSTOM EMOTICONS 
Digital Forensics is a branch of forensic science that deals with investigations based 
on evidence stored on digital media, for example recovering deleted files that are 
indicative that a computer was used in a crime. This chapter describes how a unique 
image can be used as a ‘digital fingerprint’, left on the computers of individuals a user 
has been chatting with. 
 
Instant Messaging (IM) is a form of computer mediated communication, typically text 
based, though many IM platforms include the option for audio and video. 
Traditionally bound to the computer, these platforms are now commonly available on 
phones and portable devices. 
 
In 2004 IM was the fourth most common activity among children on the Internet [1], 
in 2008 it was the second most popular activity32 [2], 61% of children regularly use 
IM [9]. 
 
A common feature of text based communication is the emoticon (or smiley). These 
allow the user to increase the information content [3] of the conversation by 
introducing body language, in the form of a crude facial expression. Most IM 
applications, some chat rooms and message boards include a set of default emoticons 
covering the basic emotions (happy, sad, angry, embarrassed, etc).  Windows Live 
Messenger, also called MSN Messenger (sometimes abbreviated to simply MSN) 
allows users to create their own custom emoticons.  
 
Using steganography techniques to create pseudo-unique images and taking 
advantage of the design properties of the underlying protocol it is possible to leave a 
‘digital fingerprint’ (a Steganographed Custom Emoticon (SCE)) on a receiver’s 
computer without their knowledge and without employing any ‘hacking’ techniques. 
This emoticon can later be recovered and used in non-repudiation, for example a 
groomer denies conversing with a child, if an SCE is found on his computer this can 
be used as circumstantial evidence in the case against the groomer. 
 
                                                 
32
 The age range of 2004 is 10-17, for 2008 the range is 10-15. 
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This chapter shall examine the background of emoticons, the popularity and risks of 
IM and how Internet criminals are apprehended. It will then describe the process of 
designing an SCE, the method of operation and a justification of the concept. 
 
4.1 Background 
Face-to-face communication typically consists of spoken words, the tone of delivery 
and non-verbal communication (body language). Text based communication loses a 
significant portion of the information content associated with face-to-face 
communication [3]. Scott Fahlman is credited for suggesting :-) [colon, hyphen, 
bracket] to express a joke or happy emotion on a Carnegie Mellon bulletin board in 
1982 [4], the idea was not new - alphanumeric combinations were commonly used to 
express emoticons. 
 
The increase in online text based communications saw ASCII art (creating an image 
from the 95 printable ASCII characters) find mainstream acceptance. Many 
applications now intercept the character strings and display an image. The increase in 
computing power, Internet access speeds and rich media has led to graphical 
emoticons in many applications. 
 
4.2 Catching Internet Criminals 
Internet criminals, including child molesters are typically caught by one of three 
methods – through the identification of their IP address [16] [14], disclosure of 
information that identifies them in the real world [12] [13], or they come to the 
attention of law enforcement for other reasons and their Internet crimes are uncovered 
[15]. 
 
All Internet traffic has a source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) address. The 
Internet Assign Numbers Authority33 (IANA) oversees global IP address allocation. 
IANA provides blocks of IP addresses to Regional Internet Registries - Réseaux IP 
Européens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC, RIPE)34 in the case of the UK. 
RIPE assigns IP address blocks to local Internet registries or Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs).  
                                                 
33
 http://www.iana.org/ (accessed 1 July 2010). 
34
 http://www.ripe.net/ (accessed 1 July 2010). 
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IP addresses are frequently recorded in server traffic logs and can be captured from 
live traffic with protocol analysers (packet sniffers). Internet criminals are traced 
through their IP address via their ISP’s subscriber database. 
 
Section 11 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 [5] defines a code of 
conduct for ISPs to retain subscriber details for 12 months. 
 
Avoiding detection by IP address is a trivial affair – using a public terminal (café, 
library, ‘wardriving’), or hiding their IP address behind a proxy or other 
‘anonymising’ (privacy) service. 
 
Criminals may divulge personally identifying information, this could be revealed to 
their victim or another individual (and later relayed to law enforcement), or they may 
disclose it to law enforcement in a sting operation. 
 
In the course of an investigation law enforcement may uncover details of an 
individual’s involvement in an otherwise unknown Internet crime. 
 
4.3 MSN 
MSN is often used as a vague term to describe a number of applications and services. 
Here the term is used to describe the system as a whole. 
 
The .NET Messenger Service (formerly MSN Messenger Service (MSNMS)) is an 
instant messaging and presence system, powered by the Microsoft Notification 
Protocol (MSNP). Microsoft released the protocol to the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) in 1999 and allows third party clients to use the service [6] [7]. 
 
Windows Live Messenger (formerly MSN Messenger) is a client application from 
Microsoft that uses the .NET Messenger Service to communicate. Numerous third 
party clients exist that port access across operating systems and hardware platforms. 
 
In 2006 Europe had 82 million IM users, 60% of which use MSN [8]. 
 
 MSN supports a standard set of built
emoticons the application transmits only the character sequence (string) 
corresponding to the emoticon. The character sequence is referenced to an emoticon. 
Both the transmitting and receiving client show their own copy of the emoticon (the 
emoticon image bundled with the application).  
bracket], the transmitting client (application) recognises the string as a
‘reference’ and displays the emoticon to 
will also send the string to 
string reference and also display an emoticon. W
the reference character sequence is sent, not the emoticon image itself. If different 
clients are used the users may be shown different images (though these will depict the 
same emotion and may look very similar).
default and custom transfer.
 
Figure 8 - Default vs custom emoticon transfer
The process for custom emoticons is different. When creating a custom emoticon the 
user loads an image into the application and assigns it a character 
cannot be a sequence assigned to a standard emoticon). When the user enters the 
(custom emoticon) character sequence, both the character sequence and the emoticon 
image are sent to the receiver (the receiver cannot look up an image it does n
Both users see the same image.
 
-in emoticons. When sending these default 
For example user A enters :) [colon 
user A, typically a smiley face.
user B. The receiving client (user B) will recognise the 
hen standard emoticons are used
 Figure 8 illustrates the difference between 
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The receiving client assigns the image a random filename and stores it deep in the file 
system.  
 
The receiver can save the SCE from inside the application or may find it (applications 
exist to recover emoticons). If the receiver tries to the copy the emoticon, the image 
file contents change (not visually) as a side effect of the application compressing the 
image to use as an emoticon. This allows the system to be used in non-repudiation. 
 
When sending a file or image (as a file), the transfer has to be accepted by the user. 
Emoticons and user icons are transmitted automatically in the background without 
user interaction (drive-by download). 
 
4.4 ‘Steganographing’ and Detecting Custom Emoticons 
Any unique or pseudo-unique image could be used in the system. Using an innocuous 
image will increase the efficacy of the system, by not arousing the interest of the 
recipient, a minor alteration to a default or plain emoticon would attract the least 
interest. 
 
For the system to operate each enrolled user requires a unique emoticon. This is 
achieved using techniques from steganography – the science of hiding information is 
plain sight, so that only an informed individual can detect the message. This process 
alters the emoticon in a way that makes it unique35 but detectable and verifiable. 
 
The emoticon is ‘steganographed’, made unique by altering the 24 bit value of a 
single pixel in the image. The colour of each pixel is determined by the value of the 
three colour channels - RGB (red, green, blue). Each channel has 256 shades (0-255), 
the product of the channels (256*256*256) provides the possibly of 16.7 million 
colours. This can be extended using the alpha (a) channel; this determines the opacity 
of the pixel and extends the entropy to 32 bits. A minor change in any of these 
channels is undetectable to the human eye. 
                                                 
35
 There are hundreds of possible emoticons (see http://www.sherv.net/Free-MSN-Emoticons.html 
(accessed 02 Sept 2010) for some examples). Each emoticon can by 50x50 = 2500 pixels, any of the 
pixels can be doctored in one of more channels by at least +/-5. Though not mathematically unique the 
number of possible source emoticons, number of pixels per emoticon and colour range of pixels mean 
the chance of two individuals independently creating the same image is improbable enough to be 
reasonably termed unique. 
  
The emoticon is identified by hashing. A hash is a one
that generates a fixed length integer irrespective of file size. The nature of hashin
means that a minor change in the data results in a dramatic change in the hash. 
Therefore a minor change to the colour and/or opacity channels of a pixel, though not 
discernable by eye is readily revealed by hashing.
emoticon and a steganogra
 
Figure 9 - Source and steganographed emoticons and hashes
4.5 Method, Experimentation and Conditions
A demonstrator was created as a proof of concept exerci
written to amend the aRGB channels of a pixel. The source emoticon image (a .PNG 
file) was chosen from the default set of emoticons that ships with the open source 
messenger client aMSN36. The application makes a change of +/
+5 if the original value is 0
the aRGB channels and saves the new image. It then makes a change in the 
subsequent channel and saves the new images, etc
 
Altering each channel +/-
(5*5*5*5 = 625), per pixel changed. Emoticons can be up to 50x50 pixels.
                                                
36
 http://www.amsn-project.net/
37
 Full source code can be found in the appendix (see Image Fiddler)
-way mathematical function 
 Figure 9 illustrates the s
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Each time the image is added to the application and turned into an emoticon, 
compression changes the file structure (and the hash). In order to determine the hash 
of the received emoticon it (the SCE) needs to be transmitted to and hashed at a 
control receiver. This process is shown in figure 10. In a real world production 
context, the SCE would be shipped to the user in a custom MSN client downloaded by 
a user (parent) when enrolling in the system. The user’s registration details would be 
stored in a managed service (database) along with the SCE hash.  
 
During experiments the MD5 hash was used, in a production environment the 
cryptographically harder SHA-2 would probably be more suitable. 
 
 
Figure 10 - Emoticon manufacture and issue 
If a computer is seized and examined in the course of law enforcement investigations, 
custom emoticons found on the suspect’s computer can be checked against a registry 
of SCE, i.e. those issued to users. If a match is found in the database i.e. the emoticon 
has been issued to a child, this is circumstantial evidence that the suspect has been 
communicating with the user. If the suspect denies such communication has taken 
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place the uniqueness of the emoticon (the hash) can repudiate this claim. The system 
has been described in terms of groomers and children, but could function in any 
setting where communication via MSN has taken place and this communication is 
been repudiated.   
 
Figure 11 describes the process surrounding the recovery of the emoticon. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Emoticon recovery process 
Numerous third party clients are available, not all of these implement the complete 
feature set, including custom emoticons. In experiments both Windows Live 
Messenger38 and aMSN have been observed to receive and store custom emoticons.  
 
The penultimate stage of phase one (emoticon manufacture and issue – see figure 10) 
is to recover the emoticon hash (from a ‘control’ host) and record it for future use. A 
second complimentary application39 was written to support the concept demonstrator. 
When the emoticon is received (at the control host), the operating system creates a 
                                                 
38
 http://explore.live.com/windows-live-messenger?os=other (accessed on 06 July 2010). 
39
 Full source code can be found in the appendix (see Hash Checker). 
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file. The application monitors the directory where the emoticon is created. The file 
creation triggers the application to hash the emoticon (file) and enters the hash into a 
database form. Additional fields exist for user details. This process can also be 
performed manually from a GUI. A hash (from a recovered SCE) can be entered into 
a database form to verify if it has been issued to a user, as in figure 11. Data 
verification and error checking is performed at each stage to ensure an emoticon is not 
issued to multiple users. 
 
Experiments were conducted across two laptops, one designated as belonging to a 
child (the user / sender of the emoticon) – Laptop1, the other as belonging to an 
unknown recipient – Laptop2. A sample of emoticons were hashed and their aRGB 
values recorded – this step is unnecessary and was performed for completeness. The 
emoticons were loaded into the application on Laptop1 and used in conversation (sent 
to) Laptop2. The emoticons were copied from Laptop2, their hashes and aRGB values 
recorded. The emoticons were then deleted from Laptop1. To simulate the recipient 
reusing an emoticon, the emoticons (received on Laptop2) were loaded into the 
application on Laptop2. These were sent to Laptop1, recovered and the hashes 
checked to ensure they had changed, as would be necessary in a non repudiation 
system. A table of the results can be found in Appendix D. Hashes and channel values 
where examined with the applications described, data streams and packets were 
examined using WireShark.  
 
4.6 Justification and Discussion 
Outside of the lab in a production environment, the author envisages this would be 
provided as a subscription service. A user, typically a parent, would register and 
download a custom application for the MSN service. The SCE would be embedded in 
the custom front end. The SCE would be sent each time a conversation was started 
with a new user, prefixed to the opening chat. This would overcome the need for the 
child to manually send the emoticon. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 (IdM), the Internet was not designed to support identity 
claims, neither does it have a mechanism for non-repudiation. Digital signatures, part 
of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), are used online to verify the authenticity and 
source of information and in non-repudiation. Files and messages are digitally signed 
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with a private key (only available to the source) and verified with a public key 
(available to everyone).   
 
Steganography is the science of hiding information in plain sight. In this system, a 
minor change in the aRGB channels of a pixel is used to create a unique custom 
emoticon. 
 
A function of the .NET Messenger Service is the drive-by download of custom 
emoticons to recipients’ computers, this places custom emoticons on the receiver’s 
computer without user action. Using steganographic techniques the custom emoticon 
is altered to make it uniquely identifiable. This allows it to serve as a ‘digital 
fingerprint’ that provides circumstantial evidence that a conversation took place.  
 
There is scope to argue the SCE could be planted (deliberately copied from the 
receiving computer to another), so cannot conclusive proven guilt. This is true, like 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and other types of trace evidence, the SCE could be 
planted. Discovery of the SCE, like the discovery of trace evidence does not prove 
anything – it is circumstantial evidence, it is strongly indicative that communication 
has taken place. But this does not mean the conversation was untoward. If a forensic 
examination fails to recover an SCE, this is not proof that the communication did not 
take place – the recipient may have used a different computer, or a client that doesn’t 
support custom emoticons. 
 
It can be argued that recipients could delete40 all custom emoticons from their 
computer, even using software conforming to DOD 5220.22-M41 to securely purge 
the emoticons. Criminals are frequently caught from fingerprint evidence, despite the 
knowledge that gloves would prevent this. Whilst custom emoticons can be removed, 
a significant number of individuals will be unaware of their existence, lack the 
technical proficiency to remove them, or do not believe they will be caught. The 
threats from viruses and malware on the Internet are well known, yet inadequately 
patched and protected computers continue to be compromised in large numbers [15] 
                                                 
40
 Providing the disk space has not been over written, deleted data can be recovered  using carving 
tools. 
41
 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/522022m.htm. 
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[16], due in part because of the same reasons (lack of knowledge, inadequate 
technical proficiency, belief they will not be affected). 
 
Parents could ban their children from using instant messaging or monitor their 
children’s communication (existing online child protection methods are more fully 
discussed in later chapters). This may be effective with younger children but older 
head strong teens will find alternate communication channels or access points if 
communications are prohibited. Research [9] suggests that parents are unable to 
decipher youth Internet lingo, rendering monitoring a largely ineffective activity. 
 
This approach has limitations and requires certain conditions to exist; custom 
emoticons are not supported by all clients, and emoticons can be disabled (by default 
they are enabled), beyond this a user could be on a public terminal (a library or 
Internet cafe) or using a live Linux distribution. Beyond this IM maybe in decline due 
to the rise of Facebook messaging. A system could be designed to enforce real world 
identity registration, log all conversations to a server and have all communications 
digitally signed. Such a system would be an expensive and invasive product that 
offers the user no additional functionality and has serious privacy implications. The 
system described here has been developed around an existing system and its 
limitations.  
 
Despite these limitations the author feels the benefits of such a system make it a 
worthwhile endeavour. With the existing infrastructure in place development costs 
would be minimal. With no tracking or remote retrieval capabilities the SCE is no 
threat to privacy. The benefit of this system is threefold, first is the ability to provide 
law enforcement additional evidence to support cases against groomers and child 
molesters. Second, it may also provide a deterring element, dissuading groomers from 
contacting children to begin with. Third and more abstract is parental reassurance. 
Furedi [9] argues that fuelled by media scare stories, parents have become excessively 
fearful for their children’s safety and have developed an overbearing approach that is 
retarding child development. Knowing a system such as this exists and may have a 
deterring effect on abusers, could reassure parents, bringing their perception of risk 
more in line with actual risk and providing peace of mind. The concept of risk 
perception verses actual risk is explored in later chapters. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Instant Messaging is a popular Internet communications tool; it allows one-to-one and 
group conversations to occur where a relationship already exists. Initially text only, 
IM has become a rich media experience with support for voice and video. 
 
IM is popular among children and teenagers, who often use a lingo impenetrable to 
their parents [10]. More grooming and Internet initiated sex crimes begin on IM that 
on other technologies [11]. 
 
MSN is a popular messaging platform with tens of millions of users in Europe alone. 
Although Microsoft controls the authentication process and setup and control traffic, 
the protocol is in the hands of the IETF and third party clients are able to access the 
system. 
 
This chapter has described a method for placing a uniquely identifiable emoticon on 
the computer of anyone who chats with a user of the system. The latter recovery of 
this emoticon can be used to reasonably conclude the recipient of the emoticon has 
been in communication with a specific user. 
 
The system is not a model solution it has been developed around the limitations of 
existing technology. However the author feels the system is worthwhile, it can help 
law enforcement in their pursuit against groomers, it may act as a deterrent against 
grooming and it could help with parents’ peace of mind.    
 
4.8 Business Impact 
This work demonstrated the feasibility of exploiting the behaviour of the .NET 
Messenger Service to leave a ‘digital fingerprint’ in the form of a ‘unique’ emoticon 
on the receiving computer. The method use stegangraphic techniques to avoid the 
arousal of interest or suspicion. 
 
The approach was warmly received but is a high risk to develop into a managed 
service for consumers – it would require considerable marketing and PR involvement, 
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does not ‘fit’ well with BT’s core business interests and would be difficult to 
monetise. 
 
BT showed considerable interest in patenting the idea, but it was felt that publishing 
the information and allowing third parties to develop the concept would provide value 
to the BT brand and reputation by showing that BT was active in the problem space 
and eager to share its findings in the public domain. 
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4.9 Steganographed Emoticon Report 
The following report, has been circulated within BT. It expands on ideas presented in 
the chapter. 
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Abstract 
Instant Messaging (IM) is a form of computer mediated communication in which (usually) 
two or more individuals converse in a text based format via the Internet. Modern IM is a 
media rich environment with support for graphics, audio and video content. Emoticons, also 
called smilies are commonly used in IM and a limited set is often supplied as standard with 
applications. IM applications may permit users to create their own emoticons (custom 
emoticons) and send these to other users during conversation.  This paper proposes a way to 
discretely leave a 'digital fingerprint' in the form of a steganographed image onto a host 
computer during an IM chat session. This image can be recovered later and used in non-
repudiation to support law enforcement cases against Internet child groomers. The approaches 
and methodology discussed in this paper are based around the Microsoft MSN protocol. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Instant Messaging began as a method to engage in text based 'conversations' over a network - 
User A would type a message that would appear on the screen of User B, B could reply and so 
on. 
 
IM is a popular communication media with children, and research indicates children are more 
likely to be groomed using IM than social networking platforms such as MySpace (Wolak et 
al. 2008). Various independent software vendors have tools that claim to make IM 
environments safer for children – these are discussed later. None of these tools leave evidence 
on offenders’ computers that can be used later to support legal action. This paper describes a 
technique whereby forensic evidence is left on the computer of anyone chatting with a child. 
 
Much information is lost in text based communication, not least is the loss of emotion 
portrayed in the face (Hancock et al. 2007). Many users use emoticons to help represent their 
emotional state and add to the informational content of the conversation. Although using 
alphanumeric combinations to represent words or emotions was not new, Scott Fahlman is 
credited with first suggesting the use of :-) [colon, hyphen, closed bracket] to represent a 
happy emotion or joke on a Carnegie Mellon bulletin board in 1982 (Kharif. 2001).  This has 
since been extended in many ways.  
 
As IM gained popularity ASCII art received broad mainstream acceptance. Many applications 
now intercept the character strings and represent these as images. As IM became a 
mainstream communications channel especially on the Internet, developers added rich media 
tools to IM applications including support for icons. Icons expressing emotions for example 
smiley faces are de facto referred to as 'emoticons' (this paper assumes the use of this term). 
As Web 2.0 swept the Internet, developers included the ability for users to create their own 
custom emoticons.  
 
The method described herein takes advantage of the .NET Messenger Service (formerly MSN 
Messenger Service (MSNMS), often referred to simply as MSN) and the Microsoft 
Notification Protocol (MSNP) with regard to the way in which it handles and transmits 
custom emoticons. The technique allows an MSN user, in this case a child, to place a unique, 
identifiable, custom emoticon on the machine of every person that they are interacting with 
via MSN text chat. This is effectively their ‘digital fingerprint’, and can later, if necessary, be 
recovered and used in non-repudiation in support of law enforcement activities. The important 
point about this fingerprint is that it occurs as an intended function of how the MSN protocol 
operates rather than a security exploit or vulnerability.  
 
 
EXISTING CHILD PROTECTION METHODS 
There are numerous technical measures for protecting children on the Internet, these include 
products by Net Nanny42, CyberPatrol43, CyberSentinel44 and others. These typically take the 
form of filters, blocks, logging and monitoring. 
  
Crisp Thinking45 has developed a tool described as an Anti-Grooming Engine (AGE) which 
builds a behavioural profile of the child’s chat. Bayesian inference (Crisp Thinking. 2008) is 
used to evaluate the conversation for sexual content, punctuation, levels of aggression, typing 
speed, sentence length and vocabulary, and compares this with known profiles for real-life 
groomers and children. Crisp Thinking claim 98.4% accuracy in independent tests (M2 
                                                 
42
 http://www.netnanny.com/ (accessed 9th September 2008). 
43
 http://www.cyberpatrol.com (accessed 9th September 2008). 
44
 http://www.cybersentinel.co.uk (accessed 9th September 2008). 
45
 http://www.crispthinking.com (accessed 9th September 2008). 
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Presswire. 2008), but beyond these headline figure results, test data and methodology are not 
in the public domain46. 
 
Some child protection software filters IM communication in much the same way as websites 
are filtered. Children are prevented from revealing personal information (address, phone 
number etc). A list of proscribed terms common in sexual conversation and harassment are 
blocked, and lists can often be enhanced or extended based on the level of protection desired. 
Filtering is not an ideal solution; many sexual terms also have legitimate non-sexual 
application. Sexual innuendo and slang terms frequently evade filters. Many terms commonly 
have different meanings depending on the context in which they are delivered. 
 
Many Internet security suites log all IM activities, contacts and conversations to be reviewed 
parents. For parents with multiple children or whose children are avid IM users this may 
quickly become an unsustainable activity. 
 
Blocking of IM, either preventing the application executing or accessing the network is 
another less flexible option. This approach may be appropriate with very young children, but 
as many messaging applications have web interfaces this is easily bypassed. 
 
The Internet Watch Foundation47 (IWF) maintains a list of child abuse websites; the list is 
updated twice daily and contains 800 – 1,200 live sites. About 50 URLs are added daily 
(Ozimek. 2008). 
 
BT CleanFeed is an ISP level filter used by major ISPs. CleanFeed48 is a two stage filtering 
process – if a request is made for information hosted at ‘suspect’ IP address it is routed to a 
HTTP proxy. If the information is not hosted at a suspect IP address it is sent to the 
destination IP address as normal. Suspect traffic is examined in detail at the proxy and 
compared to the IWF blacklist (Clayton). Requests for child abuse content are blocked, other 
requests are permitted. CleanFeed only processes UK traffic and can be circumvented using 
international proxies. Nevertheless, it does provide a level of protection to the general user 
who is not trying to intentionally bypass it. It also removes the ‘accidental access’ defence 
from people found to have accessed child pornography. 
 
Protecting children on the Internet is not simply a matter of software and technology, or 
unilateral action. Parents must adopt a holistic approach and work to educate their children 
about potential threats and risky behaviours.  
 
Older children and teenagers value their privacy and object to having their communications 
blocked or monitored. They may also have sufficient technical proficiency to bypass these 
measures. While younger children may more readily accept this, they require closer 
supervision as they are more naïve. Mitchell et al (2007) contend that parents should engage 
with children, establish rules and help them understand the dangers, but that banning Internet 
chat is probably ineffective with teenagers (Mitchell et al. 2001). 
 
 
CATCHING INTERNET CHILD SEX OFFENDERS 
Currently there exists two distinct methods for law enforcement agencies to trace sex 
offenders on the Internet. These are via the identification of an IP address or through the 
revelation of personal information (either in a ‘sting operation’ or passed by a victim/on 
behalf of a victim). This personal information might be gleaned across a variety of sources 
where the offender has used the same user name or email address.  
                                                 
46
 The authors have asked to see information. 
47
 http://www.iwf.org.uk/ (accessed 2nd September 2010). 
48
 The exact design of CleanFeed is not in the public domain. 
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All Internet traffic requires a source and destination IP address. The Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA)49, manages the global IP address space. IANA works with 
Regional Internet Registries - Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE 
NCC)50 in the case of the UK – to assigned IP address blocks to local Internet registries or 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). ISPs assign IP addresses to individual consumers and 
organisations. 
 
IP addresses may be recorded in traffic logs or captured by protocol analysers often called 
‘packet sniffers’. Many Internet criminals are traced via their IP address, as ISPs can map the 
address to subscriber information records. Although criminals can be identified via their IP 
address, the technique is unreliable as suspects may use a public terminal (library, Internet 
café, ‘Wi-Fi hotspot’), conceal their address behind a proxy or make use of a range of privacy 
techniques that are readily available. 
 
Suspects may also be traced from personal information they disclose either in conversation or 
information disclosed in their profile such as name, telephone number or address. Once a ‘real 
life’ suspect has been located, law enforcement can begin examining their computer for 
evidence of grooming (and other criminal activity). It is this stage where the (recovered) 
custom emoticon becomes relevant. 
 
 
MSN 
The .NET Messenger Service colloquially referred to as MSN is a messaging and presence 
service that was released to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in 1999 (Microsoft. 
1999, Movva & Lai. 1999]. The service can by accessed using Microsoft’s own client 
Windows Live Messenger (formerly MSN Messenger) or by third party application. As of 
2006 Europe had 82 million IM users, 60% of whom use MSN (comScore. 2006). 
 
MSN supports a standard set of emoticons. These are handled by passing the appropriate 
character sequence between clients. The character sequence is referenced (by the application) 
to an emoticon and each client will show its ‘own’ copy of the emoticon. For example user A 
enters :) [colon bracket], the client recognises the string as a emoticon ‘reference’ and 
displays the emoticon to user A, typically a smiley face.  The client will also send the string to 
user B. The remote client (user B) will recognise the string reference and also display an 
emoticon. When standard emoticons are used, only the reference character sequence is sent 
not the actual emoticon. 
 
For custom emoticons the situation is slightly different. If a user types the character sequence 
representing their unique custom emoticon, their client (application) will transmit the key 
sequence and the emoticon - the receiving computer will not have a copy of that unique 
emoticon. The custom emoticon is then embedded on the receiver’s machine and behaves like 
other standard emoticons for subsequent interactions. If the custom emoticon is unique to the 
sender this provides strong evidence that there was an interaction between the two parties. 
 
An obvious potential flaw in this system is that the receiver of the custom emoticon could 
potentially re-send the emoticon onto a third party which would erroneously imply that the 
child had also been interacting with this third party.  However, this is actually not an issue 
because of a side effect of compression which changes the hash of the (resent) emoticon even 
though it may look the same. 
 
                                                 
49
 http:// www.iana.org/ (accessed 20th August 2010). 
50
 http://www.ripe.net/ (accessed 20th August 2010). 
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CUSTOM EMOTICON MANUFACTURE AND DETECTION 
From the technical standpoint the system will function with any emoticon, nevertheless it is 
preferable to use an innocuous image in order to avoid attracting attention and to minimise the 
chances of the recipient attempting to identify and delete it from their machine. 
 
The aim of generating the custom emoticon is to make it unique to the user, yet relatively 
innocuous in its appearance. The approach borrows the idea from steganography - the science 
of hiding information in plain sight. An unsuspecting recipient may examine the emoticon 
and be presented with seemingly normal image. An informed user will however be able to 
extract additional 'secret' hidden information and identify the emoticon as being unique to the 
sender.   
 
This differs from cryptography in that cryptography will be apparent to any user – the user 
may not be able to decipher the encrypted message (only those possessing a key are able to 
access the information), steganographed information is available for all to see but one must 
know where to look. As a real world example, cryptography may be compared to a safe – 
everyone can see the safe but only those with a key or combination have access. 
Steganography is comparable to a hidden compartment or false wall – unless one knows 
where to look, one will find nothing. 
 
The unique custom emoticon is created by altering the colour value of a single pixel in a 24bit 
image. This subtle change is enough to make it unique yet without changing its overall 
appearance. Pixels have three colour channels (red, green and blue) each with 256 different 
shades, these combine (256*256*256), to provide 16.7m possible colours for each pixel51.  
Therefore a minor change in any channel will change the pixel (and thus the image) by an 
amount that can be detected by a computer but not the human eye. The product of this change 
is a unique52 image.  
 
When an emoticon becomes embedded on a recipient’s computer, it is not a straightforward 
task to find it. It is buried deep in the file system and does not have a readily identifiable 
filename. If a situation arises where the presence of the emoticon on a recipient’s machine is 
required for evidence, then it is of course necessary to be able to easily identify the emoticon 
file. 
 
In order to facilitate identification, the system generates a hash of the emoticon file prior to 
sending it. This hash can then be used to uniquely identify the emoticon. A hash is a one-way 
mathematical formula used to generate a unique fixed-length integer value regardless of the 
size of the source file or message. A minor change to a file or message will completely alter 
the hash value. The hash value is therefore unique for that particular emoticon and the 
emoticon can be identified by generating hashes for all emoticon files on the recipient’s 
computer and finding the file that yields the expected hash value53 
 
There is an additional complication in generating the hash value in that the client application 
(Windows Live Messenger) compresses the image used when creating the custom emoticon, 
thereby changing the hash value from that of the original image. It is therefore important to 
generate the hash from the file that the recipient will receive rather than the hash of the 
original emoticon image. In practice the best way to do this is to send the emoticon to a 
‘control’ machine and then generate the hash of the file received on that machine. If the 
                                                 
51
 In tests the authors used images with opacity support increasing the entropy to 32 bits. 
52
 The number of possible source emoticons, number of pixels per emoticon and colour range of pixel 
means the chance of two individuals independently created the same image is improbable enough to be 
termed unique. 
53
 Popular hash functions include MD5 and the National Security Agency (NSA) developed SHA-1. 
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receiving user attempts to recreate and resend the emoticon, as noted above, the image will be 
recompressed and the hash will change.  
 
The process for generating the unique custom emoticon is given in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Emoticon manufacture and issue 
 
In the event a suspect’s computer is seized and examined, and any emoticons are recovered 
these can be hashed and the hashes checked against the registry of stored emoticons. If a 
match is found this can be used in support of any legal action, see figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – Emoticon recovery 
 
 
JUSTIFICATION 
The process described here is part non-repudiation, part steganography and part illusion. Non- 
repudiation is the act of ensuring one party cannot dispute a contract, in this instance 
participating in an IM conversation. In the online world this is typically performed using 
digital signatures – each party signs the message with their private key, this can be verified 
(by other users) with their public key. This forms part of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
Digital signatures are viable only where both parties initially agree and sign with their private 
key. It is reasonable to assume groomers (and others of a criminal disposition) would be eager 
to disguise their identity from the start. This means any form of non-repudiation (in this case 
transmission of the emoticon) must be done in a way that does not require the cooperation of 
the receiver and does not attract their attention. This is sometimes referred to as a ‘drive-by 
download’. 
 
Stenganography, as discussed, hides information in plain sight. The minor change (pixel edit) 
performed to the emoticon changes the original in a way not readily detectable by the human 
eye but obvious when hashes are taken. Steganographing of the image is essential – it must be 
changed in order to be unique and the change must be hidden to avoid attracting attention. 
Electronic image steganography typically hides information using the least significant bits 
(LSB) of the pixel. In the system described here the content of the hidden information is not 
important, it serves as a marker which can (later) be used to identify the emoticon. 
 
The process relies on the illusion that nothing special or unusual has occurred, the recipient 
has received a plain, unremarkable emoticon – something that will neither attract attention nor 
warrant further investigation. To be successful the emoticon will be received, ignored and 
remain ‘unmolested’ within the computer file structure. 
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If the emoticon were unusual the recipient might wish to investigate or re-used the emoticon. 
If it were suspicious the recipient might delete it54. 
 
The illusion is aided by the design characteristics of the protocol - unlike file transfer, 
emoticons and display pictures are handled automatically, they are sent transparently to the 
recipient (the recipient does not need to accept them). Further, with the Microsoft client the 
received emoticon is stored using a non-obvious filename buried deep within the file 
structure. Finding the file is a non trivial task. 
 
The major governing factor is the existing technology. The technology was not designed to 
incorporate a non-repudiation function. This system has been conceived around these 
limitations.  
 
A valid argument can be made that those that wish to harm children will merely purge their 
systems of the custom emoticon using a secure delete procedure such as those that conform to 
the Department of Defense DOD 5220.22-M standard55. As counter to this criminals know 
they can be traced by their finger prints – yet many crimes are still solved in this manner. 
 
An argument can also be made that the custom emoticon can be faked or planted and as such 
fail to conclusively prove guilt. Finding the custom emoticon on a computer does not prove 
guilt or otherwise, it is circumstantial evidence that law enforcement organisations may use to 
build a case against a suspect. By itself it is conclusive of nothing, however since law 
enforcement would already have access to a suspect’s computer in order to have found the 
custom emoticon it would serve to support their suspicions and corroborate their case. 
Comparisons can be drawn to the use of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), found at crime scene 
it does not prove a suspect is guilty of a crime but it does provide circumstantial evidence. 
 
The custom emoticon may not be present on a suspect’s computer, there are numerous reason 
why this may be so – the suspect may have used a different computer, found and securely 
deleted the emoticon, used a variant (third party) chat client that does not support custom 
emoticons, etc. As discussed previously the custom emoticon itself is conclusive of nothing, 
neither is its absence. It would support a legal action but would not be the sum of evidence.  
 
The authors, while acknowledging these limitations, feel that any support to child 
protection/law enforcement activities is beneficial, as is any deterrent effect the approach may 
have on groomers.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has looked at instant messaging and its popularity among children and youth. It 
has discussed technical measures used to protect children on the Internet and augmenting 
these with proper oversight and rules, and a good parent child relationship. 
 
This paper has described the MSN Messenger Service Protocol and a method of leaving a 
‘digital fingerprint’ on a recipient’s computer during conversations. This method takes 
advantage of the (intended) operating characteristics of the protocol and does not involving 
‘hacking’ or vulnerability exploitation. 
 
The ‘digital fingerprint’ takes the form of a unique steganographed emoticon. It is made 
unique by making a minor change to the red, green or blue (and opacity, if supported) 
                                                 
54
 Deleted files can easily be retrieved using data recovery tools provided the data has not been 
overwritten. 
55
 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/522022m.htm (accessed 12 September 2008). 
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channel. The change is undetectable to the human eye but is easily distinguished and thus 
identified by taking a hash of the result.  
 
If a suspect’s computer is found to contain customised emoticons these can be hashed and 
checked against a registry. If matches exist they can be used as circumstantial evidence in 
support of legal actions. 
 
A unique steganographed emoticon could be included in a new third party MSN client, 
providing a simple, automated, ‘turn-key’ solution for the end user. 
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5. THE ONLINE CHILD PROTECTION DOMAIN 
In August 2002, two ten year old girls were murdered in Soham, Cambridgeshire 
(UK). Subsequent media coverage and government enquiries have elevated the 
subject of child protection to prominence in the public arena. New rules for those 
interacting with children could see 1-in-4 adults being vetted [103] as part of their 
work or social life. 
 
During the same period worries about child safety on the Internet have risen. This is 
driven in part by alarmist television shows such as To Catch a Predator56 but also by 
education and awareness campaigns pushed out by government and industry. This is 
often bundled with advice regarding Internet security and identity theft. 
 
In today’s society few crimes provoke more emotion and outrage than those 
committed against minors. Sexually based crimes against minors are considered 
particularly heinous; this is evident in both the media commentary and public reaction 
[1]. This public mood is undoubtedly shaped, in some part, by the public’s perception 
of child sex offenders. The generally accepted depiction of these individuals is 
malevolent stalkers who prey on innocent children, lurking in the shadows patiently 
waiting.  
 
Internet penetration in the UK is currently (September 2009) running at 76%57 
providing a new medium to those who prey on minors. Here too the public perception 
is of child molesters lurking in chat rooms and social networking forums popular with 
children to identify potential targets. Using information gleaned to manufacture online 
personae to mask their age and sexual intentions, enticing unknowing victims to 
offline meetings [2]. 
 
This has lead to much fear, uncertainty and doubt on the part of parents and guardians 
which may lead to the development of an overbearing parenting style which itself is 
having a negative effect on child development and societal practices [3]. 
 
                                                 
56
 http://www.itv.com/News/tonight/episodes/Tocatchapredator/default.html &  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10912603 (accessed 15 Oct. 09). 
57
 http://internetworldstats.com/europa.htm (accessed 12 Jan 10). 
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This chapter adopts a systems approach to understanding the online child protection 
ecosystem. It starts by defining what constitutes a paedophile and paedophilic actions 
and how this differs from those who have sexual interests in adolescences. The risks 
to children on the Internet from bullying, solicitation and unwanted exposure are 
enumerated. The Internet technologies and applications that are popular with children 
(chat rooms, gaming, social networks) are described and ranked in terms of the risk 
they pose. Existing technical measures (content filters, network level censorship) are 
described, where and when they are best used and their limitations are discussed. 
 
5.1 Systems Engineering thinking applied to the problem 
 
Systems Engineering is a branch of engineering that provides the theory and tools to 
manage the complexity inherent in modern engineering programmes, bridging the gap 
between the various technical specialties whilst maintaining oversight to eliminate 
programme drift and ensure customer requirements are met. 
 
Systems Engineering encompasses technology, processes and management activities 
to define systems, capture and refine programme requirements, verify and validate 
design concepts, manage tradeoffs and configuration, develop architectures and 
integrate with existing technology and systems, including human systems (people). 
 
The overarching goal is to deliver a high quality, fully functional product to the 
customer with minimal resources, waste and disruption while satisfying cost and time 
requirements. The complexity of modern engineering projects is beyond the skills and 
abilities of any individual or discipline. Systems Engineering seeks to understand and 
manage this complexity, bringing together integrated product teams from across 
engineering disciplines to approach the problem with a holistic view. 
 
While the traditional tools, models and metrics of Systems Engineering are not 
appropriate to the problem of online child protection, the ethos of systems thinking 
has been applied to the problem space in order to understand factors including 
 
• The motivation and requirement of stakeholders (groomers, children, parents, 
service providers, law enforcement, society, etc) 
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• The tradeoffs and conflicts between these requirements 
• The threats children face on the Internet 
• Threat vectors and technologies (chat rooms, instant messaging, email, 
webcams, social networking) 
• The existing technological measures available to protect children and the 
limitations of these measures 
• Procedural/Social techniques and behaviours that can be applied to protect 
children (parental rules, education)  
• Online behaviour and other factors that increase or mitigate the risk children 
are exposed to 
• The legacy system (the Internet)and how any solution must take into account 
it’s design and limitation 
 
Throughout this chapter the problem domain will be considered in a holistic manner 
that aims to derive the best use of resources to tackle child Internet safety, essentially 
providing the customer the best solution and best value for money. 
 
5.2 What is paedophilia? 
There is no standard agreed definition of paedophilia. The World Health Organisation 
(WHO) [4] defines paedophilia as a sexual preference for children, boys or girls or 
both, usually of prepubertal or early pubertal age.  
 
The American Psychiatric Association in The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM)58, specify the following diagnostic criteria for paedophilia 
[5] 
A. “Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing 
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a 
prepubescent child or children (generally age 13 years or younger);  
B. The person has acted on these sexual urges, or the sexual urges or fantasies 
cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty;  
                                                 
58
 Commentators have questioned the listing of paedophilia and other paraphilia  (psychosexual 
disorders) in the DSM, suggesting they been listed without any scientific or rational basis [6]. 
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C. The person is at least age 16 years and at least 5 years older than the child or 
children in Criterion A.” 
The generally acceptable definition of paedophilia among experts is a sexual 
deviation among adults for prepubescent children, where the adult is at least five years 
older than the minor. This is to exclude so called ‘Romeo and Juliet romances’ – 
relationships between similarly aged peers where one individual is under the age of 
consent. This definition is used in this thesis. 
 
The terms hebephilia and ehebephilia describe adults with a sexual interest in 
pubescent and post-pubescent minors. Though often illegal and perhaps socially 
unacceptable, these are not typically considered sexually deviant as minors are 
sexually mature at these stages. 
 
Kenneth Lanning [14], a veteran of the FBI Behavioural Science Unit describes a 
difference between paedophiles and child molesters; paedophiles have a sexual 
interest in children but may not act on these urges. A child molester engages in sexual 
activity with a child.  
 
Lanning states that child molesters cannot be readily defined as being in one or more 
discreet categories, instead they fall along a continuum – see figure 12. At one end of 
the continuum are situational offenders, they do not have a preference for children and 
are more likely to be aroused by adult pornography. Frequently they will molest 
children they have access to (their own, children of friends, children in the 
neighbourhood) and are opportunistic. Often with low self-esteem and poor coping 
skills, they may molest under stress. Morally indiscriminate, they use and abuse all 
around – family, friends, co-workers, simply because they can. With feelings of 
inadequacy they see children as non-threatening sexual objects. They are likely to be 
less intelligent and of lower socioeconomic status.  
 
At the other end of the continuum are preferential offenders - they prefer children. 
They molest children not out of insecurity but a sexual desire for children. They have 
a need for repeated sex with children and will have age and gender preferences. 
Introverted offenders often molest young children or strangers. Some may be sadistic 
 and need to inflict pain and humiliation. Diverse offenders will experiment with many 
paraphilia59. Preferential offenders are likely to be more 
socioeconomic status. 
 
 
Situation Offender (>more likely ) 
Impulsive  
Lower Socioeconomic  Status  
Less Intelligent  
MO (does what works)  
Opportunistic  
Figure 12 - Sex offender motivation continuum (Lanning)
 
In the past the Internet offender was more likely to be of higher intelligence and 
status, but this continues to 
 
When discussing technical measures this thesis uses the term groomers to describe 
those using the Internet to contact minors for sexual means who may or may not 
continue to molest children. 
scientific discourse.  When discussing sociologically and non technical measures, or 
where it is necessary to distinguish, protection measures will be defined in terms of 
pre- or post –pubescent children.
individual under the age of legal consent in the UK (16). Some of the research 
referenced in this thesis has been conducted in jurisdictions outside the UK (primarily 
the United States) where the age of conse
accounted for in the analysis.
 
                                                
59
 Paraphilia are psychosexual disorders including (but not limited to) voyeurism (watching others ha
sex), urophilia (involving urine, colloquially ‘golden showers’), scatolgia (obscene talk). Consensual 
adult activities including role play and superficial, sexual fetishism (e.g. use of sex toys) does not 
necessarily constitute paraphilia.
intelligent and of a higher 
 Preferential Offender (>more likely )  
Compulsive  
Higher  Socioeconomic  Status  
More Intelligent  
Ritualistic  
Desire  
 
dissipate as Internet access becomes ever more ubiquitous.
The author feels the term predator too emotive a term for 
 The term child or minor is used to describe an 
nt differs. Where possible this is noted and 
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5.3 Risks to children online 
Although empirical data exists on solicitation, bullying and exposure to inappropriate 
content it is difficult to define metrics for how harmful this may be. Research 
indicates that a minority of youth [43] [71] are troubled by online solicitation or 
inappropriate content, most simply ignore it and consider it ‘the price of doing 
business on the Internet’. 
 
Side-by-side comparisons of surveys and other literature is extremely difficult, there 
is no agreed definition of solicitation or bullying. Again the Crimes Against Children 
Research Center (in the YISS surveys [72] [73]) have a concise definitions and these 
are clearly described in their papers. This lack of agreed definition and standards 
means researchers can have wildly differing findings in the same area, with same 
papers seeming to contradict others, for example 
 
• Research suggests that around half [66] are not bothered by pornography and 
25% (of children unintentionally exposed to pornography) are extremely 
distressed and 20% are mildly distressed [64]. There is no indication as to 
what form the pornography takes (topless soft-core, BDSM60 hardcore).  
 
• Exposure to pornography leads to deviant sexual practices and behaviour [74], 
or pornographic exposure leads to no increase and perhaps even a decrease in 
sex crimes [32]and little scientific evidence about the risk to children [64] 
[66]. 
 
The difficulties involved in researching this area are further explored in subsequent 
sections. 
 
Vulnerable children – those with a history of abuse (physical, psychological, sexual), 
children who have a poor relationship with their parents, those who are isolated from 
their peer group, lacking in self confidence, with low self-esteem or who are bullied 
are at greater risk of all types of Internet victimisation [19] [42] [66] [71]. 
                                                 
60
 Bondage, Discipline, Sadism and Masochism (BDSM), is form of sexual role play and expression 
based are power and pain. 
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5.3.1 Bullying 
Grooming, sexual solicitation and inappropriate content receive most attention when 
online child protection is discussed. Bullying however is more than twice as common 
as solicitation [41]. Figures also show children who are victims of bullying are more 
likely to report being distressed or frightened (33%) [42] than those who are targets of 
online solicitation (25%) [43] [44]. 
 
Willard [45] enumerates the various forms of bullying as flaming (online fighting), 
harassment (insulting messages), denigration (rumours and gossip), impersonation, 
outing (revealing secrets), trickery, exclusions and cyberstalking (intense and repeated 
harassment and denigration). 
 
Ybarra and Mitchell [42] estimate 30% of youth are involved in bullying as either 
victim, bully, or both. They also found that blocking software and household rules on 
Internet use had no significant effect on bullying. Messages about Internet behaviour 
or reducing time spent online were insufficient in tackling the problem. They 
recommend promoting positive parenting and youth involvement in anti-bullying 
initiatives. 
 
The definition of school bullying typically requires 3 criteria  
• Aggressive acts, verbal included with intent to harm  
• Repetition  
• Imbalance of power.  
 
Because of the widely varying characteristics of cyber bullying, Wolak et al [56], 
encourage use of the term online harassment instead. Their research suggests 9% of 
children are harassed online, 55% of these harassments were from people the victim 
had not met in real life. Whether these harassers were known in real life but adopted 
pseudonyms (sometimes called sock puppets) is not known. Also interesting among 
their findings was the difference between harassment from known real world peers 
and online only contacts. Further they found that half (49%) of targets terminated 
their bullying by blocking or ignoring the harasser. 
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Patchin and Hinduja [69] champion the term cyberbullying and equate it more to 
violence than harassment - it can lead to violence, injury and even death for both bully 
and victim and is commonly a driver for aggression, depression and abuse. They 
describe how the psychological abuse of cyberbullying may be worse then physical 
abuse – 31.9% of victims reported being affected at school, 26.5% affected at home, 
20.4% affected with friends. These effects, occurring during such formative periods of 
a child’s life may have consequences stretching well into adulthood.  
 
Campbell [75] too feels that cyberbullying may be more severe than face-to-face 
bullying. She cautions against simply punishing bullies, as this is of questionable 
efficacy in the offline world and would be impossible to apply against anonymous 
cyberbullies. She encourages peer group involvement i.e. bystander intervention, this 
may be effective in public forums such as social network profiles and chat rooms, but 
would not be applicable in private environments such as email or text message. 
 
In order for there to be a proper understanding of the problem and meaningful 
comparison of literature, researchers need to develop a common language of agreed 
terms and definitions. In addition there needs to be qualitative research conducted to 
distinguish relatively minor incidents from serious events and in the harm done by 
bullying. Continuing research is also required to understand the long term effects of 
online bullying. 
 
5.3.2 Unwanted Exposure 
In the UK there are numerous laws that restrict access to offline media content. The 
Obscene Publications Act 1959 outlaws materials (texts, images, audio and video) 
that “tend to deprave and corrupt” [60]. The British Board of Film Classification 
(BBFC) is an NGO (funded by the film industry) to classify videos61and some 
computer games (those with violence, sexual content, or encouragement of illegal 
activities e.g. Grand Theft Auto), under the Video Recordings Act 1984 / 2010 [61]. 
Sections 63-66 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 prohibits 
                                                 
61
 Local authorities have the power to define the circumstances under which films are shown in 
cinemas, but they rarely deviate from BBFC advice. 
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pornography that realistically depicts threats to a persons life, serious injury to 
breasts, the anus or genitals, sex with a corpse, or sex with animals [63]. 
 
The UK has not seen a successful prosecution under the Obscene Publication Act in 
over 30 years, indeed a trial collapsed against a UK civil servant in 2009 when the 
prosecution offered no evidence [62]. Selling any video without BBFC certificate (or 
exemption) on the packaging is an offence. 
 
These acts ensure physical media available in the UK adhere to certain standards and 
to prevent minors acquiring age restricted media. The Internet allows individuals to 
distribute content without the costs associated with physical distribution and without 
age verification checks. The structure of the Internet allows individuals to legitimately 
post/host content that would be illegal under UK law.  
 
Responsible adult industry websites have warnings on their landing pages and content 
labelling indicating they are for adults only [76]. Disreputable Internet distributors 
attempt to maximise pornographic exposure to all (often in conjunction with other 
illegal activities e.g. SPAM, malware, viruses). 
 
In addition to pornography, parents may be keen to protect children from hate sites, 
bigotry, violence and sites promoting or glamorising illicit activities such as drug 
taking. 
 
The generally accepted position is that exposure to pornography is distressing to 
children and may shape their long term sexual development. While some may find it 
distressing or embarrassing, there is no significant evidence of long term harm [64] 
[65]. Younger children lack the maturity to understand pornography; they are usually 
annoyed or disinterested by it. Older children tend to find unsolicited pornography an 
irritant like spam. Some minors may be distressed by extreme pornography – explicit 
scenes of bondage where pain and physical trauma are involved.   
 
The limitations of this evidence should be noted - the effects of pornography on 
minors cannot easily be researched because of ethical issues, the body of work is 
small and no consensus exists (indeed some findings are contradictory) [66].  
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Exposure to hate content can be a problem as children often lack the critical skills 
necessary to evaluate source material. There is no scientific consensus on the effects 
of exposure to violent content [66]. 
 
5.3.3 Solicitation 
‘Stranger danger’, ‘Online groomer’, ‘Internet predator’ – these terms are frequently 
bandied about, particularly by the more shrill and alarmist elements of the media [2] 
[14]. 
Undoubtedly molestation is a horrific crime and a parent’s nightmare, but how does 
‘real world’ solicitation compare with anecdotes from the media? Online groomers 
are typically described as combing the Internet looking for children, befriending them 
with fake personae, tricking them into performing online sex acts and arranging real 
life meetings [67]. While there are undoubtedly individuals who operate in this way, 
their behaviour is atypical and they represent a very small minority of groomers. The 
true picture of solicitation and grooming is someway removed from this depiction. 
Research shows the typical groomer does not conceal his62 age or intents, groomers 
may shave a few years off their true age but by and large they are honest about their 
age and bring their sexual desires into the conversation early on [2]. The 
overwhelming majority of Internet initiated sex encounters (with minors) involve 
post-pubescent minors. Typically such individuals are physically mature and sexually 
aware, they are willing, in some cases enthusiastic participants in their own abuse. 
Cases involving prepubescent minors are virtually unheard of and it may be the case 
that the child has already been sexualised – groomed or abused within the friends and 
family circle. Internet initiated grooming of prepubescent children is so rare because 
of the difficulty engaging them sexually (something beyond their maturity and 
understanding) and because they are more closely supervised online. 
Society refuses to accept the image of minors as active agents; happy to meet older 
men for sex, yet these headstrong adolescents typically describe a strong romantic 
link or report being in love. If/when these relationships are uncovered nearly half of 
victims refuse to cooperate with law enforcement against their abuser [14]. Society’s 
                                                 
62
 The overwhelming majority though not all Internet sex crimes are committed by men. 
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refusal to accept the evidence, instead falling back on an artificial reality - helped by 
egregious media accounts and in some case official guidance and literature, could be 
increasing the risk to children. If children and parents are misinformed of the risks, 
how can they adequately protect themselves and their children? 
As with elsewhere in the child protection ecosystem, terms – in this case solicitation -
are frequently bandied around without explanation or context. The literature often 
reports 1-in-7 youths are solicited by online predators, citing research from the 
University of New Hampshire. The research authors concerned about the misuse of 
this statistic put out a release explaining it [68].  The solicitations did not necessarily 
come from predators – many came from the youth’s peer group, often solicitations 
were limited to vulgar comments like, “What’s your bra size?”. Two thirds of the 
victims were untroubled by the solicitations and almost all handled the situation easily 
and effectively. 
While still a source of concern, online solicitation is not as pervasive and filled with 
dishonest predatory men as many have been led to believe.  
5.4 Threat vectors 
To ensure the reader is fully informed this section will briefly look at the technologies 
the Internet provides children and the risks they pose. 
 
Chat rooms are primarily a web based platform where individuals can chat in a public 
environment or select users (from those logged into the site) and engage in private 
communication. It is analogous to a party, conversations can be public or ‘taken 
quietly’ to the periphery (private one to one). Until recently chat rooms posed the 
greatest risk of solicitation to minors [43], IM now poses the greatest risk (see table 
1). Chat rooms involved in Internet initiated sex crimes are typically keyed towards 
teens, geographical locations, dating and romance and in some potentially worrying 
cases, sexual encounters between adults and children [17]. 
 
Instant Messaging (IM) provides a private medium for users to chat one-to-one, or in 
groups. IM requires users to have an existing relationship. IM has support for 
presence (reveals whether the user is logged on / away / busy, etc) and many IM 
platforms also support audio and video communications. Bullies and solicitors may be 
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finding children’s IM detailed from sources such as blogs or social networking 
profiles. IM clients typically allow users to block unwelcome contacts, indeed this is 
what the majority of children do [68]. 
  
Online gaming provides a multiplayer element to traditional computer games. 
Massive Multi Player Online Games (MMPOG) further extend the concept with 
hundreds, even thousands players involved in the game. 
 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is similar conceptually to chat rooms – themed ‘rooms’ 
called channels, support group discussion and one-to-one communication via private 
message.  
 
Weblogs (blogs) are a form of online public diary, in addition people may leave 
comments. There is concern that personal information written in a blog could be used 
to build a profile of the child which could be used to harass or solicit, however this 
does not appear to be happening [2] [41]. 
 
Short Message Service (SMS) text messages – while not strictly an Internet 
application it is included here for completeness. Messages up to 160 characters in 
length are sent between mobile telephones or often between the Internet and a mobile 
phone. Mobile phones are a source of concern because of their pervasiveness, as 
communications become more unified and ‘smart phones’ with more features become 
the norm, traditional Internet threats will continue to migrate to this platform. 
 
Social Networking has become such a major component of the Internet in recent years 
it is covered in more detail in the subsequent section. 
 
Many of these technologies are converging, for example the social networking 
platform Facebook includes a chat client, essentially IM functionality that can be used 
independently of the main site. Many individuals also use their SNS to blog, though to 
a lesser extent than those who maintain a full blog. 
 
The rapid evolution of the Internet and speed with which services take hold or fall 
from public favour means usage and risk profiles can quickly become outdated.  
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Table 1 shows a breakdown of solicitation and harassment by platform/application, 
based on responses from (a statistically significant sample of) 10- to 15-year-olds.  
 
 Solicitation63, %   Harassment/Cyberbully , % 
IM 6.2 16.5 
Chat rooms 4.5 5.9 
SNS 4.2 8.2 
Email 2.4 6.2 
Games 2.8 7.8 
Blogging 0.8 2.5 
Table 2 - Minors solicited or harassed online in the past 12 months, (Source [41]). 
 
One activity known to increase the risk to children is discussing sex on the Internet 
with strangers [77]. However Subrahmanyam et al [78] found that teens’ primary 
source of sexual information is their peer group (little is known of the substance or 
quality of this information). Adolescents discuss sex as way of understanding and 
controlling their emotions. Maintaining open communications can serve as a coping 
mechanism for sexual expression, particularly when providing an anonymous forum 
for discussing embarrassing issues. They suggest it might be preferable to have 
children engage in online relationships and cybersex64 as this entails less risky 
behaviour, particularly unprotected sex. Cybersex and online relationships may allow 
girls (the greater risk group) to exercise more control as they are recognised to possess 
superior communication skills. 
 
5.5 Social Networking 
Social Networking has seen a meteoric rise in recent years, in January 2009 the two 
top Social Networking Sites (SNS) - Facebook and MySpace recorded over 2 billion 
visits [15]. The format of SNS differs between providers but typically a user would 
post information about themselves, photos and links to friends’ profiles. Some SNS 
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 Defined as all unwanted online requests to youth to talk about sex, answer personal questions about 
sex or do something sexual. Most were limited to brief online comments or questions in chatrooms or 
instant messages. Many were simply rude, vulgar comments like, “What’s your bra size?” 
64
  Cybersex is a form of computer mediated communication where users send each other sexual 
explicit messages – it may include fantasy, role playingand real life masturbation.  
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profiles have privacy controls limiting the amount of information that can be seen by 
strangers, others show everything.  
 
Does having a SNS profile increase the risk to minors online? Smith at Pew Internet 
[16] found that 49% of teens use social networks to make new friends and 32% were 
contacted by a stranger65. 7% of teens felt scared or uncomfortable as a result of 
contact with a stranger, this was far more likely among girls. No association was 
found between the type of information (name, address, email, school, etc) posted and 
the prevalence of stranger contact, but those who post photos online or had profiles 
were more likely to be contacted by a stranger. 
 
Most sources [18] contend that exposing personal information on the Internet is a 
risky behaviour. Whilst possibly counterintuitive, research indicates [2] [41] that 
posting personal information on a SNS or blog does not increase the likelihood of 
harassment or sexual victimisation. However limiting the amount of personal 
information openly available on the Internet can be valuable in keeping such 
information private from college admissions tutors and future employers [17]. It may 
also be valuable to minimise such disclosures as a defence against identity theft. 
 
Despite the ‘apparent’ increase in risk that accompanies SNS use – exposure of 
personal information, posting photographs and the desire to meet new people, social 
networking does not increase the risk to minors [19]. In fact youths report 
considerably less instances of both sexual solicitation and harassment in social 
networking, than in other Internet activities. A survey of 1,588 10-15 year olds 
revealed 15% reported an unwanted sexual solicitation on the internet in the previous 
12 months; only 4% reported a solicitation on a SNS specifically. 43% reported being 
the target of harassment on the Internet; only 9% reported harassment on a SNS. 
Among victims more solicitation and harassment took place on IM (43% and 55% 
respectively) than social networking (27% and 28%) [41]. 
 
Social Networking has been a hot topic for legislators. In summer 2006 the US 
Congress held four hearings on social networking, resulting in calls for greater 
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 Defined as someone with no connection to you or any of your friends 
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regulation and oversight of these sites with such claims as “[social networking is a] 
virtual hunting ground for predators” [41]. 
 
In the period 2007-2008 the SNS MySpace removed the account of 90,000 registered 
sex offenders [20]. Roy Cooper, the North Carolina Attorney General66 (AG) said 
"Predators are going to trawl in these areas where they know children are going to be. 
That's why these social networking sites have the responsibility to make their sites 
safe for children." boyd [sic] [21] accuses these AG of political grandstanding and 
fear mongering, pointing out that many offences (including public urination [22]) can 
lead to sex offender registration, none of which involve children. Nor is it illegal for 
sex offenders to have social network profiles (unless this is a condition of their licence 
(probation)). 
 
The Internet Safety Technical Task Force (ISTTF) [19] was created in 2008 by the US 
Attorneys General Multi-State Working Group on Social Networking to assess the 
risks to children posed by such technologies. 
 
Pennsylvania AG Cooper uses the MySpace figure to attack the findings of the ISTTF 
as being “outdated and inadequate”. Willard [23] analysed the work of the 
Pennsylvania Child Predator Unit67 arrest data, based on press releases from the AG. 
She found 143 articles containing the word ‘predator’ over a four year period. Her 
finding revealed 
• 8 incidents where the Internet was used to form the relationship (4 were 
reported by parents or teens, 4 were discovered from files after sting 
operations), 5 of these led to sexual encounters. 
• 166 arrests are reported as the result of sting operations (144 were in chat 
rooms, 11 IM, 9 unspecified). 
• Only 12 predators lied about their age. 
• No arrest took place as a result of SNS communications. 
• In one instance involving a teen victim communications took place on 
MySpace, this was a re-arrest. 
                                                 
66
 The position of a state Attorney General is political, the majority of Attorneys General are elected 
included all mentioned here. 
67
 Formed by AG Cooper in 2005 using specially trained agents and prosecutors [70] 
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• One was a police officer who sexually abused girls he met in the line of 
duty. He had a MySpace account linked to a teen girl – there is no assertion 
that this led to sex. 
• In one sting the predator offered a Facebook link. 
• The sting profiles set up by the Child Predator Unit did not use MySpace 
protective features. 
• There appears to have been no MySpace stings in the past two years despite 
honey trap profiles 
 
AG Corbett stated the Internet is the primary means for predators contacting victims. 
In the past 4 years the Child Predator Unit (10 staff) have discovered 8 incidents of 
sexual abuse involving actual teens where the Internet was used to form a 
relationship. During a single year Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape68 recorded 
9,934 child victims of sexual abuse. 
 
The Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape reported seeing increased use of digital 
media to manufacture child porn by family and friends, not SNS based offences [23]. 
The author suspects the ubiquity of digital media especially digital cameras (devoid of 
need of third party processing) would see an increase in all photography of an illicit 
nature (e.g. images of drug taking/street fighting). 
 
In one press release the sting took place in an ‘Internet romance chat room’ [23]. This 
suggests that while the victim may have been exploited, they would probably not have 
been misled (at least about the ‘predator’s’ intention). 
  
These results are inline with the findings of the ISSTF (and others – see table 1), chat 
rooms and IM pose a far greater risk to children than SNS and the overwhelming 
majority of child abuse is at the hands of family, friends and individuals known to the 
family, not Internet strangers [14] [19]. 
 
Willard is also scathing of age verification for accessing SNS and other services [24] 
she argues that any non-industry wide system would fail as users would go elsewhere, 
                                                 
68
 Founded in 1975, it operates a network of rape crisis centres and engages in advocacy work 
http://www.pcar.org/about-pcar (accessed 01 June 2010). 
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whilst wide scale systems would invite [civil liberties] protests and evasion 
technologies. Evasion technologies likely means technologies similar to Internet 
‘anonymisers’ [sic] and Digital Right Management (DRM) strippers used to remove 
copyright protection from digital media. 
 
The Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) Centre has been demanding 
sites display its ‘Panic Button’ (a large graphic, linking to the CEOP website) on user 
profiles. The CEOP button is displayed on the Bebo69 SNS and the Window Live 
Messenger (MSN) chat client [57]. Despite the relative safety of SNS, CEOP CEO 
Jim Gamble, with the support of UK Home Secretary Alan Johnson, has been publicly 
attacking Facebook70 for refusing to publish his organisation’s button. [58]. Facebook 
has dedicated safety teams providing 24 hour support in 70 languages [57]. Forum 
commentators have also noted that Facebook is an international site and CEOP is a 
UK organisation. BBC online forums [59], generally considered to be a barometer of 
public opinion in the UK, show little support (10% of posting as of April 2010 – six 
months after the article) for CEOP’s position. 
 
This paints some politicians as either woefully misinformed or exploiting a public fear 
for political reasons. Regardless of the motivation this has a number of undesirable 
consequences. It leads parents and the public to false conclusions, leaving them 
poorly informed about the risks, this in turn leads them to make poor decisions 
regarding children in their care. Further, it may result in unnecessary and largely 
ineffective legislation that does little to protect children on the Internet. This in turn 
may have the knock-on effect of giving parents and others a false sense of security. 
 
Dangers to children do exist on the Internet, but social networking is not the greatest 
threat. Though probably not a good idea, posting personal information on the Internet 
on blogs and SNS pages does not increase the risk to children.  
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 http://www.bebo.com (accessed 6 April 2010) 
70
 http://www.facebook.com (accessed 6 April 2010) 
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5.6 Child Pornography 
The COmbating Paedophile Information Networks in Europe (COPINE) scale 
provides a typology of Internet child pornography images (also called child abuse 
images). In the UK the Sentencing Advisory Panel71 (2002), advising on cases (in 
England and Wales) involving child pornography adapted the scale – dropping levels 
1-3 on the grounds that nakedness is not indicative of indecency and combined levels 
4-6 [51]. The COPINE Scale is increasingly being used as measure of the seriousness 
of an offence and even how dangerous an offender might be. See table 2 for details. 
 
CS SAP Description 
1 N/A Indicative: Non-erotic and non-sexualised pictures showing children in 
their underwear, swimming costumes etc. from either commercial 
sources or family albums. Pictures of children playing in normal settings, 
in which the context or organisation of pictures by the collector indicates 
inappropriateness. 
2 N/A Nudist: Pictures of naked or semi-naked children in appropriate nudist 
settings and from legitimate sources. 
3 N/A Erotica: Surreptitiously taken photographs of children in play areas or 
other safe environments showing either underwear or varying degrees of 
nakedness. 
4 1 Posing: Deliberately posed pictures of children fully clothed, partially 
clothed or naked (where the amount, context and organisation suggests 
sexual interest). 
5 1 Erotic Posing: Deliberately posed pictures of fully, partially clothed or 
naked children in sexualised or provocative poses. 
6 1 Explicit Erotic Posing: Pictures emphasising genital areas, where the 
child is either naked, partially clothed or fully clothed. 
7 2 Explicit Sexual Activity: Pictures that depict touching, mutual and self-
masturbation, oral sex and intercourse by a child, not involving an adult.
  
8 3 Assault: Pictures of children being subject to a sexual assault, involving 
digital touching, involving an adult. 
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 http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/ (accessed 29 July 2010) 
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9 4 Gross Assault: Grossly obscene pictures of sexual assault, involving 
penetrative sex, masturbation or oral sex, involving an adult. 
10 5 Sadistic/Bestiality: a) Pictures showing a child being tied, bound, 
beaten, whipped or otherwise subject to something that implies pain. b) 
Pictures where an animal is involved in some form of sexual behaviour 
with a child. 
Table 3 - COPINE Scale (CS) and SAP = Sentencing Advisory Panel (SAP) 
 
Those who have been subjects in child abuse imagery frequently report feelings of 
guilt, depression, aggression and difficulty concentrating [14] [51]. These feelings 
may be enforced by knowledge that such imagery continues to exist.  
 
 It is difficult to imagine a reasonable person who would condone child pornography 
(when considering the suffering of its subjects), however Computer Generated Images 
(CGI), sometimes referred to as ‘Photoshopping’ can create photo realistic images 
where no child is ever harmed. CGI and other artificial images can show children in a 
sexualised fashion without any victim. For example lolicon and shotacon - sub 
categories of manga and anime (Japanese comics) features sexualised imagery of 
prepubescent girls and boys. 
 
The remainder of this section, when referring to child abuse imagery and child 
pornography shall mean material that has been created where no child was harmed, 
unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
 
With no victim, where no child is harmed, the only rational argument against child 
pornography is that it leads to a normalisation of inappropriate feelings, which in turn 
leads to an increased risk of (real life) child abuse. This is the generally accepted view 
[46] [48] [79]. 
 
Research indicates that the spread of wholesome adult pornography (featuring no 
children) and easy access to it, especially via the Internet has led to a reduction (or at 
least no increase) in rape, sexual assault and sexual abuse [31] [32]. Pornography 
allows the user to satisfy their fantasies and provides a cathartic release; this can be as 
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part of a multi-person sexual relationship or individually in masturbation. If 
pornography leads to a reduction in the rate of rape and sexual assault, why does 
exposure to child pornography lead to an increase in the rate of child abuse? Are 
seemingly identical activities (viewing pornography) leading to diametrically 
opposing outcomes? 
 
The fear that artificial child pornography (real child pornography was already 
prohibited under the Protection of Children Act72) triggers an inevitable spiral into 
child abuse has led (in the UK) to section 49 of the Coroners and Justice Bill73 – 
‘Possession of prohibited images of children’. This outlaws child abuse images that 
do not contain real children (computer generated imagery, cartoons, drawings). 
During the consultation period the Home Office and the Police expressed disgust at 
some cartoons and manga, but no evidence was found that such images could fuel 
abuse by reinforcing potential abusers’ inappropriate feelings towards children [46].  
 
The consultation document cites a single case in which police raided an individual 
and found them in possession of only cartoon images. They had no choice but to hand 
the material back and allow its owner to walk free. “It is possible that this exemplifies 
that category mentioned by Lord Hunt in summing up on extreme porn: people whom 
the police would like to "do something about", but who haven’t actually broken any 
laws” [46]. 
 
A well known Internet image series showing members of the Simpsons cartoon family 
in lewd poses would fit into this category [47], indeed Australia has seen two 
convictions (2008 & 2010) for possession of this material [52][53]. Technically the 
Olympics 2012 logo also falls foul of this legislation (some reporting it resembles 
cartoon character Lisa Simpson performing fellatio) [50], however its establishment 
backing makes any investigation unlikely. 
 
Liberal Democrat MP Jenny Willott is among those who question the veracity of 
claims regarding the viewing of child abuse imagery leading to real world abuse. 
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 http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?parentActiveTextDocId=1502057&ActiveTextDocId=15 
02059 (accessed on 01 June 2010) 
73
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmbills/072/09072.25-31.html#j3_100a 
(accessed on 01 June 2010) 
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Raising the issue in a parliamentary cross-party committee hearing of the Coroners 
and Justice Bill [48], she later elaborated 
 
"This is the case with the sections on possession of Cartoon images... We are being 
asked to choose between two conflicting world views: on the one hand there is a belief 
in the 'slippery slope', that looking at images habituates individuals to the actions 
involved and can increase the risk to children; on the other it is argued that these 
images act as a release and actually reduce the incidence of harm.  
 
"It is worrying that we appear to be legislating on this subject without hard evidence 
either way – especially when getting it wrong could have such serious implications 
for children. We have passed laws against possessing indecent images of children, 
because such images are evidence of harm committed: that is clearly not the case with 
CGI imagery and before we criminalise it, we should be prepared to come up with 
evidence of harm caused by the impact of seeing that image.” [49] 
 
There is no consensus about the potentially ‘enabling’ qualities of child pornography, 
some experts argue it is a stepping stone to abuse [79], others contending that it helps 
prevent child abuse [80]. There is no significant evidence of a causative link [2]. 
 
If child pornography, where no real child is harmed, does increase the risk of real 
world child abuse, then Section 49 of the Coroners and Justice Bill is sound 
legislation. However if the bill was crafted, based not on evidence, but good 
intentions, subjective morality, or a desire to ‘appease decency’ it maybe unnecessary 
or even increasing the risk to children. Rather than being a driver for child abuse such 
images might serve as substitute for it. It is alarming to consider that laws designed to 
protect children may in fact be endangering them. 
 
Whether such images increase or decrease the overall risk to children is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it is certainly an interesting and valuable area for psychological 
research. What is of concern is that without clear evidence, good intentions and knee-
jerk responses might be worsening the situation. The author calls for more research 
and evidence based legislation. Conducting research on the matter would probably be 
illegal in the UK. 
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5.7 Current safety / prevention message 
At a ‘grass roots’ level UK government agency CEOP has an excellent website 
promoting Internet safety aimed at children. Thinkuknow74 [sic] is divided into three 
age categories (5-7, 8-10and 11-16) with advice relevant to the target age group. It 
introduces children to the idea that things may not be as they appear, that individuals 
may be deceptive and concepts such as limiting the amount of personal information 
disclosure. It is not without short comings; in a section on IM it says “Be careful not 
to share too much information with other people in chat rooms. You don’t know who 
could be listening in or what they might do with that information.” [81]. This is (in the 
author’s opinion) probably good advice, but it is known that youth perceive this as 
unrealistic and will tend to ignore it [43]. In a section on social networking it says “Be 
careful who you agree to accept into your forums / private chat areas.”  [82] yet 
adolescents often use the Internet to make new friends [16] [83].  
 
The ‘ClickCEOP’ button is a graphic linking to the CEOP website where individuals 
can report abuse or seek advice [85]. In the media CEOP have described the button as 
analogous to a burglar alarm that shows (users) children are in a ‘protected’ 
environment [59]. CEOP have even linked the death of Ashleigh Hall (the 17 year old 
who met her killer on Facebook75, which does not have the button), to the absence of 
the button [84]. Home Secretary Alan Johnson and Liberal Democrat MP Chris 
Huhne joined the debate attacking Facebook for not featuring the button [86]. 
 
Though not perfect, Thinkuknow offers useful, practical advice and age relevant 
guidance to children (also parents and teachers). At the same time CEOP are 
‘muddying the waters’ in the media – the ClickCEOP button may act as a deterrent 
but it provides no protection, it doesn’t monitor activities, profile behaviour or 
respond to events. Ashleigh Hall also used MSN to communicate with her killer – 
MSN does feature the ClickCEOP button (she did not use CEOP resources but she 
would probably have been aware of them). This media campaign and the supporting 
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 http://www.thinkuknow.co.uk/ (accessed on 29 July 2010) 
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 Facebook have since reached an agreement with CEOP whereby users can opt to have the 
ClickCEOP button on their profile – CEOP wanted it to appear on every profile. 
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comments from government ministers and parliamentarians serves to confuse parents, 
children and the public with spurious and unnecessary information. 
 
5.8 Examination of current protection software 
This section will examine some of the existing technical measures available to protect 
children on the Internet discussing both their strengths and limitations. 
 
5.8.1 Content Filtering 
Software installed on the home computer can restrict access to certain websites, for 
example those with pornographic or violent content. Typical users can block content 
based on categories such as sex, criminal skills, drugs etc. Entire applications and 
protocols may also be blocked but this is typically permit/deny rather than content 
filtering. 
Content on the Internet can be identified through three ways, the owner can mark the 
content, a reviewer can categorise it or automated processes can categorise it. All 
three methods involve some measure of subjectivity (the automated process has to be 
programmed/developed by a person). Unlike responsible pornographic webmasters, 
Internet criminals often host malware under the guises of pornography, such 
individuals are unlikely to employ content marking techniques, as their goal is to 
maximise infection. Manual review of sites is un-scalable given the enormous amount 
of content on the internet – the claims of content filtering providers have been 
challenged before the US Congress [25]. Automated content review analyses content 
on the fly, traditionally this has been performed with keyword spotting, this approach 
has a very high failure rate [25] [19] [64].  
There is evidence that the US conservative Christian right is influencing the quality of 
content filtering software, introducing a bias against non-traditional religions (new 
age spirituality) and sites providing sexual health information to homosexuals [87]. 
Content filtering is beneficial for preventing accidental exposure to unwelcome 
material and is suitable for protecting younger naïve children. Against head strong 
teenagers, especially technically competent individuals seeking such content, filters 
offer minimal value. 
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5.8.2 Monitoring 
It is possible for parents to monitor and review their children’s’ Internet activities, this 
might include examining website histories, reading emails, IM logs, system logs, even 
installing key loggers. Monitoring can be performed automatically and holistically or 
manually on a per event/application basis. It can be conducted covertly or with the 
child’s knowledge. 
 
If a child uses the Internet frequently or for extended periods, or in houses with more 
than one child using the Internet, monitoring quickly becomes unscaleable. Older 
children and teens may object on grounds of trust and privacy. Research indicates that 
parents struggle to decipher youth lingo on the Internet [25] which limits the efficacy 
of monitoring and as with filtering, technically competent youths will be able to 
circumvent this or use an Internet connection elsewhere (school, library, Internet 
café). 
 
Monitoring may encourage good behaviour on the part of youths who know they are 
being monitored and may be useful to monitor children during periods of concern, e.g. 
a parent worried their child is taking drugs or involved with the ‘wrong crowd’. 
 
Monitoring does not correlate to reduced risk of Internet victimisation [17], but is 
indicative of lower likelihood of stranger contact [16]. 
 
Martin, Durbin, Pawlewski and Parish [90] present a novel approach for 
monitoring/review in Internet ‘chat’ environments. Intelligent text analysis is used to 
identify potential ‘conversations of concern’; these conversations would then be 
anonymously reviewed by other parents in a community effort. Parents would, if 
necessary, receive feedback alerting them that their child was engaged in potentially 
unsafe behaviour, but not the original ‘message of concern’. In this approach children 
would be allowed privacy (from their parents) but would be monitored by technology 
and community members. In return for this service parents would have to 
anonymously evaluate ‘conversations of concern’ from other children. 
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Crisp Thinking76 has developed a tool described as an Anti-Grooming Engine (AGE) 
which builds a behavioural profile of the child’s chat using Bayesian inference [91]. 
Crisp Thinking claim 98.4% accuracy in independent tests [92] but beyond this 
headline figure, results, test data and methodology are not in the public domain77. 
While the range of products offered by Crisp Thinking are probably useful for helping 
to protect younger children, their value in protecting teenagers who are discussing sex 
within their peer group are more questionable. While the algorithms and test 
methodology remain secret, the efficacy must be treated with scepticism. Crisp 
Thinking has applications that can be applied in the network at ISP or site level, 
thereby preventing local bypass measures. 
 
5.8.3 Moderation and Pre-moderation and Wall Gardens 
Many message boards, forums and sites that allow user generated content and 
feedback moderate content. This typically takes the form of site administrators and 
moderators who review and remove content that violate site rules e.g. obscene 
content, spam, trolling (deliberately inflammatory, often off topic content, designed to 
offend). 
 
Moderation naturally has a time delay (until the moderator review the content), is 
subjective (based on the moderators bias) and is clearly not scalable. Moderation is 
useful for enforcing good behaviour and etiquette. 
 
Pre-moderation sees all user generated content and feedback screened by moderators 
before it is publicly viewable. This process is used in forums targeted at young 
children; the BBC78 employs trained individuals to screen messages for signs of 
bullying, harassment and other inappropriate content. Pre-moderation is extremely 
resource intensive and only suitable in very limited circumstances. 
 
Walled Gardens are environments where only ‘whitelisted’ content is permitted – all 
content is banned until it is has been evaluated and approved. KidZui79 is an example 
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 http://www.crispthinking.com (accessed 10 Nov 2009) 
77
 The authors have asked to see information 
78
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/chatguide/glossary/moderation.shtml (accessed 03 August 2009) 
79
 http://www.kidzui.com/about_us (access 03 August 2010)  
110 
 
of this technology but it is extremely limiting in what in can offer and is only suitable 
for very young children using the Internet with minimal parental oversight. 
 
 
5.8.4 Network Level Censorship - IWF and CleanFeed 
In 1996 driven by public concern about paedophilic content on the Internet the ISP 
association (ISPA) created the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)80 81.  
 
The IWF maintains a list of child abuse websites; the list is updated twice daily and 
contains 800 – 1,200 live sites. About 50 URLs are added daily [8].  
 
CleanFeed is an ISP level filter used by major ISPs. CleanFeed82 is a two stage 
filtering process – if a request is made for information hosted at a ‘suspect IP address’ 
(an IP known to host child abuse images) it is routed to a HTTP proxy. Otherwise 
traffic is sent to destination unmolested. Suspect traffic is examined in detail at the 
proxy and compared to the IWF blacklist [9], requests for child abuse content is 
‘blackholed’, requests for legitimate content at ‘suspect IP addresses’ are permitted. 
CleanFeed can be bypassed using international proxies. 
 
In 2009 the IWF received 38,173 reports, it took action against 8,844 pages across 
1,316 sites. IWF notes that despite rapid expansion of the Internet in recent years, the 
volume of commercial child pornography has remained static [93]. There is no 
breakdown of these figures into genuine vs computer generated imagery; this might 
include computer generated images on servers in the US which enjoy first amendment 
protection. 
 
ISP Zen (and others) have declined to implement the IWF blacklist recommended for 
blocking child sex abuse images [7]. Zen cited questionable efficacy of the system. 
The Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety83 (CHIS) has demanded 
government action saying self regulation has failed. 
 
                                                 
80
 http://www.iwf.org.uk/ (accessed on 02 March 2009) 
81
 The IWF remit also covers obscene content and racial hatred 
82
 The exact design of CleanFeed is not in the public domain 
83
 An advocacy and lobbying organisation http://www.chis.org.uk/ (accessed on 01 June 2010) 
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Zoe Hilton [10] NSPCC policy adviser claims using CleanFeed (or similar measures) 
is important, despite their limitations, to prevent accidental exposure to child abuse 
and paedophilia sites. A common argument given in support of CleanFeed and other 
censorship is to prevent accidental exposure to paedophilic material, as this can 
trigger a descent into child abuse [12]. This point has been raised and challenged in 
parliamentary discussions [13] and has even been disputed by seasoned industry 
experts [14]. Richard Clayton [11] disputes the likelihood of accidental exposure to 
such material, claiming that most of material is on paid-for sites or privately held in 
closed networks. Publicising or indexing child abuse websites would be necessary for 
any realistic84 accidental exposure and would quickly lead to content take downs and 
arrests for content hosts and providers. 
 
Although CleanFeed is probably the best known, other technologies (from other 
companies) exists to implement the IWF blacklist. 
 
Australian Government plans for a similar network level censorship programme have 
met with opposition from academia, civil liberties organisations and children’s 
charities [89]. Opposition to the blacklist is based on the following: 
• Efficacy of the filter – Simple to bypass, only covers http traffic 
• Civil liberties – Lack of transparency is open to abuse and mistakes 
• Funding85 – Money would be better spent if diverted to child protection 
authorities, prevention and education programmes. 
 
Around half of the Australian blacklist86 has nothing to do with child abuse imagery 
[88].   
 
5.8.5 Community Reporting and ‘Safety Mode’ – Learning from YouTube 
YouTube87 is a video sharing website created in 2005 which allows users to upload 
video – these videos are (automatically) encoded to a Flash88 format for streaming to 
a web browser. Every minute, approximately 10 hours of video is uploaded to 
                                                 
84
 Discounting randomly typing URLs or IP addresses into a browser. 
85
 The Australian blacklist is to be tax payer funded, IWF is a charity. 
86
 Unlike the IWF, the Australian blacklist has been leaked into the public domain by wikileaks. 
87
 http://www.youtube.com/ (accessed 11 Feb 2010). 
88
 http://www.adobe.com/products/flashplayer/ (accessed 11 Feb 2010). 
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YouTube [38], moderating this much content is un-scalable. YouTube relies on users 
to flag inappropriate material. Flagged videos are reviewed and removed if they 
violate YouTube’s ‘Terms of Use’ – flagged videos are not automatically removed 
[39].  
 
To augment this process YouTube launched “Safety Mode” to shield children and 
other vulnerable individuals from inappropriate content that does not violate its terms 
e.g. graphic war coverage. Additionally it collapses (hides) comments by default and 
censors profane words with asterisks [39].  
 
This pragmatic approach allows inappropriate content to be flagged and removed 
without the resource overhead typically associated with moderation; it also allows 
censorship for children without impacting the entire community. 
 
5.9 Security Theatre 
Security theatre is a term coined by Bruce Schneier to describe security measures that 
superficially appear to improve security but in reality provide little or no improvement 
in security or reduction in risk. 
 
In his blog [24] Schneier describes the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
tags at hospital maternity wards. The infant abduction rate is tiny, an order of 
magnitude below infant mortality yet infants are equipped with RFID anklets that 
trigger an alarm if they pass through scanners on the maternity ward doors. If an 
infant is removed from the ward an alarm goes off.  
 
The risk of infant abduction is very small and the increase in security from RFID 
tagging of infants is also very small. Schneier notes that RFID technology provides 
little real security but praises the approach for providing parents with a sense of 
reassurance and peace-of-mind.  
 
Many online child protection measures are questionable in their efficacy [7] [9] [25] 
and might be classified as security theatre. However, can they be considered 
worthwhile if they reassure and bring the parents risk perception in line with genuine 
levels of risk children face on the Internet. Furedi [3] has suggested that paranoid 
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parenting and a culture of fear are retarding child development and stifling society. 
One of the benefits of security theatre in this domain may be to reduce these fears in 
parents. 
 
Beginning in April 2009 paedophiles and other sex offenders on probation in the West 
and East Midlands National Offender Management Service (NOMS) area will face 
mandatory polygraphs89. During this three year trial period 600-1000 offenders will 
face regular examination. Those refusing to participate will have their licence revoked 
and be returned to prison. It is expected that successful trials will see polygraph tests 
extended to other regions and other crimes [26]. Are polygraphs an effective tool for 
monitoring sex offenders? Within the scientific community polygraphs are regarded 
with scepticism – there is no common baseline for deception (lying) and the results 
prove to be highly variable (unreliable), averaging only slightly better than chance 
[27] [28]. 
 
This suggests subjecting offenders to polygraph is not an efficient use of resources in 
the child protection ecosystem. Looking beyond the empirical data, what other effects 
does the polygraph have? The perceived accuracy of the polygraph may encourage 
voluntary disclosures on the part of the test subject (the sex offender), that may have 
gone otherwise undetected in the examination. The knowledge that the subject will 
undergo a polygraph where any violation (recidivism) would be detected may act as a 
deterrent (against offending). Here perception of the efficacy of the polygraph maybe 
also important. These points too are open to question. Polygraph use by US 
intelligence agencies (which is common), shows no evidence of stemming disclosures 
of classified information (leaks) [29]. 
 
It is reasonable to assume sex offenders are subject to polygraphs to monitor and 
defend against recidivism. How prevalent is recidivism among sex offenders? 
According to the US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, the 
recidivism90 rate for sex offenders in general is 5.3% within 3 years and 3.3% for 
child molesters [30]. It also found 40% of the alleged sex crimes occurred within 12 
                                                 
89
 Sometimes referred to colloquially as ‘lie detectors’. 
90
 Defined as rearrest, reconviction and reimprisonment during the 3 year follow up period. 
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months of offender release. Unofficial figures91 suggest the recidivism rate may be up 
to 4 times higher, higher still if behaviours and thought crimes are included [94]. 
 
Given the low rate of recidivism and questionable efficacy of polygraphing, is 
polygraphing sex offenders on licence a cost effective measure? There is however 
another facet to the question, if parents and society at large believe polygraphing sex 
offenders makes children safer, provides them peace of mind and helps bring the 
overall perception of risk into line with actual risk, should this be included in the 
argument in favour of polygraphs? As with RFID tags in maternity wards, the 
qualitative feelings of peace of mind and re-alignment of risk are difficult to quantify 
– how can a monetary value be applied to them? 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the author believes a cost / benefit analysis of 
polygraphing sex offenders, compared with other offender management processes 
should be explored. Forensic psychological interviews to determine whether an 
offender should be released on licence, closer police / probation service monitoring on 
release and other treatments could all be explored. 
 
5.10 Realigning risk 
Parents are perhaps most fearful of their children being duped into meeting someone 
they ‘know’ from the Internet and being forcibly molested. As has already been 
discussed this is highly unlikely, the majority of minors who do meet adults and have 
sex, know they are meeting an older man for the purposes of having sex. This fear has 
left parents with a disproportionate perception of risk; this perception has likely been 
fed by egregious media reporting and anecdotal accounts. When examined 
quantitatively how does the risk from grooming compare to other risks to children? 
 
• The British Crime survey92 records 314 incidences of grooming in 2008. 
• The Department for Transport93 reports 2087 killed or seriously injured 
children on UK roads (124 died) in 2008. 
                                                 
91
 Some of the data sources are of low quality – the Police lost track of 19% of offenders. 
92
 http://uk.sitestat.com/homeoffice/rds/s?rds.hosb1109chap2newxls&ns_type=clickout&ns_url=[http:/ 
/www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb1109chap2new.xls] (accessed 03 Dec 09). 
93
 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/statistics/datatablespublications/accidents/casualtiesmr/rcgbmainresults20 
08 (accessed 04 Dec 09). 
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• Cancer Research UK94 states there are around 1,500 new cases of childhood 
cancer diagnosed each year in the UK. 
 
From these figures it can be deduced that children are more than six times more likely 
to be killed or seriously injured on the road and nearly five times more likely to be 
diagnosed with cancer. According to the Office of National Statistics95 there are 
approximately 12.3 million children, this gives an unqualified risk of around 5 
reported incidents of grooming per 200,000 children.  
 
Note on the above statistics: As has already been discussed, teenagers are at much 
greater risk than younger children and girls are at greater risk than boys. Of the 314 
reported incidences of grooming there is no breakdown of this figure into 
online/offline. Also it should be noted that there is the possibility of grooming 
incidences going undetected/unreported, whereas it is unlikely that a seriously injured 
child or child diagnosed with cancer would go reported. 
 
Would parents be more relaxed, (have greater peace of mind) if their perception of 
risk96 more accurately resembled actual risk? How can parents’ perception of risk be 
realigned to more closely resemble actual risk?  
 
The media needs to maximise ratings (for profitability) and often does this through 
sensational and alarmist reporting, opportunistic politicians and special interest 
advocacy groups. Excessive parental fear or risk probably stems from these reports 
[109] [110]. This excessive fear is at best unhelpful and probably counterproductive 
[3]. In a free society, barring exceptional circumstances, freedom of press however 
unhelpful cannot be curtailed. However, the government and official sources (such as 
CEOP) should attempt to advance a responsible media agenda to help parents 
understand the real risk and rebalance their fears. 
 
                                                 
94
 http://info.cancerresearchuk.org/cancerstats/childhoodcancer/incidence/index.htm (accessed 10 Dec 
09). 
95
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?ID=6. 
96
 Assumes parental risk perception has been distorted. 
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5.11 Trade offs and Best use of Resources 
No system can ever be completely safe or secure, human nature means there will 
always be crime and there will always be dangers to children. It may seem unpleasant 
to some, but society must accept that some children will be solicited, molested, 
bullied, exposed to unwanted content and come to harm. 
 
Security is a process of compromises [33]; it may by possible to improve Internet 
child safety by universal monitoring of Internet connections by ISPs or some other 
official authority. Ignoring the technical feasibility, society would probably oppose 
this on civil liberties grounds. Parents could forbid their children from using the 
Internet, even assuming their children obey, this would be cutting them off from an 
enormous educational and social resource, likely having a negative impact on child 
development [3].   
 
With finite resources researchers must evaluate how effective child protection 
measures are. This is a relatively simple task when determining the efficacy of 
technical measures such as content filters; a quantitative metric can describe the 
performance of such measures. This only describes the performance of the 
technology, nothing about the benefit to the child - how damaging would the exposure 
have been? Is failing to block a site about drug use worse than failing to block a 
pornographic website? Social strategies such as education are harder to evaluate. 
 
Psychology researchers need to define qualitative metrics to describe the benefits of 
social engagement strategies such as education and training. Until such metrics exist a 
cost-benefit analysis cannot be performed and a comparison between strategies and 
technologies is not possible. Such work will undoubtedly be subject to a certain 
amount of bias and require a degree of expert speculation, but would probably be of 
value to decision makers and budget holders. 
 
From 2009 the Independent Safeguard Authority97 (ISA) was established to register 
and vet individuals working with vulnerable groups. This could see 1-in-4 adults 
                                                 
97
 The ISA decides whether or not an individual is fit to work with vulnerable groups, a CRB check 
discloses offences. A CRB check is part of the ISA vetting process, but can be performed 
independently for other reasons. 
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being vetted [103] as part of their work or social life. In 2008/2009 2,551 disputes 
were upheld against the Criminal Records Bureau98 (CRB) [95], it does not seem 
unreasonable that more false negatives would likely go unnoticed (people would 
investigate and dispute false positives but not false negatives). Enhanced CRB checks 
include soft intelligence (accusations, suspicions, investigations that did not result in 
conviction) as well as criminal convictions. Enhanced CRB checks are required for 
jobs where people have regular access to children. This is likely to exclude a 
significant number of people based on false positives and is obviously open to 
malicious abuse [96].  Seven UK organisations representing head teachers have 
described the process as "disproportionate to risk" [97]. Sir Roger Singleton, chair of 
the ISA has warned against over reliance on the database [98] "Frankly all registration 
means is that a) you've paid the fee and b) there is no known reason why you should 
be on one of the barred lists."  
 
Overlooking these shortcomings and limitations the vetting process is designed to 
improve child safety, even if it is draconian and disproportionate. It is not possible to 
conduct a controlled study to see if children are safer and the low rate of crimes 
against children would likely mean any reduction was small, perhaps even statistically 
insignificant. Loss of potential employment and potential scandal suffered by those 
subject to failed vetting due to false positive is not the only negative side effect of the 
vetting process. Some children’s authors have refused to be vetted and thus refused to 
appear in schools [99]. The voluntary sector is suffering as people are put off 
volunteering by the process of vetting or the current child protection climate [100]. 
 
Assuming the vetting process does indeed make children safer, does the additional 
safety make up for the loss of volunteer run programmes? Such programmes may  
involve sports, citizenship (e.g. scouts), or general youth clubs. The loss of these 
programmes may have unwanted side effects, including potentially increased 
delinquency, anti social behaviour and substance abuse. Which is of greater benefit to 
society, (potentially) improved safety or volunteer organisations and youth groups?  
Furedi and Bristow [100] are in no doubt that the current process and ‘social 
atmosphere’ that has been created is to the detriment of society as a whole. 
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 A CRB check is part of the ISA vetting process. 
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This is only one example of the trade offs that must be made, parents must also 
consider the benefit of stranger contact (rewarding relationship) versus the risk of 
harm. As described, high risk activities such as sex chat with strangers has benefits 
that must be considered. Even the act of using filters, monitoring and rules need to be 
contrasted with the requirement to expose youth to a certain amount of risk in 
accordance with individual development. 
 
5.12 Difficulties Posed to Researchers 
The evaluation of technical protection measures is a relatively straight forward task 
that can be performed using standard scientific methods.  These measures cannot be 
tested in isolation. From a systems perspective, people are the most significant 
component in this problem domain, it is essential to examine the human factors and 
stakeholders. 
 
Stakeholder analysis is the backbone of requirements capture and understanding the 
culture surrounding a system. A typical stakeholder analysis would include 
interviews, questionnaires and observations. The most prominent stakeholders in 
online child protection are children, parents, service providers, law enforcement and 
child abusers. Stakeholder analysis of two of these groups’ children and child abusers 
is fraught with difficulty. 
 
The nature of the subject would necessitate questions involving violence, sex and 
personal history. Among post pubescent minors, even if their parents are happy for 
them to engage in the process, a small but significant number are likely to be 
dishonest [104]. Questioning prepubescent children on such subjects is, at best, 
unethical and possibly illegal as it risks exposing them to information beyond their 
understanding and maturity level. 
 
Child abusers and paedophiles not already in the criminal justice system are unlikely 
to participate – it would likely entail the admission of illegal activities or, at least 
‘socially unacceptable’ behaviours and urges. Young conducted forensic 
psychological interviews on 22 sex offenders [105]. While her findings are not in 
dispute, the sample size is small and no questions appear to have been asked about the 
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motivations of participants. Those in the criminal justice system may lie during the 
interview process, perhaps being in denial, attempting to minimise or mitigate their 
guilt, or attempting to blame-shift [14]. They may even have been feigning 
cooperation in an attempt to curry favour with prison authorities. Such issues must be 
considered when weighing the value of the results. 
 
The tabloid press has no interest in rational debate [109] surrounding child abusers 
and paedophiles; it regards them as monsters that require punishment [2]. A systems 
approach requires an unbiased consideration of stakeholders and their actions - 
emotive knee-jerk rhetoric and ‘comfortable’ stereotypes ignore that children are 
often active participants in their own abuse, indeed society does not want to believe 
such actions are true [14]. Researchers who question this ingrained mindset risk being 
labelled unethical or ‘playing into the hands of child abusers’. Researchers have 
reported organisations unwilling to cooperate with them because of the potential for 
negative PR and reduced funding – one university refused to publish a PhD thesis on 
these grounds. Much of this reticence is believed to stem from a fear of the treatment 
individuals and organisations will receive in the tabloid press [106]. 
 
Despite this climate some organisations and individuals are conducting probing 
research including the Crimes Against Children Research Center99and danah boyd100 
[sic]. However even this work (through the ISTTF [4]) has drawn public criticism 
from the Attorneys General of Pennsylvania and North Carolina [5] as discussed 
earlier. The AG have been thoroughly rebuked by academics [20] [21] for political 
grandstanding and fear mongering. 
 
Such is the breadth and sensitivity of the subject a meta-analysis has been necessary 
to gain an holistic perspective of the problem space, particularly with the fear of 
negative PR. Government and law enforcement statistics (sometimes at odds with 
their public message), journal articles on adolescent development, psychology and 
medicine, parliamentary questions, testimony and enquiries, expert opinion and 
observation, even social commentary all provide valuable source information when 
collating a systems view. Researchers should evaluate all sources with a critical 
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 http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/index.html (accessed on 27th January 2010). 
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 http://www.danah.org/ (accessed on 27th January 2010). 
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demeanour, particularly with government or other potentially biased sources which 
might be (perhaps for political reasons) improperly reported, analysed or subject to 
withheld methodologies [107] [108]. 
 
5.13 Discussion 
Recent years have seen a wholesale change in attitudes toward online child protection, 
as discussed earlier, possession of well known Internet images depicting members of 
the Simpsons101 cartoon family in lewd poses saw two separate convictions in 
Australia. One in 2008 for ‘possessing child pornography’, the other in 2010 for 
‘possessing child exploitation material’ [52] [53].  Possession of these images would 
also be a criminal offence in the UK (under s49 of the Coroners and Justice Bill) [47]. 
In 2000 staff at Royal Sun Alliance, were disciplined (10 were dismissed) for 
distributing the obscene Simpsons cartoon by email. Commentators at the time called 
for restraint and common sense “Porn, especially child porn, is one matter, but smutty 
cartoons? Come on.” [54] and “Are they really that offensive? Not really…” [55]. 
Had the emails been sent today, the perpetrators would likely have attracted fines, 
prison sentences and been made to sign the sex offenders register. Would this have 
made children any safer? Do laws such as this improve child safety? The author feels 
not, ignoring the absence of a proven causative link, such material could be evaluated 
(and legal proceeding pursued) under the Obscene Publications Act against the 
‘tendency to deprave and corrupt’ test of obscenity [60]. 
 
Politicians and public officials have a duty to serve the public, using child protection 
as a platform for political gain is unhelpful [21] [41] [84] [86], it serves to confuse the 
public and distract from valuable work being undertaken in the problem space. 
 
 
5.14 Conclusions and recommendation 
The 2002 Soham murders pushed child safety front-and-centre in the public mind. As 
Internet access has surged towards ubiquity in the home and now on personal devices, 
parents have become understandably concerned about new risks. There are 
undoubtedly individuals who abuse children and use the Internet to help facilitate this 
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 It is not known if the lewd Simpsons cartoons were an identical set, it thought they are part of the 
same superset. 
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abuse; such individuals represent a small minority of child abusers. Those who do 
meet and have sex with minors are rarely deceitful or forceful; their victims are 
typically physically mature, sexually receptive teenagers. They groom their victims 
with attention and affection, behaviour which, if not for the age of consent, would be 
considered dating. Victims frequently refuse to help authorities prosecute offenders, 
citing feelings of love and affection. Parents are understandably worried when the 
media focuses on the most alarming cases and are likely overwhelmed by the array of 
safety advice and products and services to protect children. Their concerns and 
confusion are not helped when some official advice is known to be unrealistic and 
products that are designed around technical aims ignore the way children behave. 
 
While one-in-seven children are solicited this is not the same as grooming, it is often a 
single off hand comment in a chat room. The majority of children deftly handle such 
encounters and report no negative side effects. Cyberbullying and harassment is more 
than twice as common as solicitation and more children report distress resulting from 
bullying than solicitation. Cyberbullying may even have greater long term 
ramifications than real world bullying. 
 
Most people are keen to prevent children’s exposure to inappropriate content, 
particularly pornography because of its perceived harmful effects. Withholding 
pornography from children is not an unreasonable moral position, but evidence does 
not support claims of harmful effects. Computer generated and other artificial child 
pornography has been outlawed in the UK without evidence that it causes harm; it 
may in fact be increasing the risk to children. 
 
Technology has a part to play in keeping children safe on the Internet but it is a minor 
role and parents should not be reliant on it. It’s most effective at protecting younger 
children from accidental exposure to inappropriate content. At least some teenagers 
are actively seeking such content and may be able to circumvent technological 
measures or simply use a public terminal or friend’s computer. Ignoring teenagers as 
stakeholders, failing to address their culture with a systems mindset, will continue to 
see products and services at best under perform and at worse do more harm than good 
[101] and risks a false sense of security. 
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Social measures, education and close well formed relationships between parents and 
children and oversight are major factors in keeping children safe. Education applies to 
children, parents and others with an interest in child safety. Children should receive 
age appropriate information about risks and how to protect themselves, Thinkuknow is 
a very good source but needs to be supplemented in schools with information that 
reflects how children behave and  should include role playing what to do when faced 
with solicitation, bullying and online exposure. Parents and others involved in child 
welfare need to be aware of the various technologies so they can communicate and 
relate to children. This needn’t be complex; knowing that IM is a chat environment 
and what a social network profile is and how important these things are to children are 
invaluable in understanding a child’s world. This understanding and an accurate 
perception of the risks rather than fear stoked by media scare stories help build a 
strong relationship. Testing boundaries and engaging in at least some forbidden 
behaviour is to be expected with teenagers. A strong relationship will mean those 
teenagers will turn to parents, teachers or social workers if they become involved in a 
serious situation or are unable to cope. 
 
Without universally recognised definitions and metrics side-by-side analysis of 
research is difficult and the quality of results questionable. Until such standards are 
agreed, the literature and the broader understanding of the problem will vary widely. 
Without this, the requirements for programmes, products and services risk being 
inaccurate and incomplete. Without adequate requirements capture, definition and 
validation any solution to a complex problem will be left wanting. 
 
5.15 Business Impact 
The systems analysis caused the author and many he has spoken with to challenge 
their preconceptions about the online child protection problem space and how best to 
address its challenges. BT currently provides Cleanfeed, an ISP level content blocking 
system, however the ‘real world’ systems value of the IWF blacklist has been 
questioned - the chance of accidentally finding genuine child pornography is 
incredible low (there are between 500-1200 web pages that are not indexed among 
over 200 million websites [112] and in excess of one trillion indexed pages [113]). 
However such security theatre can be merited if it provides reassurance to the public 
at large. BT also provides its customers with content filtering software from McAfee 
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free of charge, the author believes this too be a valid action if for no other reason than 
it keeps BT broadband package competitive in the marketplace. 
 
This work largely indicates that BT should not engage other technical methods to 
protect children on the internet e.g. network level content analysis or predator 
detection. Though it should of course maintain a research and analysis interest in 
technical protection methods. 
 
The best way to protect children online is through education of both parents and 
children. BT has the skills, experience resources and trusted brand to engage with 
parents, children, teachers and other stakeholders in outreach and education 
programmes. Such engagements could form a part of BT’s Corporate Social 
Responsible (CSR) agenda. The value of such programmes cannot be readily 
discerned from a balance sheet but would almost certainly have a positive impact on 
BT’s brand and reputation, generating goodwill with existing customers and perhaps 
winning new business. 
 
5.16  Reflective Commentary 
The Online Child Protection work evolved from work to establish whether is it 
possible to detect sexual predation based on text based chat. As a side issue the author 
begin to examine the wider issues of the problem space in order to satisfy the systems 
requirements of the doctorate. The author was initially of the opinion that many of the 
challenges could be addressed with technology, the systems approach lead to a 
complete reversal of this opinion 
 
An analysis of the stakeholders, the interfaces, an understanding of dynamics of 
abusive relationships, and human factors in particular developmental normal teenage 
behaviours, lead to the realisation that technology is only a bit player in the protection 
of children. It is important, but the return of investment is inferior to proper education, 
training, strong relationships and good support structures. 
 
Content filters and some other products designed to protect children are valuable in 
shielding younger children from some of the potentially harmful recesses of the 
Internet. However such measures can be readily circumvented even without any 
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technical skill e.g. using a public terminal or friend’s computer. Teenagers are 
headstrong individuals beginning to assert their identity and seeking privacy - some 
boundary testing and defiance is to be expected. Unrealistic expectations and 
draconian rules are unlikely to be followed, rules need to be based on consent and 
understand (‘user buy-in’). 
 
In addition to the author’s own perceptions the subject of child protection is emotive 
and highly political. Many of the approaches to child protection amount to security 
theatre that do not perform as intended ‘outside the lab’, some politicians and the 
media are using the subject publicity and not to advance the cause, all of which have 
lead to a distortion of the problem space. The systems thinking approach dramatically 
changed the author’s perception of the problem and he considers it should be essential 
practice to anyone working in the field. 
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5.17 Systems Analysis Report 
The following report, has been circulated within BT. It is an abridged version of the 
research and findings from this chapter. 
 
 
A Systems View of Online 
Child Protection 
 
Abstract 
Online Child Protection is never far from the public conscience in the UK as parents and 
society at large seek to keep children from harm on the Internet. There is much fear, 
uncertainty and doubt as parents are exposed to mawkish anecdotes in the media, and receive 
erroneous advice from industry and official sources. This paper takes a systems view of the 
problem space - it examines the size and nature of the problem, what measures exist to protect 
children, whether or not they are effective, and what factors affect the risk to children online. 
It finds the traditional protection message and advice is based on unsubstantiated 
assumptions, is widely ignored, and may actually be unhelpful. It also describes the 
challenges to researchers, and discusses how close parent/child relationships, and education 
both within the home and school environment are most effective ways to protect children 
online. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2002 two, ten year old girls were murdered in Soham, Cambridgeshire (UK). 
Subsequent media coverage and government enquires have elevated the subject of child 
protection to prominence in the public arena. New rules for those interacting with children 
could see 1-in-4 adults being vetted [Ozimek, J., 2008, 14 July] as part of their work or social 
life. 
 
During the same period worries about child safety on the Internet have risen. This is driven in 
part by alarmist television shows such as To Catch a Predator102 but also by education and 
awareness campaigns pushed out by government and industry. This is often bundled with 
advice regarding Internet security and identity theft. 
 
Internet usage in the UK is currently (May 2009) running at 76% 103 (of the population), this 
presents a new and relatively safe channel for abusers wishing to approach children. 
Furthermore, the explosion of Social Networking Sites (SNS) and blogs provides a potential 
source for ‘child-mining’ – with children having uploaded photographs and personal 
information. Here the public perception is of child molesters using information gleaned from 
such sources to manufacture online personae to mask their age and sexual intentions, 
grooming naïve young victims and enticing them to offline meetings [Wolak, J., Finkelhor, 
D., Mitchell, K., & Ybarra, M., 2008]. 
 
The reality of sexual predation on the Internet is somewhat removed from this perception. 
Children who meet Internet groomers are overwhelmingly physically mature teenagers, who 
know they are meeting older men and intend to have sex with them. Many do so more than 
once [Mitchell, K., Finkelhor, D., & Wolak, J., 2001], [Smith, A., 2007]. However, Internet 
initiated grooming of sexually immature, prepubescent children is almost non-existent 
[Internet Safety Technical Taskforce, 2008], [Wolak, J., Finkelhor, D., Mitchell, K., & 
Ybarra, M., 2008].  
 
Looking beyond what shrill elements of the media and industry are telling the public, this 
paper examines the problem space from a systems perspective. Describing the application of 
systems thinking – stakeholder analysis, threat vectors, risk factors, behaviours, and existing 
protection techniques. It describes the difficulties researchers face in such a sensitive arena, 
and discusses what the authors’ believe to be the most effective way to protect children, and 
highlights areas where additional work is needed. 
 
 
SYSTEMS THINKING 
Systems Engineering seeks to manage the complexities inherent in modern engineering 
projects. It encompasses processes, technology, and management activities to define systems, 
capture and verify requirements, validate designs, manage conflicts and trade-offs, develop 
architectures and co-ordinate disparate specialist product teams. Its mission is to deliver a 
capability that satisfies the customer requirements, using the least resources, at the best cost. 
 
The traditional techniques, methods, models and metrics of systems engineering may not, at-
a-glance seem applicable to the online child protection ecosystem. However there is much 
value in the systems ideology of ‘stepping-back’ and taking a holistic view of the problem 
space to understand factors such as:  
 
• Stakeholder requirements and motivation (abusers, children, parents, law 
enforcement, prisons and reform services , service providers, society at large) 
                                                 
102
 http://www.itv.com/News/tonight/episodes/Tocatchapredator/default.html &  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10912603 (accessed 15 Oct. 09). 
103
 http://internetworldstats.com/europa.htm (accessed 12 Jan 10). 
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• Conflicting requirements and trade-offs (privacy vs safety) 
• Threats facing children on the Internet (grooming, bullying etc) 
• Factors and behaviours that increase risk 
• Perceived risk vs actual risk 
• Existing protection measures (efficacy and limitations) 
• Legacy requirements (limitations of the Internet, and existing services) 
 
This list is only a limited sample of the many considerations, and is presented to give the 
reader a brief idea of how systems thinking can be applied. 
 
PAEDOPHILES, CHILD MOLESTERS AND ONLINE GROOMING 
The term ‘paedophile’ is emotive and divisive. It is often bandied around in the media as a 
catch-all for anyone with a sexual interest in minors. It is an ambiguously defined and poorly 
understood label. The American Psychiatric Association in The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)104, specify the following diagnostic criteria for 
paedophilia [American Psychiatric Association, 2003]. 
D. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, 
sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or 
children (generally age 13 years or younger);  
E. The person has acted on these sexual urges, or the sexual urges or fantasies cause 
marked distress or interpersonal difficulty;  
F. The person is at least age 16 years and at least 5 years older than the child or children 
in Criterion A.  
The general consensus is that paedophilia describes adults with a sexual interest in 
prepubescent children, and where the adult is at least five years older than the child. This 
excludes so called Romeo and Juliet romances between peers where one individual is under 
the age of consent. In the UK the Sexual Offences Act 2003105, sexual acts between minors are 
outlawed but government advice to Police and the Crown Prosecution Service is not to 
actively pursue these cases [BBC, 2004].  The terms hebephilia and ehebephilia describe 
adults with a sexual interest in pubescent and post-pubescent minors. 
Lanning [Lanning, K., 2001] discourages the use of the term ‘paedophile’, cautioning that it is 
a (psychiatric) diagnostic term that describes desires and interests not intentions or actions. 
The term ‘child molester’ more accurately describes the sexual abuse of children. 
Lanning argues child molesters can not be easily placed in discreet categories, instead falling 
along a continuum, from situation sex offender to preferential sex offender. Briefly, 
situational sex offenders are likely to be less intelligent, opportunistic, impulsive, and follow 
modus operandi (MO) behavioural patterns. Preferential sex offenders (at the opposite end of 
the continuum) typically exhibit more intelligence, focused criminality, compulsion, and 
ritualised patterns of behaviour.  
Groomers are individuals who befriend children, with the intention of gradually engineering 
the ‘friendship’ towards a sexual relationship. This would begin with fairly benign behaviour 
such as playing with the child or buying them an ice cream. Gradually the groomer would 
introduce the child to sex, typically with exposure to pornography and child pornography to 
normalise the subject within the child’s mind. Simultaneously the groomer would ingratiate 
                                                 
104
 Commentators have questioned the listing of paedophilia and other paraphilia  (psychosexual 
disorders) in the DSM, suggesting they been listed without any scientific or rational basis (Tromovitch, 
P., 2009). 
105
 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2003/ukpga_20030042_en_1 (accessed on 15 December 2009). 
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themselves with the child, showering them with attention, buying them gifts, telling them they 
were special. Sexual activity may begin with kissing and touching. The child will be told this 
is normal behaviour and maybe exposed to other (already) groomed children. The child may 
be told to keep the activities a “special secret” or coerced into silence through threats, or told 
the groomer would get into trouble if people found out. 
Online groomers are often described as using similar tactics but hiding behind a fake persona 
– typical that of someone in the child’s peer group, often slightly older and more ‘worldly’. 
By the time they meet the child, the relationship with the child will be strong enough to 
withstand any sense of shock or deception the child feels. The reality of online grooming does 
not reflect this perception. 
Evidence indicates that far from concealing their identities and intentions groomers are open 
and candid, revealing both their ages and sexual interests in minors during Internet encounters 
[Wolak, J., Finkelhor, D., Mitchell, K., & Ybarra, M., 2008]. In the majority of these 
encounters the victims were active, even enthusiastic participants in their abuse. They may 
even have initiated it. Society struggles to understand that these victims are post pubescent 
adolescents - physically mature and sexually curious; it refuses to accept they are anything 
but innocent participants forced against their will [Lanning, K., 2001]. This misconception is 
reinforced in the media and sometimes official information. This may be hindering public 
advice and leaving parents ill informed and poorly equipped to protect their children. In fact 
online solicitation of pre-pubescent minors is extremely rare [Internet Safety Technical 
Taskforce, 2008]. Younger children are more closely monitored by parents, less available 
online than teenagers, and on the whole not interested in sex and romance. This makes them a 
much smaller target [Wolak, J., Finkelhor, D., Mitchell, K., & Ybarra, M., 2008]. 
WHERE ARE THE DANGERS? WHAT ARE THE RISK FACTORS? 
What are the real dangers facing children on the Internet? Do certain activities, applications, 
and platforms pose a greater threat to children than others? What behaviours on the part of the 
children increase the risk they face? What other factors are involved? 
 
A common activity of children on the Internet is the use of chat rooms [Ybarra, M., & 
Mitchell, K., 2004], this is also the most common (76%) venue for first encounters of Internet 
initiated sex crimes [Mitchell, K., Finkelhor, D., & Wolak, J., 2001]. Typically the chat rooms 
were keyed towards teens, geographic locations, dating and romance, and worryingly, in a 
few cases, sexual encounters between adults and minors. Of the victims of Internet initiated 
sex crimes, 75% were aged 13-15, 1% were aged 12, none was under 12. 75% of victims were 
female, 96% of offenders were male. While it is clear that discussing sex and relationship in 
chat rooms, particularly with strangers’ carries risk above that of normal Internet use, it also 
has developmental benefits that may not be immediately apparent.  
 
Subrahmanyam et al [Subrahmanyam, K., Greenfield, P. M., & Tynes, B., 2004] on sexuality 
and identity in teen chat rooms found that peer group communication is the number one 
source of sexual information for adolescents (though little is known of what they are telling 
one another). Adolescents talk about sex online as a way to understand and control their 
feelings, maintaining open communications can serve as a coping mechanism for sexual 
expression, particularly when providing an anonymous forum for discussing embarrassing 
issues. It maybe preferable to have children engage in online relationships and cybersex106 as 
this entails less risky behaviour, particularly unprotected sex. Cybersex and online 
relationships may allow girls (the greater risk group) to exercise more control as they are 
recognised to possess greater communication skills. 
                                                 
106
  Cybersex is a form of computer mediated communication where users send each other sexual 
explicit messages – it may include fantasy, role playing, and real life masturbation.  
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Social networking has seen a meteoric rise in recent years, in January 2009 the two top Social 
Networking Sites (SNS) - Facebook and MySpace recorded over 2 billion visits [McCarthy, 
C., 2009]. While the format, layout and target demographic of the various SNS platforms 
differ, a user typically posts information and photos of themselves and links their profile to 
friends. Some SNS profiles take advantage of privacy controls to limit the exposure of 
information to the larger Internet, others do not. 
 
Does the use of SNS and having a profile increase the risk to minors online? Research at Pew 
Internet [Smith, A., 2007] found that 49% of teenagers use social networks to make new 
friends and 32% were contacted by a stranger107. 7% have been left scared or upset at one 
time, by contact with a stranger, this was far more likely among girls (possibly because of 
egregious media information). No evidence was found that linked the posting of personal 
information (real name, address, email, school) to stranger contact. This repudiates the notion 
of groomers harvesting information to spot victims. Those who posted photos online were 
more likely to be contacted by a stranger. It should be clear that stranger contact is a not 
necessarily negative, mostly it will be positive or at the least benign [Livingstone, S., & 
Helsper, E., 2007] – the majority of strangers (adults and minors) have no ill intentions. 
Further, it is important to realise youths widely ignore warnings not to communicate with 
strangers, seeing the advice as unrealistic [Mitchell, K., Finkelhor, D., & Wolak, J., 2001].  
 
The majority of child abuse takes place within the family or by individuals well known to the 
family (friends, neighbours, teachers etc). Offline abuse, along with neglect and disadvantage 
increases the risk or likelihood of the victim becoming involved in Internet initiated abuse. 
All types of real world abuse (physical, psychological, sexual), poor parenting, lack of 
supervision, alcohol and substance abuse, poor relationships between parent and child, mental 
health problems, bullying and peer-group isolation are all factors that increase a child’s risk 
online [Internet Safety Technical Taskforce, 2008]. Being female, frequenting chat rooms and 
discussing sex online especially with strangers are also associated with increased risk [Wolak, 
J., Finkelhor, D., Mitchell, K., & Ybarra, M., 2008]. 
 
This paper deals mostly with the risk to children from grooming, largely because this is the 
greatest fear of parents, however it is not the only threat children face on the Internet. The two 
other main concerns are exposure to unwanted material and bullying.  
 
Although parents may wish to shield their children from violence, hatred, drugs etc the main 
concern is pornography. There is little evidence to suggest children suffer any harm from 
exposure to pornography and virtually no research on the matter [74]. Although a minority of 
children were upset by unwanted exposure to pornography most considered it an irritant, like 
spam and felt in it was the ‘price of doing business on the Internet’. It is not known how 
‘upset’ this minority were from their exposure. Younger children often lack the maturity to 
understand pornography and are simply annoyed by unwanted exposure, they may however 
be distressed by extreme pornography – explicit scenes of bondage and sadomasochism 
where pain and physical trauma are involved. 
 
Online bullying has no consistent definition and covers an array of behaviours including 
impersonation, outing (revealing secrets), denigration, exclusion, and harassment. Online 
bullying shares many attributes with real world bullying but includes the possibility of the 
bully being anonymous. It is estimated that around 30% of children are involved in online 
bullying either as an aggressor, a victim, or both, with 19% regularly involved in some form 
of bullying [Wolak, J., Mitchell, K., & Finkelhor, D., 2003]. It was found that the use of 
Internet rules, and blocking software had no significant effect on bullying. 30% of victims felt 
upset, 24% were afraid, and of those that were neither upset nor afraid 34% still experienced 
                                                 
107
 Defined as someone with no connection to you or any of your friends. 
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some effects such as aversion to the Internet, feeling jumpy or irritability [Internet Safety 
Technical Taskforce, 2008]. 
 
CURRENT PROTECTION METHODS 
What methods exist to provide a measure of protection for children on the Internet? To enable 
the reader to better understand the issues, some of the key methods are discussed here. 
 
Numerous software packages offer tools for parents to install on their home computers. These 
typically allow parents to block certain applications, filter websites and review online 
activities. Blocking is often unwieldy as some legitimate use is often permitted. The filtering 
of websites consists of a list of blacklisted (or whitelisted) URLs or dynamic analysis of 
content. With the continuously evolving nature of the Internet and its massive size, manual 
evaluation of sites is un-scalable. Filtering of any type is subjective – at some stage an 
individual, committee or other authorising body will have defined what is acceptable, what is 
not, and create categories (adult content, violence, hate groups, etc). The subjective nature of 
filters, their general efficacy, and the claims of providers have all been brought into question 
[National Research Council, 2002].  
 
Reviewing technologies vary between applications, but may include website histories, email 
and IM logs, keyloggers (recording every keystroke) and even replay of video calls. In a 
family with more than one child or where a child spends more than brief periods online, this 
is prohibitive in terms of the parents’ time. Older children may decry these as being excessive 
and an invasion of privacy.  
 
In 1996 the Internet Service Provider Association (ISPA) created the Internet Watch 
Foundation (IWF)108 to catalogue child abuse109 websites, this is compiled into a blacklist 
which is provided to ISPs to block access. BT CleanFeed110 is a popular ISP level filter - 
traffic destined for a suspicious IP address is diverted to HTTP proxy where the destination is 
compared to the IWF blacklist [Clayton, 2005]. The raison d'être behind the IWF is to prevent 
accidental exposure to child abuse (the viewing of which would motivate real life abuse), 
however this has been disputed [Cellan-Jones, R., 2009] on the basis that most child abuse 
websites are pay sites or privately held and indexing this information would lead to exposure 
and arrest. Also questioned is the commonly touted notion that exposure to such images 
triggers abuse [Lanning, K., 2001]. The IWF blacklist is updated twice daily and usually 
contains 800-1200 live sites with 50 URLs added daily [Ozimek, J., 2008, 9 October], as of 
September 2009 the blacklist contains around 500 URLs (a near all time low) [Ozimek, J., 
2009]. Around 95% of UK ISPs employ CleanFeed or a similar product to implement the 
blacklist, these products can be easily circumvented by using international proxies. 
 
Many images on the Internet are altered (sometimes referred to as ‘Photoshopped’), indeed 
photo realistic images can be computer generated without the need for a human subject. With 
no victim, where no child is harmed, the only rational argument against computer generated 
child pornography is that it leads to a normalisation of inappropriate feelings, which in turn 
leads to an increased risk of (real life) child abuse. This is the generally accepted view 
[Ozimek, J., 2009, 17 March] [TheyWorkForYou.com. 2009] [Carr, J. 2003]. Though it 
enjoys first amendment protection in the US, all artificial child pornography is prohibited in 
the UK under section 49 of the Coroners and Justice Bill111 – ‘Possession of prohibited 
                                                 
108
 http://www.iwf.org.uk/ (21 Oct 2009). 
109
 The IWF remit also covers obscene content and racial hatred. 
110
 The exact design of CleanFeed is not in the public domain. 
111
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmbills/072/09072.25-31.html#j3_100a 
(accessed on 01 June 2010). 
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images of children’ (real child pornography is prohibited under the Protection of Children 
Act112). 
 
Research indicates that the spread of conventional pornography (featuring no children) and 
easy access to it, especially via the Internet has led to a reduction (or at least no increase) in 
rape, sexual assault and sexual abuse [Kendall, T. 2007] [Diamond, M. 2009] as it allows the 
user to satisfy their fantasies and provides a cathartic release. 
 
During the consultation period of the Coroners and Justice Bill the Home Office and Police 
expressed disgust at some manga (Japanese comics), but cited only a single case in which 
police raided an individual and found them in possession of only cartoon images [Ozimek, J., 
2009, 17 March]. There is no consensus regarding the ‘enabling’ properties of child 
pornography, some experts follow the generally accepted view [Carr, J. 2003], other argue 
that it is analogous to conventional pornography, and as such computer generated images may 
even help prevent child abuse [Lazarová, D. 2010 ]. 
 
Crisp Thinking113 has developed a tool described as an Anti-Grooming Engine (AGE) which 
builds a behavioural profile of a child’s chat using Bayesian inference [Crisp Thinking, 2008]. 
Crisp Thinking claim 98.4% accuracy in independent tests [M2 Presswire. 2008], but beyond 
this headline figure, results, test data and methodology are not in the public domain114. While 
the range of products offered by Crisp Thinking are probably useful for helping to protecting 
younger children and blatant grooming attempts, their value in protecting teenagers who are 
discussing sex within their peer group are more questionable. While the algorithms and test 
methodology remain secret, the efficacy must be treated with scepticism.  
 
Perverted-Justice115 is a US based organisation that exposes those who attempt to groom 
children in Internet chat rooms. They have a pool of volunteers who setup ‘honey pot’ 
profiles in chat rooms and wait to be approached. The organisation is mired in controversy - 
California Judge, Dallas Holmes described the Perverted-Justice witness “odd”, “weird” and 
“repulsive” [Stokley, S., 2007], following the collapse of a trial. Former Dateline NBC 
(Dateline worked with Perverted-Justice to create the US TV show To Catch a Predator) 
producer Marsha Bartel alleged Perverted-Justice begged individuals to come to sting 
locations [Franklin, K., 2007]. The activities of Perverted-Justice are of such concern to some 
that they have led to the formation of Corrupted-Justice116 an organisation that researches and 
exposes the tactics of Perverted-Justice and works with attorneys and law enforcement.  
 
Mitchell et al [Mitchell, K., Wolak, J., & Finkelhor, D., 2005] found that police stings (rather 
than vigilante/media operations) generally matched genuine ‘real life’ grooming and result in 
high conviction rates. They feel these proactive investigations are beneficial and encourage 
policy makers to support them. dana boyd [sic] questions the value of these activities, noting 
that if you seek solicitation you will find it - most teens ignored any solicitation and were not 
bothered, considering it a ‘spam like’ annoyance [Lordan, T., Finkelhor, D., Ybarra, M., 
Lenhart, A., boyd, D., 2007]. Those children who are groomed are mostly sexual mature 
teenagers and willing (if misguided) participants in their grooming.  
 
DIFFICULTIES POSED TO RESEARCHERS 
The more mundane areas of online child protection such as the effectiveness of filtering can 
be tested using standard laboratory methods. People however, are the most significant 
                                                 
112
 http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?parentActiveTextDocId=1502057&ActiveTextDocId=1 
502059 (accessed on 01 June 2010). 
113
 http://www.crispthinking.com (10 Nov 2009). 
114
 The authors have asked to see information. 
115
 http://www.perverted-justice.com/ (10 Nov 2009). 
116
 http://corrupted-justice.com/about.html  (11 Nov 09). 
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component of this system and the most unreliable component of any system. To this extent an 
examination of the human factors and stakeholders is of primary importance.  
 
In order to gain a proper understanding of the problem it is essential to engage in stakeholder 
analysis, the most visible stakeholders in online child protection being the children, their 
parents, child abusers and service providers. Suitable access to two of these groups – children 
and child abusers – poses a challenge. 
 
Typically stakeholder analysis might include interviews, questionnaires and observing the 
stakeholders. The very nature of the subject means that some of these questions would be of a 
sexual and personal nature. For prepubescent children this is unethically and possibly illegal 
as it risks exposing them to sexual information beyond their understanding. It is likely post 
pubescent children will be sexual aware and better informed, however their parents may still 
object to them taking part. 
 
Child abusers and paedophiles are not going to participate unless they are already in the 
criminal justice system – as, to participate would likely involve admission of illegal activities. 
Young [Young, K., 2005] engaged 22 child sex offenders in forensic interviews. While her 
findings are not in dispute, the sample size is small, and questions must be asked about the 
motivations of those who took part. Those in the criminal justice system may lie during 
questioning, possibly being in denial, attempt to minimise or mitigate their guilt, or blame-
shift [Lanning, K., 2001]. Further, they may feint cooperation in order to curry favour with 
prison authorities. Consequently this reduces the value of any information obtained from 
them. 
 
The tabloid press reports paedophiles and child abusers with loathing and disgust [Moore, J., 
2008], and is only interested in regarding them as monsters that require punishment. A proper 
systems evaluation demands stepping back from knee-jerk rhetoric and ‘comfortable’ 
stereotypes to consider what factors maybe be influencing child abusers. Could the behaviour, 
albeit misguided, of children be a contributory factor? Experts [Lanning, K., 2001] have noted 
that society does not want to believe such things are possible. Whether tabloids drive or 
reflect public opinion - child abusers are a despised group. Some controversial subjects such 
as recreational drug use may find advocates among societal commentators, academics, or 
even a subset of society at large. Child abusers and paedophiles have no public advocacy117.  
 
Researchers who engage in any questioning of this status quo risk being labelled as unethical 
and playing into the hands of paedophiles. They may find colleges and organisations are 
unwilling to work with them for fear of reduced funding. One university even refused to 
publish a doctoral thesis. Much of this is believed to stem to fear of how an individual or 
organisation will be treated by the tabloid press [Newman, M., 2009].  
 
With academics and organisations working in fear of the tabloids, negative PR and public 
reaction, how can these difficult and sensitive subjects be properly examined? 
 
There are some researchers conducting serious research in the problem space including the 
Crimes Against Children Research Center118and danah boyd119 [sic]. Indeed their work on the 
Internet Safety Technical Taskforce (ISTTF) [Internet Safety Technical Taskforce, 2008] has 
                                                 
117
 Groups such as North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) and individuals such as 
Tom O’Carroll are advocates for child sexual liberation, but these are marginal and ostracised, with 
little or no public platform in the mainstream media. 
118
 http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/index.html (accessed 11 Nov 2009). 
119
 http://www.danah.org/ (accessed 11 Nov 2009). 
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drawn much public criticism from the Attorneys General120 (AG) of North Carolina and 
Pennsylvania [Jones, S., 2009]. The AG have in turn had their argument analysed and been 
thoroughly rebuked for political grandstanding and pandering to public fears [boyd, d., 2009], 
[Willard, N., 2009]. 
 
A system oriented meta-analysis is necessary to gain a full picture where the threat of 
negative PR hangs over researches. Government and law enforcement statistics, adolescent 
development, medical and psychological journals, parliamentary questions and testimony, and 
social commentary and opinion all provide sources that can be valuable. Researchers should 
always approach information with a critical eye, but this is especially important with 
government data, which maybe (possibly for political reasons) improperly reported, analysed 
or subject to withheld methodologies [Oates, J., 2009, 22 Sept], [Oates, J., 2009. 30 Sept]. 
 
DISCUSSION 
It is the opinion of the authors that online child protection is a poorly understood problem 
space. Industry is offering products, services and advice to protect children, these offer some 
degree of protection for prepubescent children who need shielding from accidental exposure 
and there own naivety. Older children who are actively seeking contact with strangers (in 
social networks and chat rooms) and discussing sex and relationships are entirely misjudged 
either through misunderstand or a wilful disregard of their behaviour in the ‘real world’. 
 
In order to deliver real improvements to child safety and not security theatre the industry must 
first understand the problem space. This understanding begins with the child. The Crimes 
Against Children Research Center conducted the Youth Internet Safety Survey (YISS-1) 
[Crimes Against Children Research Center, 2009] in 2000 and repeated it in 2005 (YISS-2). 
This was a nationally (US) representative sample of behaviour and victimisation of 10-17 
year olds on the Internet. With the rapidly changing nature of the Internet these surveys are 
becoming dated (Facebook was launched in 2004). Although the Internet is a global medium, 
do culture differences affect the risk i.e. would the results of the UK survey match those of 
the US? The UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS)121 a cross sector organisation 
investigating child safety online are investigating a survey of this type. 
 
The tired mantras about stranger danger and not divulging personal details are unrealistic and 
widely ignored. With this in mind what recommendations can be made to children? Wolak et 
al [Wolak, J., Finkelhor, D., & Mitchell, K., 2004] recommend a programme of education and 
awareness e.g. making children aware that those who seek sexual relationships with them 
probably do not have their best interests at heart. It must be recognised that adolescents will 
break some rules, they must be engaged with, and informed of the risks and dangers, they 
must also feel they can turn to parents (teachers and other responsible adults) if they do find 
themselves embroiled in solicitation, bullying or other harmful activity. Parents etcetera, must 
accept boundary testing and rule breaking are normal, and that their children will be involved 
in things they disapprove of. They must also understand that if the child is too scared to come 
forward under such circumstances things will likely get worse.  
 
Parents should continue to be vigilant for risk factors such as abuse, isolation, bullying, 
substance abuse, and self esteem issues etc, and take intervening action if necessary. It must 
also be recognised that some parents are negligent or ineffective. Safe Internet behaviour 
should be included in the education curriculum – tailored to the child’s age and sexual 
maturity. In the UK teachers are already trained to spot potentially troubling behaviours and 
have procedures in place to intervene where necessary. This training should be standardised 
and extended to include an understanding of Internet technologies and how these threats 
                                                 
120
 The position of a state Attorney General is political, the majority of Attorneys General are elected 
included all mention here. 
121
 http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/ukccis/index.cfm (accessed 12 Nov 2009). 
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(which are essentially the same as those children face offline) manifest themselves. Internet 
threats do not present the same immediate threat as those in the real world (a child is not at 
risk of physical harm unless they go and meet somebody) and the child should be encouraged 
to log off and inform an adult if they feel threatened. Today’s children are more ‘connected’ 
than ever before and this trend shows no sign of abating, as such adults should not dismiss a 
child’s complaint of online harassment with advice along the lines of “well turn the computer 
off and do something else”. This maybe adequate in the short term while issues are 
investigated, but in the mid- to longer term may have a detrimental effect on the child’s 
development and peer relationships. Communicating with strangers should be treated with 
caution but not proscribed. Parents and children should work together to devise rules on 
Internet communication. A strong parent-child relationship, where children understand the 
risks and are comfortable discussing them with parents, not authoritarian rules or technology 
will provide the greatest protection to children. 
 
The goal of the media is to maximise viewers/listeners/readers, a good way of doing this is 
sensational, mawkish, scare stories. Although it is highly implausible the media should be 
discouraged from reporting child protection in this fashion. 
 
Laws need to be in place to protect children but these laws must be based on evidence not 
subjective morality or a desire to appease, especially when there exists the very real risk such 
law might actually be harmful. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored online child protection from a systems perspective, describing how it 
became such a prominent subject and how its sensitivities pose challenges to research. Using 
systems thinking it has shown that conventional wisdom is misinformed about the dangers – 
sharing personal information on the Internet does not, in itself increase risk, and that some 
known risky activities such as discussing sex in chat rooms, have potentially unseen, 
beneficial side effects. Children, especially adolescents, the key stakeholder in the system, are 
poorly understood, advice given to them is outdated, unrealistic and likely to be ignored. 
Technology has a role to play particularly protecting younger children against accidental 
exposure to unwholesome content.  Filters can block access to undesirable material but the 
quality and reliability of filtering technology is limited. Here more aggressive blocking, with 
a higher false positive rate (over blocking) maybe acceptable, but the best protection for 
younger children is close supervision.  
 
The role of technology in protecting technological au fait, head strong teenagers is smaller. 
Even those without the technical proficiency to circumvent protection measures are still able 
to use a friend’s computer or public Internet terminal. Continuing to ignore the behaviour of 
teenagers and develop products, services and advice in absence of what is known about them 
will see under performing solutions and ill informed users – given either a false sense of 
security or inaccurate understanding of the real risks. Parents are probably most fearful of 
younger children being tricked into meeting, and then forcibly molested by paedophiles. 
Research indicates this scenario is extremely rare. Victims are overwhelmingly sexually 
mature teenagers who are seduced by attention and affection, and are aware their seducer is 
an older man. Adolescents and parents alike need to be educated and informed of real 
dangers, not mawkish, scare-mongering anecdotes from the media and other sources. 
 
Real life abuse, bullying, peer group isolation, substance and alcohol abuse, self esteem and 
confidence problems all increase the risk of being victimised on Internet. It is the authors’ 
belief that the foundation of child safety on the Internet is different for prepubescent and post 
pubescent children; prepubescent children are best protected with close supervision and 
oversight. The best way parents can protect post pubescent adolescents is by forming a close 
relationship with them, working with them to define rules, rather than dictating to them. 
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Parents should expect their child to, at least occasionally be ‘up to no good’, but with a strong 
trusting relationship in place the child will turn to the parent whenever they are upset or in 
trouble. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
This section will examine what has been learned from each of the pieces of work 
discussed in the main body, the author’s contribution to the body of knowledge, 
publications and reports and suggestions for furthering the state of the art. 
 
6.1 Identity Management 
More and more people are using the Internet for more and more services. Typically 
these services require a user to register and issue the user with login credentials – a 
username and password. This has two side effects – the users are saddled with a 
plethora of usernames and passwords and are regularly disclosing personal 
information to service providers. Faced with ever more login credentials users often 
succumb to password fatigue, employing insecure practices such as reusing 
credentials across multiple websites and services and writing down login credentials 
in clear text. Disclosing personal details to so many providers’ leaves users open to 
the nuisance of direct marketing campaigns and spam, as well as the risk of identity 
theft. 
 
These problems stem from the underlying nature of the Internet – it was never 
designed to support an identity system. Additional systems have been developed to 
support elements of identity, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for example is used for 
email encryption and SSL, usernames, passwords and sometimes hardware devices 
are used to authenticate users. Microsoft Passport, a single sign-on web commerce 
service, was the most notable attempt to address the problem but failed for reasons of 
privacy, trust and consumer buy-in. 
 
Federated identity management seeks to address this by having the user register with 
an identity provider. The identity provider would then attest the user’s identity to 
relying parties – websites and other service providers who would previously have 
required the user to register. This paradigm also places the user in control of their 
personal information; the user decides how much personal information the identity 
provider may reveal to the relying party. If the relying party demands too much 
personal information the user has the option to cancel and withdraw from the process. 
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In order to be successful a new identity metasystem needs to provide federation, login 
security, information security, user centricity and standardisation. 
 
Technically none of these elements are insurmountable; indeed standards and 
protocols exist to build a federated identity infrastructure. This has led to the adoption 
of identity management within the enterprise (user centricity being delegated to the 
organisation). 
 
The author has shown that whilst there exists no major technical obstacles, without a 
breakdown in Internet trust and security, the success of a consumer federated identity 
metasystem is unlikely. The enterprise is happy to pay for identity management – it 
simplifies user management and the enterprise is already liable for its data. The cost is 
offset by administrate savings. No business model exists in the consumer space.  
Consumers like functionality but are less interested in security and are unwilling to 
pay for services given a choice. Service providers (relying parties) will be resistant to 
losing the valuable marketing opportunities provided in personal details and sales 
tracking. Identity providers will face liabilities in the event of data loss and fraud but 
have no revenue stream. This will prevent an identity provider moving beyond the 
low value applications such as blogging that are currently supported. 
 
If the Internet were to see a breakdown of trust and security with a substantial 
percentage of transactions being fraudulent and leading to identity theft this could be 
the driver required to see a federated identity metasystem, perhaps being championed 
by the government or financial sector. Until such time the status quo will persist with 
a hardening of existing methods e.g. more complex password rules and increased use 
of OTPs. The author has published these findings on the future of identity and the J-
curve. 
 
While there is undoubted progress to be made in simplifying the process of federation 
and forming dynamic trusts, the big challenges are overcoming user apathy and 
developing a sustainable business model. The author feels this is dependent on the 
collapse of Internet trust and security, or a major industry and government push. 
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6.2 Text Analysis 
Education and recreation are seeing more children spending increasing amounts of 
time online. This frequently involves interaction with individuals neither they, nor 
their parents have met in the ‘real world’. The absence of this real world interaction 
makes it much more difficult to determine the identities of those individuals with 
whom children come in contact. The Internet offers a great deal of anonymity 
between users. 
 
The vast majority of people on the Internet, as in real life, present no harm to children; 
their contact will be beneficial or at least benign. A small minority of people do 
however pose a threat to children and the anonymity of the Internet reduces their risk 
of detection. 
 
The author has investigated the feasibility of detecting child grooming based on the 
content of Internet chat – interactions in email, chat rooms, IM, social networks and 
message boards. While semantics can be effective in the analysis of language, its 
efficacy is greatly reduced when language does not adhere to normal definitions i.e. 
where spelling, grammar and syntax do not follow rules. Informal lingo, slang and the 
deliberate use of misspelling and poor grammar (sometimes called ‘text speak’ and/or 
‘leet speak’) are a common feature of youth conversation. A statistical method can 
overcome the limits of the linguistic method, it has no ‘understanding’ of language, 
instead it analyses patterns.  
 
Statistical models need numerical data; this is generated by feature extraction - 
assigning numerical values to language characteristics. Trigram analysis for example 
is based on the frequency of trigram occurrence.  
 
Bayesian trigram analysis has been shown to be the most accurate classifier given the 
linguistic nature of online chat among children. The author attempted to establish if 
this method could be improved upon using a novel feature extraction method 
consisting of token vectors made multiple coefficients (multiple character strings) and 
Gaussian Mixture Models. 
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Around 80% of grooming is obvious with groomers being honest about their age and 
sexual intention. To test the classifier the author selected four texts Nineteen Eighty-
Four, The War of the Worlds, Fahrenheit 451 and On the Origin of Species. The first 
three books are broadly similar works of fiction, the latter a scholarly work of 
biology. In experiments On the Origin of Species was used to represent the blatant 
grooming, the assumption being this blatant grooming would be substantially 
different from regular chat as On the Origin of Species is substantially different from 
the other works. 
 
Assuming parents and children could easily spot the blatant grooming attempts, the 
real challenge is differentiating subtle grooming from normal chat. This challenge is 
essentially the same as successfully classifying the three fictional works. 
 
Experimental results showed the novel feature extraction/GMM method proved very 
unreliable and substantially inferior to Bayesian trigram analysis. 
 
The novel feature extraction/GMM process was computationally expensive and 
unreliable, with statistical expertise the process could be improved but the author 
doubts it would become the leading classifier of undisciplined Internet conversations. 
80% of grooming is blatant; the other subtler grooming is known to involve building a 
relationship by showing interest and affection. Showing interest and affection – 
dating, is normal teenage behaviour. Differentiation is very difficult if not impossible 
because the conversation content is essentially the same. Further work in this area is 
possible but the author feels it would not represent the best use of resources in the 
child protection ecosystem. 
 
6.3 Steganographed Custom Emoticons  
Instant messaging is one of the most popular online activities among children. The 
.NET Messenger Service often simply MSN is a popular IM platform with over 80 
million users in Europe. 
 
Emoticons are key sequences, images and animations that are used to add information 
content to text by expressing emotions that would be present in non-verbal 
communication if the conversation were taking place face-to-face. Simple ASCII 
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emoticons began to take-off in the early 1980s with the suggestion of using :) to 
express a joke or being happy. With the rise of rich media these have become small 
images and even animations. Many applications now intercept the keystrokes and 
display rich media emoticons. As well as having a default set of emoticons the .NET 
Messenger Service also supports the use of user generated custom emoticons. 
 
Steganography is the art of hiding information in plain sight, for example hidden 
writing with invisible ink. It is possible to steganograph digital images in a number of 
ways e.g. using the least significant bits of a noisy file. 
 
Using steganography techniques it is possible to make an ordinary image unique by 
changing the aRGB (alpha, red, green, blue) channels of a pixel. This subtle change is 
imperceptible to the human eye but readily detected with hashing functions. 
 
The author developed software to modify the aRGB values of a single pixel of a 
common emoticon to generate 625 emoticons that appeared identical to the human 
eye but were in fact unique. These emoticons can be loaded into any .NET Messenger 
Service client (the service is run on open protocols) that supports custom emoticons. 
 
Clients on the .NET Messenger Service do not transmit the emoticon images 
associated with default emoticons, only the key sequence is sent. Both the 
transmitting and receiving client show their local copy of the emoticon. Custom 
emoticons do not already exist at the receiver and so must be included with the key 
sequence. Custom emoticons are buried deep within the receiver’s file system – 
retrieving them is a non-trivial exercise. The emoticon transfer is handled as a drive-
by download, i.e. it is automated background activity requiring no action on the part 
of the receiver. 
 
A ‘steganographed’ custom emoticon can be used as a type of ‘digital fingerprint’ left 
on the computer of anyone who chats with a child. This can later be used by 
authorities as evidence that communications have taken place perhaps in a case of 
suspected child grooming. If the user saves and re-uses the custom emoticon, the act 
of loading it in the application changes the hash, meaning any attempt to imitate the 
original child (user) or spoof the emoticon is easily detected. 
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Internet criminals are detected using one of three methods, identification via IP 
address, disclosure of personal information that leads to real world identification, or 
they come to the attention of law enforcement by other methods. The hierarchical 
governed nature of public IP addresses (necessary for Internet use) means an 
individual can be easily traced to an ISP. UK ISPs are required to retain subscriber 
records for 12 months. 
 
Evading IP address identification is a trivial process that can be accomplished through 
numerous ways – proxies, onion routing, ‘anonymising’ services, ‘wardriving’, use of 
WiFi hotspots etc. Despite this simplicity many Internet criminals are caught through 
IP address identification. In the same vein, though it is possible to detect and delete 
the custom emoticons, or use a public terminal at a library or Internet café, many 
individuals will not bother, thereby preserving the unique custom emoticon on their 
computer.  
 
The system could be implemented in a number of ways. The author feels the best way 
would be to operate the system as a managed service. Parents would register with the 
service provider and download a custom client for the .NET Messenger Service. This 
client would contain the custom emoticon, the details of which would be recorded 
alongside the registration details held at the service provider. The custom emoticon 
could be automatically ‘pushed out’ (without the sender needing to manually invoke 
the custom emoticon) each time the child begins chatting with a new contact. Any 
emoticons recovered by authority could be compared against the service provider 
database. 
 
The concept has been shown to work and the technologies (digital imaging, hashing 
and the .NET Messenger Service) are mature. Further work developing the custom 
client and service could be a cheap and simple activity building on existing open 
source client. 
 
BT considered patenting the process, but instead decided to publish (prevent 
patentability) and allow anyone to develop the idea without royalty restrictions. 
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6.4 Online Child Protection 
During the author’s technical work relating to Internet child protection it became 
apparent that technological defences were only a small part of large complex issue. A 
problem ideally suited to systems analysis. 
 
The online child protection ecosystem contains much fear, uncertainty and doubt. 
Politicians, products and services providers and the media have ‘muddied the waters’ 
with alarmist anecdotes, selective reasoning and worst case scenarios. This combined 
with the sheer volume of information on the subject has left children, parents and 
society poorly informed about the nature of the issues at large. 
 
Systems theory teaches that no part of a complex system can be considered in a 
vacuum, the interfaces and interactions between subsystems and components must be 
taken into account. Human factors engineering reveals that people are the unreliable 
component in any mature system. Human behaviour and culture can easily upset 
strategy and development [111]. Systems developed without an appreciation of 
stakeholder requirements rarely achieve optimum performance. In order to understand 
and assess the problem, proper requirements capture and stakeholder analysis is 
essential. Many of the products, services and even advice around child Internet safety 
ignore the behaviour of children. 
 
Perhaps the single most significant consideration is the difference between 
prepubescent and post pubescent children. Prepubescent children are easier to protect 
– while they are more naïve they are naturally more dependent on their parents and 
readily accept close supervision and oversight. Post pubescent children, teenagers, are 
a more difficult demographic, at significantly more risk. Physically mature and 
sexually aware, they yearn for adult levels of independence and privacy, but lack 
psychological maturity and emotional control. They are likely to be headstrong, 
defiant, secretive and testing/dismissive of authority – these are normal 
developmental behaviours. Technically au fait children may even have the ability to 
circumvent any technological measures; others may bypass them by using a friend’s 
computer or public terminal. 
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Children face three primary risks online, solicitation, exposure to unwanted content 
and bullying. Solicitation typically comes in the form of a crude comment in a 
conversation; the vast majority of children adeptly handled the incident and suffered 
no negative effects from it. Unwanted content is not just limited to pornography; it 
can also include violent content, bigotry and the promotion of illegal activities such as 
criminal skills and drug use. As with solicitation the majority of children were 
unbothered by exposure to unwanted content. It is not uncommon for teenage boys in 
particular to actively seek this type of content. Cyberbullying is a poorly understood, 
poorly defined problem. It is thought a significant minority of children are involved 
either as bully, victim or both. The effects, both immediately and in the long term, 
may be more severe than real world bullying. With ever more devices connected and 
always online, combined with more peer group interaction online, cyberbullying is 
increasingly difficult to escape. Victims of bullying are also at greater risk of other 
forms of Internet victimisation. 
 
There is no such thing as a typical child abuser, their motivations, methods, 
socioeconomic status etc can’t be discreetly categorised, they fall along a continuum. 
The vast majority of child abuse takes place within the family or at the hands of 
someone known to the child. Child Internet groomers are typically honest and open 
about their ages and sexual intent; the majority of victims who meet groomers in real 
life know they are meeting an older man for sex. Grooming typically revolves around 
showing the victim affection and taking an interest in them. Abduction and forcible 
rape are extremely rare. Victims often refuse to help authorities, citing strong 
emotional feelings towards their abuser. Children who are already abused, neglected, 
bullied, depressed, suffering peer group isolation or otherwise psychologically 
troubled are at greater risk of becoming the victims of Internet initiated sex crimes. 
They are often active, even enthusiastic participants in their own abuse.  
 
The government needs to be clear about the dangers online and back a concise safety 
message grounded in the realistic known behaviours of children. ThinkUKnow is by 
and large an excellent source of information, but risks being undermined by CEOP’s 
and the government’s media agenda. Good advice and good legislation is based on 
evidence, not untested ideas, anecdotes and subjective morality. Posting personal 
information and photos on the public Internet may not be a good idea, but there is no 
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evidence that child abusers are ‘data mining’ this information in the search for 
victims. People may find computer generated (artificial) child pornography repugnant 
but there is the possibility that it makes children safer by providing paedophiles 
catharsis.  
 
Education provides the best, most cost effective way to protect children on the 
Internet. ThinkUKnow is generally an excellent resource with age appropriate material 
but its’ message needs to be pushed out through schools perhaps featuring role play to 
help guide children in case they are solicited, bullied or exposed to unwanted content. 
Education should not be limited to children; parents cannot be dismissive or fearful of 
technology because just they don’t understand it. A simple, high level overview need 
not be technical but would help the parents establish a common ground and engage in 
dialogue with their children. It will help them to understand the environment, the 
appeal, the benefits and the risk. Such education should also be mandatory for 
teachers and social workers. 
 
A small but not insignificant number of children are bothered by solicitation and 
unwanted exposure to harmful content, this is more likely if the solicitation is 
persistent and aggressive and the content is explicit and depicts pain. This may be 
exacerbated if the child is going through puberty, becoming sexually aware but not 
fully able to comprehend the situation. In addition to covering such scenarios in 
education, the child needs a strong, supportive and understanding parental 
relationship. 
 
Some degree of boundary testing and ‘getting up to no good’ is to be expected from 
teenagers, however if they become involved in a situation they are unable to handle 
they must feel able to turn to a parent or other responsible adult. In the absence of this 
they may worsen the situation because of feelings of isolation or fear of excessive 
punishment. 
 
Some children will always suffer abuse, solicitation, bullying and exposure to 
unwanted content. Technology can provide a measure of protection, especially 
protecting younger more naïve children from exposure to harmful content. It is less 
beneficial at protecting older children. The child-parent relationship is important at all 
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age levels, younger children need supervision, older children need support and trust. 
The Internet is now a major factor in both the education and leisure of children, 
parents need to understand to the ‘basics’ in order to be properly involved in their 
child’s development. Parents would also benefit from properly understanding the risks 
involved in child Internet use and understand that alarming media anecdotes are news 
worthy because of their rarity. 
 
Online child protection is an enormously broad subject covering technology, 
psychology, sociology and behaviour, legislation and civil liberties. Most people have 
an opinion and many hold strong beliefs. Internet child protection is never far from 
the headlines. Yet much of what people believe - the generally accepted view - is an 
inaccurate representation of the facts. The author has shown the subject is too 
complex to properly address solely at the subsystem level and that focusing on an 
individual variables at the expense of the whole is inefficient and retards progress. 
 
Further work should involve thought leaders asking serious questions about security 
theatre and the real value of measures legal, technical and social used to protect 
children. A broad survey similar to YISS needs to be performed to understand how 
children in the UK are using the Internet and what dangers they have encountered. A 
syllabus which educates and engages children, but which also understands their 
behaviour, needs to be developed. Training complimentary to this syllabus needs to be 
developed for teachers, social workers and parents, not only covering the technology 
but realistically portraying the issues – the risks and how their children’s behaviour 
contributes to this. 
 
Social scientists need to work to define common metrics so that research can be 
meaningfully compared. They also need to work with industry to show that while 
products and services meet technical requirements, they do not necessarily meet user 
requires or address user behaviour. 
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8. APPENDIX A – TERMINOLOGY 
 
Bayesian refers to a statistical method to determine probability. 
 
Chat a blanket term that describes real-time Internet communication, this includes 
IM, IRC, SNS chat functions etc. 
 
Gaussian Mixture Model a clustering technique used in statistical probability. 
 
Emoticons aka smileys graphical representations of emotions e.g. happy, sad, 
confused, embarrassed. 
 
Microsoft Network (MSN) a blanket term that may refer to the chat service, the 
protocol (underlying the chat service) or the application(s) i.e. the user interface to the 
chat service. 
 
Identity Provider (IdP) an authority where users register their details, the IdP then 
provides credentials and attests to the user’s identity to relying parties. 
 
Instant Messaging (IM) a form of two-way communication between two or more 
individuals conducted in real-time. Traditionally text based, many instant messaging 
platforms provide support for audio and video. 
 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) a form of Internet chat based around channels, similar to 
chat room is supports group chat or one-to-one communication. 
 
Relying Party (RP) a website, service, platform or application that accepts a users 
identity based on assurances from a IdP rather than collecting and managing user 
details itself. 
 
Social Network Site (SNS) a platform that allows users to publish content in the form 
of a profile, typically mood/status, images, video and links. They user can choose to 
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make the profile public, visible only to approved users (friends) or somewhere in 
between. 
 
Token a unit of data created from features extracted from text. Tokens can be used to 
train a model or classified (tested against a model). 
 
User Centric an ethos or approach that places the user in control of how their 
personal data is used. 
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9. APPENDIX B – RISKS AND SAFETY ON THE INTERNET 
In the main body of the thesis the author calls for a broad survey of UK children 
similar to the US YISS project.  
 
Since completing this work the author has become aware of the EU Kids Online 
project a trans -European project that surveyed 23,420 children across 25 countries 
[1]. 
 
The report broadly reflects the findings of this thesis, with one key difference – the 
problem of cyberbullying. EU Kids Online found that 19% of children had engaged in 
bullying in the past 12 months, 5% report being bullied on a weekly basis. Of the 5% 
who have been bullied online 57% were very upset or fairly upset, however 94% got 
over the bullying immediately or within a few days. 
 
Given the currency, sample size and methodology of the EU Kids Online project the 
author recognises this is probably more representative of state of cyberbullying in the 
UK. 
 
 
[1] S. Livingstone, L. Haddon, A. Gorzig and K. Olafsson. (2010, 21 October). Risks 
and safety on the internet - EU kids online. EU / LSE. [Online]. Available: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/EUKidsOnline/EUKidsII%20%282009-
11%29/Survey/Survey%20documents.aspx 
  
174 
 
10. APPENDIX C – FLOWCHARTS 
 
The following flowcharts were created as part of the software engineering process and 
describe how the applications work. 
 
10.1 Text Analysis 
 
Open text 
source file
End of File?
wordCount = 
15000?
wordCount=0
Create 5000 
word training set
Create 500 word 
test set
Start
End
CreateDataSet
Split the source text e.g. Darwin into a single 
15,000 word training set and multiple 500 word 
test sets.
N
Y
N
Y
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All tokens 
analysed?
Start
End
Percent
Determine the frequency, as a percentage of 
each token
N
Y
tokenPercent = 
tokenFrequency/
totalNumberToken 
* 100
Record 
tokenPercent
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10.2 Steganographed Custom Emotions 
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11. APPENDIX D - CUSTOM EMOTICON CHANGE – 
EXPERIMENT LOG 
 
Original Source Emoticon: Baring_teeth_smiley.png 
Manufactured 
File 
name Hash Colour 
1.png abbd77ad7b06513172c1c58e8086e5e4 [A=1,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
2.png e891351cf88b0f115ef5c66ce7a9fde4 [A=2,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
3.png 00fb459af4ef96ed36acc10f54346643 [A=3,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
4.png 46bb1f29fc247fc090a0fc23d5c8ea05 [A=4,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
5.png c401d91c6de43a2a254f8223db412468 [A=5,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
6.png 2ff95002bb5b1aedda0cc71d2950fff4 [A=6,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
7.png 2c1e17ec897242e708c3379714e28c96 [A=7,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
8.png cb4fe8a3630eb8416736a8ec399567a7 [A=8,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
9.png ba60adff743e9cf956e38a2b0f85e618 [A=9,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
10.png 212570f504760ebcbd49400a07659741 [A=10,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
11.png de4739e58b347613346352ad44b46bbc [A=11,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
12.png d679442dee61de6d6a979bd011e233fd [A=12,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
13.png 81403885e9191cc41c7ea6970e7085fd [A=13,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
14.png 743c50c297d980ce0cccf19889148e14 [A=14,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
15.png cd19dc374bb4b5a66ff89865da20f50d [A=15,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
16.png b962c04ddeb74ba98562ef84b383dcfc [A=16,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
17.png 85f535dc8cdf3f825deda497490bf013 [A=17,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
18.png 5babc08c45fcb6215f8bda2e5f426ff4 [A=18,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
19.png d5207f586e3c6758657e26894c0bd030 [A=19,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
20.png 96a86399862d3842de198b89405d2b0f [A=20,R=1,G=1,B=1] 
250.png 55a303df5253f22fc6f6ad94f71b4d10 [A=255,R=2,G=5,B=5] 
251.png 4270c7716bdddd23c3703e3e4b69a45b [A=255,R=3,G=1,B=1] 
 
Sent from source - Received at first hop 
Filename Hash Colour 
XZ9Ot0TmxdtD8FVKdCzBjlqZ5MM= abca826720df868d736f9e805af5a0ea [A=1,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
S0haOruopUs61SxoHb9e0SypyOA= 513540dac8184ab6e9adbb0c12efedcb [A=2,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
iW26K6M5v3siMBTQs+TGfx3TCSg= 138e4f0c180827e123f4c810524d9eb2 [A=3,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
wa+6L+YRj9+cyZYMu6r2FCo+3bvI= 8923b51d404481ec7699a3ad71531767 [A=4,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
YC82Fr0uMPPkNwxLzarQE7ul1BYI= ca321ec838da004eab31f2381ff59ee5 [A=5,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
+152b1+uAQqZpcB5twyp69wFKKc= bde77fbbd7fce0ac6226945e78d643ef [A=6,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
fi3eBVjJVr04yKOUFuTo6tUUDlQ= 82214c7050defd6ecbc8d8b52e6f175d [A=7,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
n+jK+kCmD+jVkAgT0mq0qbPccNE= ba0e1ce87bbc5ac43a199ba9cac68eaf [A=8,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
0uOqkPfD7Qk8gjmgyph+gOhUNTk= d308765676fee3b7b0251857c5205b2d [A=9,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
JrYMt2IRJI2YfJ8w59MDW2FEXb+Y= 31e8bce24d9429599a33c29fd3e09db6 [A=10,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
zu33HVQYRHOJysJKEADwfc8wQ9Q= 47460cf43c8727ceb568820e6f8b1f40 [A=11,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
73lDU0LrwA6HBSqR472RSMh0vD4= fb35e42fb357a94a4e6f6aa337d896a3 [A=12,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
2QLZz2n1GYUNebyEpqNgAkLTAeo= e26ca8b51d3ad485baaf0e9cecce42d7 [A=13,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
3RCgylSpqWP4dRniziBXYfN5l8A= f785c8dcd09acecbc5734f002914987d [A=14,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
FYUYQEeeB2F2VUQkWx2FZWgY2FpZps= ad25d8b8141ed3478304190b5c9d230b [A=15,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
Ea9SlCOVLabBovoXrvp+aFQKdoM= 38166709276e4be3b20632244e552a53 [A=16,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
YUjacEZEkgXho4Glkk2Fz40UgWk= 7f960362080863065825476b17898908 [A=17,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
jJFtLvblSFwOTVja5TJqS5vHJ5I= 95b3710ff12fcc4f7bb64dc9f6f7ca73 [A=18,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
LERqMKWlIJR2Y9LpKzXaVvG42FeA= a0c872cfa7dcf7b25d43b2c4db80c046 [A=19,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
O1G2FsKjA9IpjU0w407ouiy+fck0= ad9e52fdfea193b30e22316589ef5450 [A=20,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
xoSBwJd5hg6o2FU66mQmqb64w58k=   a68f44f1f022123bdc5225f96ee7a44c   [A=255,R=2,G=5,B=5] 
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20fyZYlfgY9JTxYVYUHhAQCrVOc=   0a87129822022c25a3f95525b07a4fd0   [A=255,R=3,G=1,B=1] 
 
Recovered at first hop - Sent to 3rd Party (received at 3rd Party) 
File name Hash Colour 
8+srWWpU1k9kienyGg9qL2F1RWqY= 8dbee777d14ff11e224090ff51d0bba9 [A=1,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
AHDhk87Dg7A2FFeZhZAhFzNzUj3w= 768307fa221a1942d977198f4ec205de [A=2,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
NLn5sPdrphC2GP427HLP0fyeS6I= 05fcd23456b5e78f3c788979b37104bc [A=3,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
36wrw7N35WJnQOsLZXomYDVhIUU= 5277a9690127b53dc69555344b2bc798 [A=4,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
y8KcHIF4oZBe1E2Fw8dfGRQ+PZm8= 7fe754185e61654f868583630b69988a [A=5,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
JVobDgMA4H44hZex+vEDTyZXmcc= 3461579fed83497abce017195f2cd292 [A=6,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
UCdz+w2kqctb7ecHSGnPDaDP4Ts= 4b9d37dcd0ce5ea83162b126712da6c8 [A=7,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
2fv7IbcHig1z4PA386TbTMzoWqg= 4d10044ae49a5de7a6260f7189502014 [A=8,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
OAea4rJBht7gk0oVCFxjW7rJ2FyE= ce19061009c2eb944c045e369aad3e67 [A=9,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
LKH0LMFg816WU9GN4DXWmOdsoOE= e31f6df201a10c4c7390e1f16bce51fc [A=10,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
FgWPdHCOZfgcXQlJX5mctdlKNpM= 6aa8596ed9e90404a50dd8996d600c44 [A=11,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
Dr7+f7inzbz90bvLhVPK33fKX9U= dabf089242c8b2e1bf25d3b7de5b68e6 [A=12,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
v0ZTEjnFj79lnN2FZ1QJAMXKE0kk= 4e453bafa29e259f3f8e1ec10ded6c6e [A=13,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
Fh8EBabzoi5J6sHdzlO1jUzFig0= c5f9592a287217fd2da321b34372c71c [A=14,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
miWUOqxl42jXek0j0j8VIc7A3vg= 35a696257622f1acc119d02a3d510e4d [A=15,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
gK4Iev2GfFGZR2X9KtEAND2Fo8I4= 1dd0e522ded24235ec10b236a956d457 [A=16,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
P785in2FyWZL99l2k+4xa5mZremY= 8c854b8cc19f98780545f04bad4eb758 [A=17,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
MHeJxhbH0B9w7KMq36VB+EKeVow= 53a32b7fd099cc9d6b8833fcf38abc80 [A=18,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
W64bKxFjV8CkeY7TB3SUEe35Cr8=  33270e99599b6179137e1748e415752a [A=19,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
c9tFBRx7oP+ZtKhMc+zVgoFuqxo= 720174dcb239f1bea8aa1827e7244e17 [A=20,R=0,G=0,B=0] 
3IO8+WnbddXcpb0LQSyyx2F5GsIU=  7d9f82ddb7a2cffededebd4948642e0f   [A=255,R=2,G=5,B=5] 
fQnVoyI6PYcw8gL9DCfO2FUO4660=   97f8f4c9bdf68944716e17bc859e7ca0  [A=255,R=3,G=1,B=1] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
